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28 January 1985

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DANGER SEEN FOR ICELAND IN NORDIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 26 Nov 84 p 5

[Article by Jacob Andersen]

[Text] Iceland will come under even more pressure if a nuclear-free Nordic zone is established without Iceland, according to prominent Icelandic politicians.

"I do not believe many Nordic politicians understand Iceland's special position. I heard a Danish member of parliament say: 'We cannot include Iceland in discussions concerning a nuclear-free zone. After all, we cannot even afford to travel up there.'

This was stated by one of the leaders of the influential Icelandic Progressive Party, Gudmundur Thorarinsson. It was Thorarinsson who spoke for Iceland at the major conference last week at Christiansborg on the chances of creating a nuclear-free Nordic zone. Among the controversial topics was precisely the role of Iceland in a future zone arrangement.

"It is significant that the debate over the role of the Baltic Sea has been given a prominent position, while the role of the North Sea is seldom mentioned. This is not because nuclear weapons in the Baltic Sea are more dangerous in general, but because they are more dangerous to Denmark and Sweden," Thorarinsson said.

He said that he and the majority of the Icelandic population are extremely positive toward removing nuclear weapons from the Nordic region once and for all. The reason is that this would remove some of the reasons for a possible attack, but also because it would be a positive symbol at a time when the process of reducing tension has come to a halt.

"But Iceland must be included. Otherwise we will be under more pressure. I know that there is talk about starting with the Scandinavian countries and later bringing in the northwestern islands. But what is the argument against including us from the beginning?"

So far, none of the parties in the Nordic countries that support the idea of a zone have stated openly that Iceland should have to wait. In the appeal for

the weekend conference that was written primarily by the representatives of the Nordic Social Democrats, however, it was stated that the zone would "consist primarily of the territories of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden." A subsequent paragraph stated politely that "the zone also should be open to Iceland."

Several promoters of the conference told INFORMATION that it could be difficult to include Iceland in the first round and that conflicts over this issue were possible.

Icelandic representatives at the conference expressed openly their disappointment that their resolution on the necessity of reducing tensions in the North Atlantic was not brought to a vote. This decision was made because of a lack of time by the conference leadership. Iceland was not asked to be part of this leadership.

A Troublesome Island

There are several reasons why the Scandinavian parties want to leave Iceland out during the initial round.

One reason is that the sea between the Nordic countries and Iceland does not belong to the territorial waters of the Nordic countries, but is free and open to all ships, including those of the nuclear powers.

If Iceland is included, the Nordic zone will be discontinuous geographically.

More importantly, the North Atlantic is a kind of "Mediterranean Sea" between the United States and the Soviet Union, which gives it unique strategic significance. Most of the nuclear-armed submarines of the superpowers are in this area. The same is true of half of all the more important war ships.

Iceland's location in this bullseye has created extremely strong ties between the United States and Iceland which, for this same reason, has been called a kind of American Kola Peninsula.

To this, Thorarinsson said:

"We do not deny that there are problems. There are many. One is that the zone would be divided into two geographic regions. It could almost be said that if we are genuinely in the North Atlantic, then where would a zone not be possible?"

"But the problems are not insurmountable as long as we limit ourselves to declaring the Nordic countries free of warheads and nuclear-powered vessels. This has been the main thrust, for example here at the conference. Iceland has no nuclear weapons, nor do we want any. On the other hand, we do have communications equipment that plays an important role in nuclear strategy."

N-Weapons In Sea

The zone debate is a good opportunity for Iceland to publicize the growing concentration of nuclear weapons in the sea.

"It is important to mainland Europeans to remove the nuclear weapons from the land. They argue that the more nuclear weapons deployed in the sea, the better. Nuclear submarines guarantee that the side that is attacked will be able to respond with nuclear weapons. As a result, they are vital to the strategy of deterrence, it is argued. They should not expect great enthusiasm from us on this point, however. After all, we live in the sea."

Fish Exports

If you support the zone strategy, you must also accept the fact that zones have boundaries. It follows, unavoidably, that countries on the other side of these boundaries will come under increased pressure.

"That is an interesting problem, but our situation is unique. The growing concentration of nuclear weapons actually threatens the existence of Iceland, even if they are not used. The danger of accidents such as collisions increases. Radioactive waste also can cause problems: 75 percent of our exports consist of fish. If no one wants to buy the fish, we cannot survive in Iceland," Thorarinsson answered.

"In addition, there is the danger of war. A high-ranking NATO officer who did not know I was an Icelander once told me that the first nuclear bomb probably would be dropped in the North Atlantic. After all, this is far enough away from the United States and the Soviet Union, while at the same time it would show the Russians that 'we mean business,' as he stated it."

"NATO believes that if war breaks out in Europe, then Europe could last no longer than 2 weeks without American reinforcements. Reinforcements will come by ship across the Atlantic. That is the only possibility when such large numbers are involved," Gudmundur Thorarinsson said.

"This should cause Europeans to see the situation more from an Icelandic perspective."

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FORDE PLEDGES CONTINUING FIGHT FOR NORDIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 12 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Ingolf Hakon Teigene]

[Text] Despite security policy agreements, the Norwegian government is simply an appendage to Reagan in NATO, according to the prominent Labor Party member, Einar Forde.

Oslo, December--"Realistically, if we establish a nuclear-free Nordic zone, we must count on a battle in NATO," according to the deputy chairman of the Norwegian Labor Party, Einar Forde. He believes it is possible, however, for the concept of a zone to gain acceptance within the alliance. He believes it is important for NATO headquarters to understand that a zone would not mean a break with the alliance.

According to Forde, "at the present time" the Labor Party does not want to follow the example of the Danish Social Democrats and work toward a unilateral declaration stating that Norway would be nuclear-free in war and peace. But he would not "rule out the possibility of such unilateral resolutions in parliament." That could occur if the situation became desparate, if we felt that we had run into a brick wall, and that the situation was at a complete deadlock.

Forde indicated that the Labor Party would conduct a far more active disarmament policy if it won the elections next fall, even though that would provoke criticism within NATO. "We know that would be unpleasant, but we are prepared to endure that unpleasantness," Forde said.

Activist

The 41 year old Forde has been in parliament since 1969, when he was elected from Oslo as spokesman for the youth organization of the Labor Party. He has been an active NATO opponent and an activist in the work against the military dictatorship in Greece and against the United States' war in Vietnam.

Forde also was one of the most prominent opponents of Norwegian membership in the EC--in conflict with the official party line. After the EC battle, many believed that Forde would follow his leftist oriented friends out of the party

and join the newly founded Socialist Election Alliance, which later became the Socialist Left Party (SV). Forde remained in the party, however, and he worked his way toward the top. He became a cabinet minister in 1979 and 2 years ago at the party congress he was elected deputy chairman.

Forde is a typical intellectual politician. It has been stated as a point against him that he practically went directly from the university to parliament. But he is representative of the new generation of Social Democratic voters and politicians--people with solid education and high positions.

Few would dispute that he is one of the most highly motivated debators and feared polemicists in Norwegian politics.

Bloc-Free Europe

Although Forde no longer votes with the Socialist Left Party, whenever it is proposed that Norway withdraw from NATO, it becomes clear that he has retained his vision of a bloc-free Europe.

"If John Lyng (the late liberal politician who was the leader of the Conservative Party and Norwegian foreign minister from 1965 to 1969) could think this thought, we must also think it: There is no lasting security for Europe as long as our continent is artificially divided. In the long run, our goal must be to replace the present blocs with other security arrangements," Forde said.

His reflections over the possibilities of security in Norway and other Nordic countries are placed within a broader European context.

"Recent years have given us a completely different and more alert European consciousness. Of course, we are happy to see that the United States and the Soviet Union will meet in January to resume negotiations on arms control. But expectations in Europe are extremely low. Personally, I believe talks could begin on space weapons, on continuing the SALT II process, and perhaps on mutual troop reductions in Europe (the so-called MBFR negotiations in Vienna)."

"In this situation, I have noticed a growing interest in returning to detente, to a genuine reduction in tensions. In today's chilly climate, there is no other way for Europe to go. We must break the ice, expand the range of contacts between East and West, conduct talks, and strengthen trade contacts. We have so much of substance to discuss with the small countries of Eastern Europe. If you travel around divided Europe, you will notice how incredibly similar people in the various countries feel toward their respective superpower. This climate in Europe contains the possibility of initiatives that could lead us away from the Cold War and its most serious effects.

New Generation

In 1979 Forde was a member of the government that, in December of that year, decided to support in Brussels the deployment of new medium-range missiles

in Western Europe. Personally, he was against that decision. Four years later the entire Labor Party group in parliament voted against deployment and, thus, against what the party's own government had supported previously.

What was the most important thing that occurred during those years?

"First of all, we must remember that there was a parallel development in most of the Western Social Democratic Parties and that it was a development that coincided with the arrival of a new generation of security policy experts in these parties. The Social Democrats within NATO began to talk among themselves and this gave them strength to change the process that was occurring."

"Politically, the general trend in relations between East and West was extremely important. Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980. Many of us had held various meetings with the Reagan administration's people before they came to power. We knew they were rather indifferent toward arms control and disarmament."

Role Of Peace Movement

What significance do you attribute to the broad popular movements that arose?

"There is no reason to hide the fact that the peace movements have played an extremely important role as a driving force. It can be said that the peace movements have done much of the heavy work. We, ourselves, have done the fine polishing and the laborious shaping of concrete political positions. I would characterize our relationship to the Norwegian peace movement as good and fruitful."

What relations should exist between the movement and a dominant Labor Party?

"Let me answer this in the following manner: I recently had a meeting with the leadership of No to Nuclear Weapons. I warned them that they should be careful not to let their slogans and demands coincide too closely with the policies of the Labor Party. The peace movement has mobilized opinion. It has given knowledge to the public and has created a well-informed counter-expertise that has helped the politicians, among others. The fact that we disagree on certain points, such as the strategy for establishing a nuclear-free zone, is only healthy. It is important, as the peace movement is doing, to create breadth in the debate. I believe that the tension that arises in this connection is fruitful rather than troublesome."

"Let me also praise No to Nuclear Weapons in Norway on another important matter: In recent years the movement has been challenged to take a clear position on the nuclear buildup and suppression of peace activists in Eastern Europe. This challenge was met in an exemplary fashion in that No to Nuclear Weapons approved new slogans on this topic for their demonstrations earlier this fall."

Settlement

This fall the Labor Party reached a security policy settlement with the non-socialist government.

Can you understand the criticism that has been directed against this broad settlement: that it covers up differences and puts a lid on the debate?

"No, I cannot understand it. The parliamentary report on disarmament and security is not primarily a settlement. It is a new joint basis for active disarmament policies. I believe that the positive aspects of the report are far more striking."

What positive aspects?

"First of all, it is the Conservative Party that gave in the most. If you look at the document from the government that was the starting point for the process that finally led to the report, you will see that the Conservatives rejected a nuclear-free zone, the idea of a freeze, and any possibility of debate on NATO's first-strike strategy. In the report, they accepted in principle our position on all these questions. In my opinion, this report moved the center of gravity in Norwegian security policy several steps to the left."

Internal Struggle Damaging

"Secondly, I would like to warn against the idea that agreement on security policy is suspect. A small country cannot live with internal disputes over security and foreign policy for a long time without creating problems. Before the report was issued, we were on the verge of a governmental crisis for 3 years. That is an unfortunate situation."

But we saw that the report could not stand up against political reality. When Parliament took up Norway's position on the freeze proposal at the United Nations, parliament split down the middle again. Is there, in reality, anything left of the report?

"I must admit that I am more uncertain now about the conclusions drawn from the report by the government. It is also clear that, on some points, the report is a compromise and some clarifications may be needed."

"But if we take the freeze resolution as an example, it remains a fact that the government went to the Swedes concerning this matter to get the Swedish-Mexican proposal changed so that Norway could vote for it. Two years ago such an initiative would have been unthinkable."

"On the other hand, I would not hesitate to call the present Norwegian government the least active in NATO. It is so passive that it is difficult to call our government anything but an appendage of Reagan. But OK, I am willing to give them more time to see if the language in the report leads to any results. I now expect the government to explain the position of Norwegian public opinion

to NATO and to take concrete initiatives within the alliance to show that the unity expressed in the report is serious."

Moratorium And Corridor

In which areas is it particularly urgent that we begin?

"We are not yet finished with the question of Europe as a nuclear hostage. For this reason, a moratorium on the deployment of Euromissiles remains at the top of our agenda. The same is true of an initiative against the deployment of cruise missiles on ships and planes. There is a forest of missiles surrounding us. When it comes to a moratorium, however, I am prepared for a confrontation with the government, unless Reagan proposes one himself."

"Another important area is the question of a nuclear-free corridor in Europe. In many ways, the tactical nuclear weapons are the most dangerous. Prominent NATO circles are planning not only a reduction of their number, but also a modernization of these weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons are playing a greater role in the Soviet arms buildup. This debate has not even begun in Norway. In the report from parliament, however, the coalition parties agreed to language on such a corridor which, in practice, supports the findings of the Palme Commission. Here, too, I see the possibility of confrontation here in Norway, since a strong effort will certainly be needed in NATO. But I believe that this is extremely important: although I am a strong supporter of a Nordic zone, I believe that a nuclear-free corridor through Europe is more important, since this would involve the removal of weapons.

Nordic Zone

Obviously, a third question is a nuclear-free Nordic zone. Can you honestly say that the policies of the Labor Party and of the Nordic Social Democrats are totally clear on this issue?

"Of course, there is still a lack of clarity. It is also clear that the various Nordic countries have differing degrees of emphasis on the matter. What is clear is that the Labor Party, if we are able to form a government, will take the initiative and speed up the process. We believe that the parliamentary report opens the door to such initiatives. But the position of the Norwegian government seems to be that it cannot accept some positive statements and its goal is to do as little as possible."

Battle With NATO

Is it not true that such a zone would be difficult to establish without some kind of battle within NATO?

"I believe that is correct. To be sure, the zone concept has ripened since it was revived in the Nordic debate 3 or 4 years ago. At that time, our own foreign minister, Knut Frydenlund, traveled to Washington where the proposal was rejected out of hand by Secretary of State Alexander Haig. I believe the idea will ripen further. We must take time to explain to the people in

Brussels and in Washington that a zone would not be a break with NATO. But if we establish a nuclear-free Nordic zone, we must be realistic enough to anticipate a battle in NATO. Of course, we must not have exaggerated ideas about the importance of small countries. On the other hand, we must remember that we have a voice in NATO--a voice that will be heard."

No to Nuclear Weapons has demanded that parliament declare Norway to be nuclear-free in war and peace. The Danish Social Democrats have approved a similar resolution. Why does the Labor Party hesitate to take such a position?

Unilateral Steps Inappropriate

"Ultimately, our understanding of a zone is a declaration of freedom from nuclear arms. The question is whether or not the road to such a zone begins with legislation in parliament to this effect. At present, I do not believe so. That would create a confrontation with NATO that we do not wish to take on at present. I see no purpose in playing that card just now."

But does this rule out such a move later?

"I would not rule out the possibility of such unilateral resolutions in parliament, but that would require a desperate situation. That could occur if we felt we had run into a brick wall, that the situation was completely deadlocked, and that we needed to scream. But as a strategy for establishing a nuclear-free zone, I cannot now recommend such a recommendation."

Are you afraid that a future Labor Party government would have the same difficulties in NATO that Denmark has had and that we would be ridiculed as an unimportant country?

"I believe that calling Denmark an unimportant country is extremely unkind and I do not believe that the Norwegian government treats Denmark with such contempt. But we understand that it is an extremely difficult task to conduct a more active disarmament policy within NATO. We know it can be unpleasant, but we are prepared to accept this unpleasantness. It is not just campaign rhetoric to say that the Labor Party leadership has spent much time on these questions. We have taken precise political stands and we now understand this subject. This is necessary, because we will be sailing in difficult waters."

Treholt Affair

The court case against Arne Treholt will begin this spring. Do you believe that this will have a negative effect on the credibility of the Labor Party on security issues?

"Because of my friendship with Treholt, I am perhaps not the one to ask about that. But I believe that there is less reason to believe that this will be a problem for us now than was the case during the first hectic weeks after his arrest."

"The politicians in the governmental parties also have been extremely fair on this issue and have not attempted to misuse it. Let it be said, however, that this is not a question of Arne Treholt's role as a Labor Party politician. But we can never be sure about what effect this case will have on public opinion. This matter also has all the unpredictability of any court case."

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REFORM OF ANOMALIES, ABUSES IN SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM OVERDUE

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 30 Nov 84 p 1

[Commentary by Michael Jungblut: "The Social-Welfare State Turns Into a Juggernaut--Our Welfare System Is a Dud"]

[Text] His name was Bluem, not Hercules, replied the man in charge of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in Bonn at one time when, at the beginning of his tenure, he was besieged with questions as to when and how he planned to tackle the many tasks awaiting him there. Since then Norbert Bluem has been waging a courageous but also fairly solitary struggle to maintain the viability of the social welfare system in the Federal Republic. In this respect, at least, he does resemble Hercules fighting Hydra, that mythical being which always grew two new heads as soon as one was cut off.

No sooner does social security become economically manageable again for the time being than the dire news arrives that the insurance carriers will have to take up a loan to enable them to make the pension payments. At the same time it becomes necessary once again to curb the vast expenditures in the health system. Barely have the finances of the Federal Labor Institute been straightened out more or less when the municipalities sound the alarm because they no longer can carry the financial burden of welfare assistance. No sooner has it been made possible to avoid a rise in welfare taxes by a clever shift of contribution payments from unemployment insurance to social security than it becomes necessary once more to discuss the introduction of a new obligatory insurance from whose income it is intended to meet the costs, rising at an alarmingly rapid rate, of tending to persons in need of care. And no sooner has Norbert Bluem in difficult negotiations with Franz Josef Strauss saved part of his plans for reforming the financing of hospitals than some of the CDU heads in the Laender, concerned about their electoral chances, are again raising the question of pensioners' contributions to health insurance.

After the most recent change in administrations in Bonn, the social welfare payment promises of the state were curtailed and cut as never before in the history of the republic. And yet those in power by no means control developments. And they will continue to stumble from one crisis to the next until they recognize and correct the basic error of modern social welfare policies. Ever-increasing contributions are just as unhelpful as periodically recurring curtailments which unfortunately end up hitting hardest the ones who depend

most on aid from society. The truth is that our system of social security has degenerated into a huge dud--well meant but poorly thought through.

Every third mark being earned in this country must be spent for social welfare payments these days. In the 1985 Federal budget being discussed in Bonn this week, the budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs with DM 56.8 billion ranks first. Since 1960 annual social expenditures have risen from DM 63 billion to over DM 500 billion. Whereas in 1960 not quite DM 9 billion were enough to finance health insurance, today far more DM 100 billion are needed. Continuing to pay wages in case of sickness, which cost 3 billion in 1960, now costs 23 billion, while expenditures for social welfare aid have risen from 1.6 to 18 billion.

Nevertheless, there are not enough funds by any means. Nor will there ever be. The reason for this is that the social welfare state for a start makes its citizens poorer by leveling ever-increasing taxes on them before it can then support them again with welfare payments.

The "social market economy" which allegedly has been created in the Federal Republic in the past three decades actually does not exist. In reality there exist side by side a social economy and a market economy which are based on entirely different principles and therefore hinder each other more than they complement one another:

--The secret of the success of the market economy which has given us unprecedented prosperity is that whoever works longer, harder or more creatively than others, offers better and cheaper products and creates jobs is rewarded. The trick consists in placing the powerful impulse of self-interest in the service of the common good.

--In the social welfare sphere it is exactly the other way round. Not the one who behaves properly as far as the common good is concerned is rewarded, but the one who claims as many social payments as possible at the expense of society.

--Whoever shows up for work despite a headache, is economical in the use of medicine and does not run to see a doctor at the slightest provocation cannot expect to benefit as a result in any way. The system favors him who goes and takes a cure as often as possible, who abuses paid sick leave for some additional days off, who claims unemployment insurance or welfare aid while working on the sly or despite an increase in his income continues to live in a government-subsidized apartment, who draws a children's allowance without needing it and who applies for handicapped person's ID with all the favored treatment that entails despite the fact that he is not hindered in following his trade.

In the early days of the modern social welfare state this conflict was covered up. Traditional value concepts and rules of behavior prevented many people from claiming payments without being in need of them. Moreover there did not exist as yet the now customary "take-away/get-back procedure"; the more generous the state payment promises were which politicians made particularly

in election years, the higher were the taxes levied on the citizens by the state. Every mark allotted by the DM 500 billion redistribution machinery of the big-brother state first has to be collected from the citizens.

But this means that many are needy only because the state makes them so. Many a worker depends on a state-subsidized apartment or housing allowance, on BAFOeG [Federal Law for the Advancement of Education] support, a maternity allowance or a children's allowance and is unable to provide for old age and sickness from his or her own income only because the state has curtailed the income or raised prices through innumerable taxes to such an extent that those who have been plundered in this manner no longer can support themselves and their families without assistance. They are actually cultivated to be what they are--and on top of that the support for them is peddled by politics as a social welfare payment.

Who can be surprised if people accommodate accordingly. While, on the one hand, citizens try escape the ever more ruthless infringement by the state of their income by refusing payment, using all possible tax dodges or black-market labor, they try, on the other hand, to get back as much as possible from the big pot. To this the state reacts with new taxes, thereby provoking even greater defense reactions. A vicious circle.

This vicious circle is made even worse by the fact that the suppliers of many social welfare payments--doctors, nursing homes, the pharmaceutical industry, the builders and maintainers of state-subsidized apartments--are not subject to any market control in determining their prices. They generally reckon in accordance with the cost-reimbursement principle. In other words, they do not profit like private entrepreneurs by holding down costs as much as possible; they have to raise costs to make it all worth their while.

Appeals alone will not accomplish anything. The traditional method of whacking the bushes of social payments with an axe at best yields short-term relief and in addition invariably hits particularly hard the persons who are really in need. Those getting a free ride at the expense of the social welfare state are hardly impressed by this.

The only lasting remedy is for the social welfare state also to become a market economy state. This means that also in the social sector of our economy the signals must be set in such a way that suppliers and consumers of social payments of their own volition behave differently--namely, in such a way that self-interest and common interest point in the same direction.

There are opportunities enough. Norbert Bluem's plan to reform the financing of hospitals in such a way as to give the managers of clinics at long last an incentive of their own to operate as economically as possible is a first step in the right direction. But this example also shows what resistance will have to be overcome--even among people of one's own party--because wherever conditions are poor there are influential circles profiting from them.

It pays to make the effort. Even if a reform of the social welfare state could save only 10 percent of its current costs, the financial total of more

than DM 50 billion would be equal to almost half the receipts from wage taxes. If the maneuvering room is used to specifically reduce the burden on lower income groups, millions of people at long last might find out that they actually do not need any charity.

8790
CSO: 3620/159

LEADING PAPER: SWEDEN PROJECTING ITS OWN USSR HYSTERIA

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 22 Nov 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Sweden Ponders Its Neutrality"]

[Text] Swedish Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom has demonstrated very stylishly that Sweden was not criticized by President Mauno Koivisto in London. According to Bodstrom, not even people in Sweden completely understand everything which is concealed in the fact that the Soviet Union has repeatedly violated Swedish territory in the air and on the sea in recent years.

That is Sweden's official opinion. On the other hand, the private sector of public opinion accuses Finland and President Koivisto--above all, through the press--of unwarranted remarks and stupid advice, to put it mildly. In the background to these standpoints, there is more often than not undisguised disapproval of the fact that in Finland the Soviet Union's acts are interpreted in an apologetic tone.

Seen from Finland's vantage point, the heart of the conflict still seems to be the confusion which arose in Sweden a few years back over the credibility of the neutrality policy. An indisturbed foreign policy with the traditional course of nonalignment no longer continued to be self-evident. Even in Sweden, people are not certain about the durability of the traditional course. The uncertainty finds an outlet in attacks on Finland, although this type of reaction stems mostly from perplexity.

The statements made by President Koivisto on his trip to London are linked in Sweden to the opinion he gave last spring about Sweden's investigation of submarines. The President has commented very courteously on subaqueous issues, however. He has not ridiculed any more discernibly the hysteria which prevails in Sweden.

Swedish Defense Minister Anders Thunborg has put the submarine violations within precise confines. According to him, in addition to the Soviet submarine which ran aground and flagrantly violated Swedish territory, there is altogether conclusive evidence of a second violation on the sea bottom of territorial waters.

All in all, there are about 10 incidents thought by experts to involve submarines. No more than that. The number is enough to indicate, however, that there is a pattern of activity behind the violations. Then again, the infringement of airspace over Gotland was a unique episode and does not point to the existence of a pattern of violations, according to Thunborg.

So Swedish public opinion should not become more hysterical than the facts warrant. After all, steps are being taken to correct the deficiencies in defense preparedness uncovered as a consequence of the territorial violations, and in the next few years the country will also get its antisubmarine system in good working order. The Swedes' response to superpowers who militarize the world is thus correct to a tee and one the superpowers can grasp. It should restore the Swedes' self-confidence.

Perhaps the most troublesome stage is still ahead, however. Parliamentary elections will be held in Sweden next autumn. The policy of neutrality appears to be swelling into an electoral issue for the first time. Researchers offer two models as alternatives to the neutrality route. One is a course of action which follows the Soviet Union at heel and accepts expansion of its sphere of authority. The other is collaboration with NATO.

The debate can become fierce if the Swedes lose their nerve in the election battle. In light of traditions, it would also seem useful if the Swedes had the strength to concentrate on broadening the concept of international law--honed by the Palme government this autumn--from the standpoint of neutrality. The superpowers in particular and the Soviet Union above all have been asked by other governments on several occasions to respect it. Attention is furthermore called to the fact that international law is a fundamental factor in the national security of small and medium-sized states. This forebodes the rejection of all changes.

12327
CSO: 3617/47

KOIVISTO FOREIGN POLICY REMARK AGAIN 'MISUNDERSTOOD'

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 23 Nov 84 p 11

[Commentary by Erkki Pennanen: "Misunderstood Koivisto Lowers His Reaction Threshold"]

[Text] President Mauno Koivisto's problem has been that he has become very easily misunderstood in the news media--at home and abroad. The President has taken active measures to combat new misunderstandings and to instruct journalists, but the results are bewildering.

Relations between the President and the news media are limited mainly to contact during official visits abroad. There has been only one on the program this year--last week's visit to England. In connection with that one, too, misunderstandings managed to arise.

Out of a meeting between the President and a group of British journalists there appeared in the prestigious newspaper GUARDIAN an explanation of the debate concerning a Nordic zone free of nuclear weapons so erroneous that the President's office thought it justifiable afterwards to disclose the President's entire train of thought. The reporter had not been able to express it concisely in the right form.

Koivisto himself felt the bite of the Swedish press when he dared to mention the poor state of relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union at his meeting with Finnish journalists. Koivisto's brief remark was so meager in its content that the President can with reason be surprised at the legitimacy and interpretations of Swedish reactions. They are perhaps based in part on inaccurate quotations from Koivisto's words. On the other hand, the sensitive Swedes read between the lines what the President left unsaid.

Confusion on Diplomatic Level

On the trip home from London, the President read an unobjective court report in the paper ILTA and became incensed. Upon arriving home, he gave the women's magazine JAANA a fulminating statement in which are materials for slight confusion on the diplomatic level. The President criticized the arrangements for his official visit in such a style that, in addition to his own adjutants and the protocol division, the hosts' faces also turned pale.

As he leafed through domestic newspapers, the President's eye became riveted on an interview with Governor Paavo Aitio in which hopes were expressed for changes in the governors' status and appointment procedure. Exactly in the style of his predecessor, Koivisto angrily informed Aitio and the other governors through ETELA-SUOMEN SANOMAT that they have good reason to stick to their own tasks and should not interfere in matters which do not concern them.

At a get-together of the association of editors-in-chief, Koivisto clarified his stand in somewhat greater detail. When, contrary to the nature of the get-together, HELSINGIN SANOMAT expressed the gist of the standpoint in a direct quotation of a single sentence, the President ordered his office "for unavoidable reasons" to publish the text of his own train of thought word for word.

Losing Patience With Reporters

What is this? Earlier, in public and in private, Koivisto has often expressed his impatience with journalists, their way of reporting the news and their inaccuracy, especially with regard to quotes. Then again, they have come to expect overbearingness from him.

When attempts by the President's officials to explain presidential statements in connection with misunderstandings which had arisen occasionally led only to new misunderstandings, the President thereafter prohibited anyone--even himself--from explaining his statements.

Nearly all occasions are taped nowadays and, if necessary, the President's office is charged with the task of revealing the President's train of thought in its entirety.

The method is honest to the extent that it fulfills the public's demands down to the final line and leaves no place for subsequent clarification. The reader himself can in theory decide whether the President has become a pawn of the journalists or the victim of professional inexperience. However, the method also has its obvious peculiar sides.

The President has proven to be very thin-skinned and vulnerable in dealing with the news media. The reaction threshold seems only to have become lower and the intensity of the reactions seems to have increased. At hand is the well-known danger of making mountains out of molehills.

12327
CSO: 3617/47

POLITICAL

FINLAND

CENTER PARTY LEADERS HOSTED MEETING WITH CPSU MEMBERS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 4 Dec 84 p 9

[Article: "Center Party and CPSU Agree To Foster Friendship"]

[Text] The official delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was the guest of the Center Party for a week, has returned to its homeland. As a finishing touch to the visit, the Center Party and the CPSU issued a joint communique. According to it, the parties agree that each will in every way and manner foster and develop trust between the peoples of Finland and the Soviet Union.

Center Party representatives had announced during the discussions that in the future the party would also conform to the foreign and domestic policy of the Kekkonen line and "would strive to continue to develop the conditions for earnest cooperation with other progressive and international forces."

The CPSU delegation gave recognition to the Center Party for improving relations between Finland and the Soviet Union

According to the communique, the Center Party and the CPSU consider detente and a policy of cooperation possible in the current situation as well, but it presupposes reaching an agreement on limiting nuclear weapons in particular and preventing the arms race "from extending to areas which do not yet have it." That wording may mean outer space.

The CPSU's three-man delegation was led by V.N. Ptitsyn, party leader of the Murmansk area. Foreign minister and party leader Paavo Vayrynen conducted the talks on behalf of the Center Party. The CPSU's representatives met all the current central leaders of the Center Party.

The Center Party and the CPSU have sent official delegations as each other's guests for as many as 10 years.

12327
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MINI-POLL: WHY PEOPLE WILL AGAIN VOTE FOR PASOK

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 9-10 Dec 84 p 8

/Excerpts from the column "Timely" / Letters to this column come from strangers. We read them with more or less attention. Of course we pay less attention to unsigned letters which are usually the most demanding.

I have before me a letter responding to the question we posed in this column: "Why will you again vote for Andreas Papandreou?" The letter is not only unsigned but the writer adds in a postscript: "You may publish it if you wish but without deletions!!" The unknown sender should believe that I did not even read it.

But I read with great interest the other letters dealing with the subject. There were exactly 23 such letters.

The "mini-poll" proved completely disappointing. With the exception of a well-written letter, which I will discuss later, all the others were negative. "I will again vote for Andreas because I do not want to vote for ND. And I do not want to vote for ND because..." An avalanche of logical, unreasonable, or inconsistent charges followed.

With few exceptions, most of the charges against ND did not justify even superficially a vote for PASOK. If abstention was a right and voting not compulsory, as is the case in most democratic countries, then one could hope that all those who are dissatisfied would vote for no one.

But I promised a positive voice from a reader: "Responding to your kind invitation, I hasten to give you my reply declaring in advance that I am not actively involved in politics and that certainly I am not a 'green guard.' I confess that I will vote for Andreas and PASOK for two basic reasons: For negative reasons, because your camp is backward; and for the following positive reasons: Andreas and his PASOK envisioned many things and promised even more but in any event it started on a new, hopeful course. Not that all would be idyllic. Not at all.

"All are put on the scale and the scale still appears to tilt clearly to the Left. Moreover, there is hope that after the experience gained /in office/ the mistakes will become lessons and the renewed vote of the people will not

be interpreted as an 'unconditional' approval of all that was done but as a mandate for a more sober and sound dealing with the great issues..."

I will not reveal the name of this sincere PASOK follower and I hope his optimism will be justified and the past mistakes become lessons whatever the electoral result may be. But...What can we say? We do not trust the Papandreu camp neighter as a future government nor as a future (embittered) opposition. And nothing we read convinced us that any of our serious fellow citizens who care about the future of Greece can hope for another 4 years of PASOK government.

The shortest letter came from Larisa. "You are asking why the Greeks will vote again for Andreas. There is only one answer: Because they are Greeks! And the Greeks always think as children."

Will we ever grow up?

7520
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POLITICAL PARTIES' VIEWS ON ELECTORAL LAW

Athens ENA in Greek 29 Nov 84 p 10

/Text/ All variations of the electoral law being studied /by the government/ are designed to force the Left to support PASOK.

Everyone, especially the Left, has only something good to say about the simple proportional. But no one is prepared to see it used in the garment of "simple and unadulterated." The government wants to have the simple proportional but with a strong dose of a majoritarian system.

ND considers the simple proportional to be an honest system but it challenges PASOK to have the honor of introducing it. KKE and KKE-Int. swear by the simple proportional but they are ready to discuss any system that will favor one party at the expense of the other.

All signs show that the government is leaning in the direction of a mixed electoral system with 200 seats to be distributed proportionately among the various parties and the remaining 100 to be divided between the 2 major parties, with especially favorable treatment for the party with the highest percentage of votes.

But these general principles do not constitute a full-fledged electoral system. "The variations of the 'two hundred-one hundred' are many," said one of the experts at the Ministry of Interior to ENA.

The preferences of the parties of the Left are ranging among these variations. ND rejects the system arguing that by using it the confrontation takes an even more polarizing character since the question posed to the voter is "which party will come first." The answer of the leftist voters beyond PASOK is "down with the Right." Therefore, the system which heavily favors the first party affects the party line up since PASOK will draw votes from the Left even against the will of the communist leaders.

KKE is categorically opposed to the two hundred-one hundred variation, first of all because it shares the view of ND that PASOK counts on the votes of the Left to gain a plurality and secondly, the proportional distribution of the 200 seats may create the impression among KKE voters that "the party will increase, in any event, its seats in the Chamber of Deputies."

This assessment, together with the critical importance of gaining first place, is causing fear among KKE cadres. "False satisfaction with the 200 seats, blackmail for the remaining 100, will lead to a thinning out of KKE's popular base," is argued by the younger cadres of the party. For this reason the main message in the recent resolution of the KKE Central Committee was to call for the "resistance of the masses to the dilemma--PASOK or the Right."

KKE's strong opposition to the variation, which combines the proportional with the majoritarian system, is also due to the fear that only KKE from among the parties of the traditional Left will lose votes to PASOK. According to KKE's assessment, KKE-Int. may even be favored by the system which provides for the distribution of the 200 seats proportionately. In any event, it will not be harmed. These fears are aggravated by the apparent trend in the Ministry of Interior to "cut" the system to fit PASOK even in the proportional distribution of the 200 seats.

Specifically, PASOK appears to lean toward the preservation of the electoral districts which in their majority have four or five seats. A system of simple proportional in those districts will be similar to the reinforced proportional, according to the assessments of the Ministry of Interior. For this reason, KKE's proposal for a law establishing the simple proportional provides for a very broad constituency equal to the area of each court of appeals. If the simple proportional is applied with the existing districts, KKE will be the sure loser.

By contrast, KKE-Int. expects four to five seats which are, of course, less than those it could have with the simple and unadulterated proportional, but even these have tremendous importance for a party which today has no seats in the Chamber.

KKE's fears for the reappearance of its rival KKE-Int. are reflected in the bill on simple proportional it introduced in the Chamber. The bill does not specifically provide for a "quota needed to participate in the Chamber," but it makes the gaining of a seat by the small parties difficult.

On its part, KKE-Int. is reluctant to enter a discussion on the extent of moving away from simple proportional, in spite of the fact that last year G. Banias stated that his party was fighting for the simple proportional but it would examine any system which would approach the simple proportional without adulterating it.

At the Ministry of Interior the work has been divided among teams of experts, in a way that one team does not know what the other is doing. In the two hundred-one hundred distribution, a major point is to allocate the 100 seats in accordance with the constitution which provides that the deputies are elected by the districts. Consequently, the 100 seats cannot be allocated to the 2 major parties in a "package"; they must be allocated to the electoral

districts. But this complicates the electoral system and may cause problems of understanding among the voters.

The main factor which will determine the fate of the electoral law is not the attitude of the parties but the stand of the president of the Republic.

On the part of PASOK, it appears that the recent "move" to support the re-election of K. Karamanlis to the presidency, together with the earlier introduction of the electoral bill, are designed to prepare the ground for a confrontation with the president on the issue of the electoral law. But such a confrontation may be a fatal move for PASOK.

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PASOK-ND AGREEMENT ON ELECTORAL LAW ENVISIONED

Athens | AVGI in Greek 15 Dec 84 p 5

/Text/ Article by S. Vangelis/

/Text/ The newspapers headlined the report that ND favors the reinforced proportional electoral system with 17 percent as the percentage a party must receive in order to participate in the second distribution of seats. What is of special interest, however, is that ND proposes exactly the same system used in the 1981 elections.

This ND position, which is at the same time an indirect proposal to PASOK, coincides with the reports that an agreement on the electoral law between the two parties is being attempted with the intervention of powerful non-parliamentary leaders.

Thus, it appears as if ND tells PASOK: "If we cannot reach an agreement on a new electoral system, we must remind you that in 1981 there existed mutual consent. Let us then hold the elections under the same system which gave you the victory in the previous election."

ND knows, of course, that the chances for its proposal being accepted are few. Moreover, the opportunity to use the same electoral system was "lost" last fall when the PASOK leadership suddenly decided not to hold elections. Yet ND reminds PASOK that it proposes "a framework of common acceptance" and that, therefore, PASOK will be fully responsible if an agreement is not reached.

But do the conditions exist for such an ND-PASOK agreement? Despite the differences existing within each side, both political forces have their own "philosophy" as concerns the substance of the electoral law which, both ND and PASOK have repeatedly said, must ensure "viable, stable and unadulterated" governments. Therefore, the perception for autonomous one-party governments is common.

ND knows that the few possibilities for returning to power are reduced in proportion to the "proportionality" the new electoral law will provide. The reinforced proportional system--even in the event the government fails to win--ensures the present bi-partisan balance system and, therefore, the government's internal cohesion.

On the other hand, PASOK appears to be convinced that, in its difficult effort to create a system corresponding to its promises, it cannot easily act as it pleases as concerns the electoral law. Appropriate government sources are now openly accepting the view that any electoral law cannot "bring about miracles" and are trying hard to maintain the present government majority with political means. PASOK understands that, despite its relative optimism, the structure and present correlation of the political forces do not allow it large margins to work out "comfortably" and at will the electoral system.

Six months after the Euroelections these correlations of power show a stability. ND, after experiencing a period of "dynamism" immediately after the election of its new leader, now shows clear signs of stagnancy and fails to gain on PASOK which continues to appear on the defensive and tries to heal the wounds opened when it followed a policy of rifts. It has yet to devise the appropriate pre-election plan and has at its disposal two effective propagandists--the controlled TV and its "forgotten" organizations.

The "balance" which has been restored between the two political parties which have relatively close electoral percentages, does not allow for the formulation of an electoral law which would subsidize either of the parties without considerable risk. The "game", therefore, must be played at the "peripheries" of the two parties in order to secure additional electoral strength which will provide the necessary marginal electoral percentage for a majority government.

ND will do its best to absorb the 2 percent of the National Political Union /EPEN/ votes and in this instance it is helped by the reinforced proportional system. It seems that PASOK will try to lure the Left by solving a minor technical detail: to have KKE-Int. represented in the Chamber of Deputies, but as some of its circles point out, this can only be achieved with a drastic drop in its electoral strength. The legislative arrangement to be worked out for the representation of the "small parties" in the Chamber will provide PASOK with the possibility of preventing ND from absorbing the EPEN percentage of the electorate.

The electoral confrontation of the two parties will in reality revolve around the small parties which both PASOK and ND will attempt to absorb. All these developments create a commonly acceptable framework for the electoral law and there will be, of course, those who will give it their "blessing".

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ELECTORAL SCENARIOS: ALLIANCES TO LEFT, RIGHT

Athens ANDI in Greek 23 Nov 84 pp 12-14

/Article by Spyros Kavounidis: "Scenarios of An Electoral Fantasy"//

/Excerpts/ Facing his last election campaign year and with the only official "opinion poll" the result of the Euroelections of 1984 which were held in a climate of a virtually national election behind him, everyone is now wondering and expecting to see the initiatives Papandreu will take to bring about PASOK's electoral success in the 1985 parliamentary election to win, that is, a clear majority.

Last September's reshuffling was purely defensive in character with the removal of ministers who had caused "frictions" (regardless of the soundness of their actions) and with the promotion of certain persons as a local counterweight to the election of Mitsotakis as leader of ND. For this reason it is not at all certain that this is the final composition of the cabinet until the election.

We must examine what possible moves PASOK has at its disposal under existing conditions and of course how inclined is it to utilize those possibilities.

By necessity, in charting its electoral tactics, PASOK will view the electorate with the limited "political" criteria under which the electorate will be faced in a more or less continuous spectrum of politico-ideological categories.

Of course, this does not mean it will ignore other aspects. Not at all. To the extent possible it will also try to attract uncommitted voters on the basis of their class or by satisfying specific needs or interests in an effort to improve its work as a government. But the main emphasis will fall on political criteria. In this, there has been major emphasis given to the importance of the so-called Center, to the right of PASOK. Without undervaluing its importance, I believe that from the electoral point of view the Center is less important than the area to the Left.

To the right of PASOK, the revulsion caused to the traditional center voters by Mitsotakis because of his leading role in the Glucksburg /King Konstandinos/ coup and the apostasy of 1965 and also because of the questions

over his integrity caused by the rumors accompanying his public life, is not likely to be removed because of his abilities--which are always subject to proof.

/His past/ will certainly hold back certain personalities of the Center who might have tried to re-enter the political stage through the ND. Therefore, in the political criteria division the percentage of the Center may not be as significant as it tries to appear lately.

The relatively large mass of undecided voters is to the left of PASOK, especially in the area between PASOK and KKE-Interior; this was shown in the 4 percent shift in the electorate in 1981 between the parliamentary election and the Euroelections. Indeed, the change in KKE-Int. policy and its increased criticism of PASOK for the past year and a half led to an increase of its electoral support in 1984 compared to the parliamentary election of 1981, although the 1984 Euroelection was conducted largely along the lines of a national election.

I believe then that the major question in PASOK's electoral calculations is how to hold down any outflow of voters to KKE-Int., or if you wish, the opposite, how to attract undecided voters from the Left.

Let us suppose that PASOK--in the next election to be held under some system of reinforced proportional, but more proportional than the present--gains a plurality but not a clear majority in the legislature, something not too farfetched. How can a cabinet be formed under such conditions? Under the best conditions KKE-Int. will have two or three seats in the legislature, or maybe none. In any event, it will have little to offer PASOK for the formation of a majority in the legislature.

On the other hand, KKE will have the seats needed to support a coalition cabinet with PASOK or even to support a purely PASOK cabinet. However, this is almost ruled out because of unforeseen reactions of certain circles which are not distinguished by their devotion to the parliamentary process and because of the fundamental differences of their views over crucial national issues (Cyprus, the Aegean)--even if the differences over EEC are overcome.

The other solution would come through a break of the ND party and the formation of a coalition cabinet with the "enlightened" splinter of ND. This, of course, is a "second-stage" solution because as a first step it requires the willingness of ND to break up, something far from certain. But even from the PASOK point of view such a coalition cabinet would be a rather unacceptable solution.

The strongly anti-Right views of the PASOK members and the majority of its voters and also the prospect of having to give up its visions, rules out the possibility of such solutions. It is clear that if PASOK does not win a majority of seats in the legislature it will not be able to form a government.

After the above analysis, let us now examine the only possibilities which are worth considering politically but also in terms of arithmetic. I see two electoral tactics open to PASOK, geared, of course, to gaining a clear parliamentary majority. One is a separate entry into the electoral arena; the other is cooperation with KKE-Int.

The first possibility, and of course PASOK's first choice, is to run alone and to try to win a majority. This choice, which is in keeping with PASOK's history and pre-history (as PAK) and in line with the dynamics of its growth, involves many risks because it can lead to an impasse. Of course, there is always the last resort of dissolving the legislature and calling for a new election, but such a route may conceal many traps after PASOK returns the mandate to form a government, especially if there has been no change in the occupant of the presidential office. Naturally, one cannot win if one does not take chances and until now PASOK has done well.

However, to strengthen this choice, PASOK will make overtures to center politicians and personalities associated with the independent Left. In fact, I think the overtures to personalities moving on the periphery of KKE-Int. and in the unaffiliated Left will be particularly strong.

PASOK's objective will be evident; to limit the votes of KKE-Int. to those of the party followers--that is, below one percent, and to take away all the votes influenced by KKE-Int. Naturally, PASOK will pursue this objective by simultaneously intensifying the anti-Right character of the struggle and by emphasizing the horror of a possible victory by Mitsotakis.

The second possibility--which is less likely to be implemented--is for PASOK to seek electoral cooperation with KKE-Int. since its following is much larger than its post-election number of seats in the legislature. In that case PASOK would be happy if it could implement, on a larger scale, the case of Glezos, but something of the sort would not even be discussed by KKE-Int. For this reason, the proposal for electoral cooperation--unlikely as it is--will take the form of an electoral coalition.

The basic disadvantage for PASOK of such a move would be that it would be interpreted as a confession of weakness. On the other hand, such a coalition, with some electoral system of reinforced proportional, could hope to win 160-165 seats. Of these, five or six would come from KKE-Int., as agreed, while the rest would give PASOK the possibility of forming its own government. PASOK would have no serious internal problems with this solution.

The time is past when PASOK's Left wing considered KKE-Int. too far to the Right; even those from the Center would have no special problem. We may add that KKE-Int. has gained the reputation of a sympathetic, civilized party which does not cause fear, at least among the urban voters.

In some provinces the loss of some blindly anti-communist votes may be risked but the simultaneous opening to certain centrist cadres will be aimed

at them so the final loss may be minimal. Of course, one important problem, then, will be the possible worsening of relations between KKE and KKE-Int. But these relations will be moved for a solution as an issue to the time after the election.

Where the intra-party problem will be much more serious is in the area of KKE-Int. Its policy of intensifying the criticism of PASOK increased its cohesion and following and, thanks to its relative success in the Euroelection, it is imbued now with euphoria and partisan pride. There is no doubt that a PASOK proposal for electoral cooperation would shake KKE-Int. from top to bottom.

The basic advantage for KKE-Int. would be the certainty of winning an unprecedented number of parliamentary seats, likely to be accompanied by its recognition as a party in parliament, with a necessary amendment of the Vouli Rules, with all the other consequences such as the change of the parliamentary correlation to KKE, the upgrading of its international relations, etc.

The opposite will be uncertainty over its winning even a minimal parliamentary representation. Another basic argument in favor of electoral cooperation will be the difficulty of explaining why not do before the election what KKE-Int. seeks so insistently to do after the election.

There will be, of course, opposing arguments derived from the dislike a portion of KKE-Int. members feel for PASOK and from certain orthodox views of renewal. Such cooperation could be interpreted as a rejection of the person /Leonidas Kirkos/ who shaped KKE-Int. in recent years and as a sign that the party relinquishes the opportunity of developing a genuine Eurocommunist currently on the political stage at a moment when many of its members believe the party is avoiding at last the danger of being forever a marginal grouping.

It will be risky to foretell the outcome of such an in-party debate in KKE-Int. in the rather unlikely case it was invited to cooperate. In any case it is certain this debate would hurt its organization. It is equally certain that the acceptance of electoral cooperation would result in the loss of a minimum number of votes.

Of course, all this is based on a hypothetical electoral scenario. From a hypothesis to reality is, of course, a great distance. The case when PASOK enters the contest by itself has historical support, and certainly it is more in line with its way of thinking from top to bottom, and has in its favor many arguments. Moreover, there may be some hidden cards to be used at the right moment against Mitsotakis. Be that as it may, PASOK's independent entry will not be an electoral walk. The question is what facts the PASOK planners have in mind, how do they evaluate them and how daring can they be?

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ESAK, PASKE ACTIVITIES WITHIN GSEE

Athens ENA in Greek 22 Nov 84 pp 26-28

/Excerpts/ In addition to the big industrialists, the Greek General Confederation of Labor /GSEE/ can also be a bad employer. But let us start from the beginning.

The dismissals were sought by the United Antidictatorial Labor Movement-Cooperating /ESAK-S/, a syndicalist organization of KKE, which under the pretext of democratization has put together "a proscriptions list" with 17 names of GSEE employees. The list was submitted to the GSEE presidium for its approval.

The proposal probably would have been implemented if it were not for GSEE President G. Raftopoulos, who is reluctant to inaugurate the necessary procedures because among those employees are persons he trusts absolutely.

If GSEE accepted the ESAK-S list it would come in conflict with its own declarations for the protection of the right to work and the end to dismissal of employees /by enterprises/.

It is said that first on the "black list" is the name of one of the GSEE legal counsels who was appointed in 1982 and who is "accused" of belonging to KKE-Int.! It is followed by the names of employees serving at the Raftopoulos office, office cleaning women considered "suspect for the confederation's democratic functioning," officials of the organizational bureau, and of the GSEE administrative machinery, who have been in service for many years.

In the last plenum of the GSEE leadership an ESAK-S official, a member of the GSEE presidium, accused the Pan-hellenic Militant Workers Trade Union Movement /PASKE/ which is the PASOK syndicalist organization, of not cooperating with ESAK-S to move forward a number of issues, while it made veiled suggestions of bad management of the GSEE finances.

We must say that PASKE is very reluctant to approve the dismissal of the 17 employees, although some of its cadres had voiced threats, prior to Euro-elections, against employees who during discussions had shown themselves to be unfriendly to the Change.

Because of these discussions, which were reported to the GSEE presidium, an extraordinary meeting of employees was called. At the meeting they were told that they had "an obligation" not to be in political disagreement with the presidium, especially not to express such views in public...

The PASKE reluctance to approve the dismissals is due to the belief that GSEE will be unable to demand measures against dismissals by the government and the employers, when GSEE itself will have given the "bad example," especially when the criterion for dismissals is the political affiliation of the workers.

This thinking, however, did not prevent GSEE from avoiding, as a workers' organization, to declare its position on the intentions of the minister of labor regarding the enactment of legislation which would allow the dismissal of workers and employees because of their political views and their personal files.

Before closing, we must mention that "strange things" are happening among GSEE personnel. For example, an employee dealing with GSEE international relations (he had been appointed to this position by Kh. Karakitsos in 1981) is at the same time special advisor to the government on questions relating to the Central Intelligence Service! Another appointee, also appointed by Karakitsos, deals with financial matters and works also as an advisor to the Labor Force Employment Organization on the same issues.

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SOVIETS REPORTEDLY STEP UP INTEREST IN NORTH

Athens 1 KATHIMERINI in Greek 1 Dec 84 pp 1, 3

/Text/ Western European diplomats in Athens have noted that the Soviet interest in Northern Greece has increased considerably. According to all indications, Moscow is urgently seeking the opening of a General Consulate and an Aeroflot office in Salonica.

Reliable sources say these issues are being constantly raised by the Soviets and very likely were mentioned by USSR Ambassador Igor Andropov in his recent meeting with Premier A. Papandreu who is expected to visit Moscow in January.

The same sources explain that the Soviets want to establish a consulate which will cover Thraki, Makedonia and Epeirus, i.e., almost one third of Greece.

The question of establishing a USSR General Consulate in Salonica was initially raised by the Soviets in 1978 and was again discussed in April of the following year, but no progress was made.

In November 1980 the Soviet side suddenly asked to conduct negotiations to amend the 1973 agreement on air transport and the setting of new schedules between Moscow, Kiev, Salonica and Athens.

Well-informed circles have noted that the economic interest of the USSR in such a new flight schedule is virtually non-existent. However, if such an agreement is signed the Soviet side will formally seek the establishment of a General Consulate in Salonica, since practical and current problems of Aeroflot will very likely require the permanent presence of Soviet diplomats in Salonica.

A possible explanation of the insistence of the USSR is that Moscow wishes to more closely oversee developments in the Balkans.

Reliable observers noted that following the death of Tito, the central leadership of Yugoslavia was exposed to pressures by several constituent republics such as that of Skopia, which brazenly attacks both Greece and Bulgaria. The same observers feel these centrifugal tendencies may dangerously increase in the future.

The increased interest of the USSR in Yugoslavia and especially in the Skopia republic is shown by the fact that despite strong objections from Bulgaria the USSR has established in Leningrad an institute of the Macedonian language and literature.

According to preliminary arrangements in 1978, Greece would also have the right to establish a General Consulate in Odessa. The Greek side seeks to cover a large area in order to serve the dispersed Hellenism of the USSR.

Nevertheless, Western sources in Athens seriously doubt the possible effective functioning of a Greek General Consulate in Odessa. The Soviet bureaucratic system does not allow the settlement of even elementary questions outside of the Soviet capital. For this reason, even large and prosperous countries of the West seriously ponder the possibility of closing down their own consulates in the USSR.

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KKE CENTRAL COMMITTEE DISMISSES 'HARDLINERS'

Athens ANDI in Greek 23 Nov 84 p 15

/Excerpts/ On the eve of the Polytechnic School anniversary it is somewhat of a problem for a party to expel a member belonging to the generation of the anti-dictatorial student movement. Nevertheless, the KKE Central Committee, setting its own priorities, did not hesitate to remove its regular member Stathis Khatzopoulos, one of the new party cadres who rose in its leadership after the fall of the dictatorship.

He is accused of "factionalism". The reason came accidentally or rather through the mechanism of self protection that all parties have and especially KKE.

A Discreet Blow to the "Leftists"

In one of the base organizations of the Greek Communist Youth /KNE/ one member proposed to its leadership to have the party denounce all published reports or rumors on the existence of trends or factions within KKE. Then another, possibly naive, KNE member took the floor to say that this was not right because "he was told by a party cadre that indeed there are different trends." The familiar procedure to find the culprit followed and the trail led to Stathis Khatzopoulos.

The issue came before the Central Committee Plenum that met approximately 1 month ago, when it was decided to remove the person who circulated those terrible rumors. But the "principle of unanimity" was not achieved. Indeed, during the discussion of the issue, Khatzopoulos became ill, and this forced certain members of the Central Committee to say: "We went back to the period of Zakhariadis when we physically exterminated our cadres."

Nevertheless, Khatzopoulos cannot claim laurels as an opponent to the Zakhariadis tactics. As we found out, his theoretical views do not go beyond his ruthless opposition to PASOK and his unwavering defense of Soviet socialism and KKE's call for the implementation, along general lines, of the Soviet model in Greece.

What is interesting is that the removal of Khatzopoulos hits a "weak" link, but at the same time is a warning to those strong members of the Central

Committee who share similar views. In other words, it is like "insulting the bride to warn the mother-in-law." In this specific case the latter is the faction of high KKE hardliners who are headed by the Central Committee member Nikos Kotzias.

This trend does not function precisely as a faction with para-organizational processes, but it has institutionalized its existence and peculiarity through the party organs in which it participates. The model it proposes is almost identical to the Soviet one, but this does not prevent it from denouncing the "gerontocracy" within KKE.

The "discreet blow" given in the case of Khatzopoulos by the Central Committee meeting was followed by a compromise on the part of the hardliners who indirectly stated that they will stop the process of building up their trend. Thus, it appears they have postponed the publication of a newspaper, with unnamed writers, which would propagandize the "Leninist theses."

It must also be noted that the removal of Khatzopoulos was followed by many cadre transfers, especially in the KKE Athens organization where Khatzopoulos was working as a member of the City Committee. It remains to clear up the case of the KKE Northern Suburbs Secretary Aktiv as well as the cases of several labor cadres suspected of being involved in this activity.

Change of Correlations

Thus, it appears that lately the hardliners have been on the defensive not so much because of Khatzopoulos but because of the expression of full confidence in the person of Kh. Florakis by the USSR.

Indeed, the phrase, "he is a steadfast friend of the Soviet Union," which accompanied the speech of Chernenko at the presentation of the Lenin Prize to the KKE secretary general, acted decisively in the intra-part correlations.

Shortly thereafter, RIZOSPASTIS published interviews with Soviet leaders by its reporter M. Androulakis. The hardliners considered the interviews "reformist". The issue was presented to the leaders who emphasized that "we must not be more royalist than the king" at the moment when the Soviet leaders themselves find certain problems in the socialist structure.

The dogmatic cadres who control the "ideological work" and the party publications expressed opposition to a joint committee for the simple representation. "How can we report in RIZOSPASTIS the views of KKE-Interior," the hardliners observed, but they did not impose their view.

It is worth noting that G. Farakos, the editor in chief of RIZOSPASTIS, did not participate in the recent reactions, possibly because he did not want to get involved at the moment the Soviets supported Kh. Florakis in such a telling fashion. By contrast, a female member of the Politburo, who tried to close

down a newspaper published in the Ionian Islands by KKE, but with a broader political platform, has been "put in the dog house."

However, all these changes do not refute two basic findings relating to the base of the party: The first is that since there are different views in a party there will also be trends. As long as the KKE leadership closes its eyes it will pay the political and intra-party costs of such cases. It is a common belief among party members that something in the party, or at least in its present policy, must change. And as long as a democratic debate over the subject does not open, these cases will increase.

Something worse: As long as the overall problems of the communist movement and the party's strategy are not placed under scrutiny "the criticism of convenience" will prevail. Under these specific circumstances this criticism is nothing else than the return to the roots and scriptures and the more "radical attitude" toward PASOK.

Of course, the current cannot be reversed--if not actually strengthened--by fake political differentiations and revolutionary gymnastics, like the partisan participation in the Polytechnic School anniversary, come what may, even if this temporarily pleased the members.

P. S. A News Item

Since we are talking about expelled cadres, KKE-Int. (no, no, it does not expel) will begin a discussion with approximately 100 former cadres and members of KKE expelled or withdrawn in the last few years. Among the subjects under discussion will be, in addition to the more general views of KKE-Int., the possibilities of political cooperation--each trying its own expansion...

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BIRTH STATISTICS POINT TO MINIMAL POPULATION INCREASE

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 29 Nov 84 p 5

/Text/ A study issued by the National Statistical Service of Greece /ESYE/ under the title, "Statistics of the 1981 Natural Population Movement in Greece," shows that until the year 2,000 the country's population will increase at a very slow rate and that, under the present genetic tendencies population increases will be minimal.

The number of births will reduce progressively while, on the contrary, the number of deaths will increase, given that in 1995 the percentage of population over 65 will reach 14 percent compared to 11 percent in 1971. The old age population, that is, will number 1,377,000 persons compared to 957,000 in 1971. Other interesting points of the study are:

In 1981 the natural population increase (excess of births over deaths) reached 54,693 or an increase of 5.6 percent per 1,000 persons. Specifically, men increased by 28,309 or 5.9 percent per 1,000 males while women increased by 5.3 percent per 1,000 females. The true (net) population increase in 1981 reached 65,000 or a percentage of 6.7.

Marriages

Marriages in 1981 totaled 71,138 or 2.3 marriages per 1,000 persons. To this figure one should add 292 more--which were reported late. Compared to 1980 the percentage shows an increase. The grooms were of an average age of 27.7 years and the brides 22.7.

Ninety percent of the brides and grooms were married for the first time. Specifically, 92.3 percent of the grooms were single, 2.1 percent widowers, and 5.6 percent divorced. Of the brides, the corresponding figures were 95.1, 1.1, and 3.8 percent.

Education

Grooms: 0.7 percent were illiterate, 57.4 percent could read and write, 28.4 were graduates of gymnasiums and 13.5 were graduates of higher education institutions.

Brides: 0.9 percent were illiterate, 56.9 could read and write, 33.35 were gymnasium graduates and 8.7 had higher education school degrees.

In 1936 the percentage of illiterate grooms and brides was 9.3 and 34.4 percent, respectively. In other words, there is a considerable drop in the number of illiterates who married from 1938 until now.

Births

The number of children born totaled 140,953 or there were 14.5 such births for every 1,000 cases. To this figure 234 should be added because they were reported late. Of the 140,999 births, 139,734 were single child births. Births of twins reached 1,251 or a percentage ratio of 8.9 per 1,000 children born alive.

The Illegitimates

In 1981, the number of illegitimate births reached 2,234 or a percentage of 15.8 of births. In 1926-1928 the illegitimate births reached 12 percent and in 1936-1938 they reached 13 percent.

The average age of the mother of a legitimate child was 25.2 years. Of such births, 93.1 percent represented marriages of 9 years or less. Specifically, 40.2 percent of the legal births came from marriages of 1 year and 14.1 percent from marriages of 2 years.

Fertility

The most fertile ages are: 20-24 years with 14.7 births per 1,000 women; 25-29 years with 124.8 births, and 30-34 years with 64.4 births.

In 1981 the number of stillborn infants reached 1,323. In other words, for every 1,000 births there were 10 stillborn infants.

Deaths

In 1981, the number of deaths reached 86,261 individuals or a mortality rate of 8.9 per 1,000 persons. Nineteen deaths should be added to this figure because they were reported late. In 1980, the mortality percentage rate was also 9.0 percent. The average age of the deceased was 68.4 years for men and 73.4 for women. The main causes of deaths were:

--Cardiac diseases: 216.6 deaths per 100,000 or 24.4 percent of the total number of deaths.

--Neoplasms in general including the lymphatic and blood tissue neoplasms: 171.2 percent per 100,000 persons or 19.3 percent of deaths.

- Cerebrovascular diseases: 164.4 percent per 100,000 persons or 15.5 percent of deaths.
- Other diseases of the respiratory system: 61.4 percent per 100,000 persons or 6.9 percent of deaths.
- Accidents: 42.8 percent per 100,000 persons or 4.8 percent of deaths.
- Diseases of other parts of the gastrointestinal system: 35.1 percent per 100,000 persons or 4 percent of deaths.
- Endocrinic and metabolic diseases, immunological disturbances: 32.4 percent per 100,000 persons or 3.7 percent of the total number of deaths.

During the pre-war period the major causes of death were: influenza, tuberculosis, malaria, etc. In 1981, deaths from pregnancy complications totaled 16 mothers or a percentage of 0.1 per 1,000 births.

Infant Mortality

A total of 2,294 infants under 1 years of age died in 1981 or a percentage of infant mortality of 16.3 per 1,000 infants born. The major causes of infant deaths were: a group of syngenic anomalies, other respiratory pathological conditions of the foetus and the newborn anomalies related to the prenatal period and undetermined small infant weight, special infections during childbearing, including septicolemia, inhalation and food swallowing which causes suffocation, pneumonia, influenza, etc.

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LITERACY STATISTICS PAINT DISHEARTENING PICTURE

Athens TA NEA in Greek 25 Nov 84 p 17

/Article by Th. Andonopoulos: "One in Four is Illiterate"

/Text/ Analysis of the 1981 census data, partial as it was, has created shock in Greek society. Of the 8,225,041 Greeks under age 64, about 2 million --exactly 1,988,560--are illiterate. (The population total according to the 1981 census was 9,740,417. But for illiteracy studies, the statistics consider only the ages from 0 to 64.)

This figure represents 24.2 percent of the country's population. A total of 706,721 persons over 10 years did not attend school, while 1,281,839 did not even finish elementary school.

This "antiquated monster," as illiteracy has been characterized, threatens--150 years after the establishment of compulsory elementary school attendance (1834)--every effort for modernization and places serious obstacles in the alignment of Greek society and economy with those of the developed countries.

The unbelievable educational picture of modern Greece as proved by the cold logic of numbers, is developing gradually as we pass from the urban centers to the countryside; from the urban and semi-urban reality to the outer areas. Ineed the percentage of illiterate people is differentiated by social groups, geographic areas and sex.

No Schooling At All

The female population is the greater victim of illiteracy. More than half a million women (563,455 to be exact) over 10 years old--13.3 percent of the total--have never attended school while the corresponding figures for men is 143,226 persons. In other words, 80 percent of the illiterates are women...To this percentage one should add 16.7 percent--704,656 women--who have not finished elementary school.

But what is particularly disturbing and eludes the arguments of the past "that illiteracy is limited mainly to the aged and therefore we are compelled to wait for the biological solution of the problem," is that illiteracy

is not at all limited to only old people. Of the total population of 15 to 64 years of age, 415,460 individuals or 6.7 percent never attended school, while 819,110 persons or 13.2 percent of this total population did not finish elementary school.

In the rural areas the illiteracy percentage reaches 14.4 percent while 36 percent of the rural population is not only unable to express their thoughts in writing but also unable to read and understand even the capital letters /headlines/ of an athletic newspaper!

This difference between city and village is attributed to the moving of the educated element in rural areas to the urban centers. As a result, the illiteracy percentage in these rural areas increases steadily.

Thus, at the level of elementary education Greece appears "as a country of two speeds," but as the English socialist leader Averin Bevan said in the decade of the 50s, "when civilization is not in step in both the city and village then it limps on one foot."

As concerns this "sad picture of illiteracy" in the rural areas, it should be noted that 49.5 percent of their population has simply finished elementary school and can be assumed that 85.4 percent in the best of cases "are not illiterate" in the traditional meaning of the word, since they have finished any one-teacher or two-teacher school.

Yet, 36 percent of the illiterates in the rural areas cannot be disengaged from these schools and their conditions of operation. On the contrary, there is a direct relation between these one- or two-teacher schools and the low quality of education they provide. The view that "these schools are nurseries where the illiterate grows" is not far from reality. In the opinion of the teachers and parents in rural areas, these schools constitute a process for an expanded production of semi-illiterate people and have been characterized as "spiritual graves".

The figures of public school distribution are eloquent. There are in Greece 3,565 one-teacher elementary schools; 2,119 two-teacher; 846 three-teacher; 382 four-teacher; 215 five-teacher; and 2,683 six- or more teacher schools. In their overwhelming majority the six-teacher schools are in cities and semi-urban areas while the first three groups of schools are located exclusively in rural areas and make up 25 percent of the total pupil population and 48 percent of the pupil potential in the provinces.

In addition, the study of the census data shows that about 20 percent of those between the ages of 15 and 64 are illiterate. Therefore, the findings by the Secondary Education Supervision Center and the Labor Force Employment Organization that the overwhelming majority of the country's work force has not even finished elementary school is a fact which has immense social, economic and cultural consequences especially in a period where the need for

Greece to enter the area of technological revolution is not a distant vision but a daily need for survival.

The Athens area is not exempted from this sad situation of illiteracy. In this area there are 373,864 individuals "who sign with their index finger-print." Moreover, in 44 of the country's 51 nomes, the percentage of the illiterate exceeds 8.5 percent of the population of more than 10 years of age.

Particularly in the country's large cities (the Athens-Piraeus environs, Salonica, Patras, Irakleion, Larisa, etc.) the phenomenon "of the Fourth World illiterates" has started becoming evident. The greatest percentage of illiterate people in this area exists in the less privileged social categories, especially among the poor who live in the marginal city quarters. This category includes mainly the unemployed, the seasonal workers, etc.

These ghettos of the Fourth World are surrounded by an economically and technologically competent society where the written communication and the written word are present everywhere. Here the illiterate, the person who cannot read or write, faces a disadvantage in many situations of his daily life: in stores, in transportation, in business, in the exercise of his political rights. Many are the cases in the "provinces of Athens" when the illiterate unemployed person avoids applying to an employment office or to attend seminars of vocational training in order to be re-employed in a sector where the economy needs workers.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the illiterate person here faces a "daily racism." Neither society nor his family respects him. Since he cannot help his children with their homework, they pay no attention to him or show disobedience. Moreover, many illiterates are ashamed and try to avoid revealing that they do not know how to read or write.

The geographic distribution of illiteracy in the various nomes of the country reveals "isles of ignorance" which can become mine fields to every program of decentralization and regional development.

Specifically, illiteracy fluctuates in relatively high percentages in certain areas as follows:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Greater Athens	14.5	Aitolokarnania Nome	35.20
Akhaia Nome	22.8	Arta Nome	35.8
Thesaloniki Nome	19.7	Thesplotia Nome	37.0
Kavala Nome	19.0	Karditsa Nome	38.5
Korinthia Nome	20.6	Levkas Nome	40.6
Khania Nome	23.2	Xanthi Nome	42.9
Khios Nome	21.7	Rodopi Nome	46.3
Agion Oros	17.8	Serrai Nome	37.0
		Trikala Nome	38.0

D. Vergidis and P. Papakostopoulos, two specialists who analyzed the 1981 census data relating to illiteracy, observed the following:

--Illiteracy is a social, political, and cultural problem. It restrains citizens from participating in public affairs; it constitutes a serious obstacle in the development of social institutions; and destroys the possibility of exercising criticism.

--Greater percentages of illiterate people are observed in social categories with particular problems, in undeveloped and difficult-to-reach areas.

--The illiteracy problem is particularly serious in farm areas. Not only because it undermines the social inequities but because the modern farmer, to the extent he uses modern cultivation methods and farm machinery, is in need of occupational training. Also, illiteracy among women in these areas seriously hinders their emancipation.

--The one- and two-teacher elementary schools are nurseries of semi-illiterate people.

--Illiteracy is not a "shame" which must be eliminated. It is a social, cultural and political reality and its solution must be placed on a collective basis. It cannot be achieved without the participation at all levels of those directly concerned: the illiterates themselves.

--At the same time the solution must not be left to the state alone. It should also be a concern of the farm cooperatives, the labor unions, the cultural societies and, in general, of all public collective agents.

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ND SCORES VICTORY IN PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ELECTIONS

Athens | VRADYNI in Greek 17 Dec 84 p 1

/Excerpt/ The physicians and engineers presented ND a triumph in yesterday's elections, the results of which constitute a political message of first magnitude, enough to explain the new defeatist crisis PASOK Chairman and Premier Papandreu experienced 2 days ago.

The Democratic Movement of Physicians, which is well disposed towards ND, scored an absolute majority during the elections of the Panhellenic Medical Association /PIS/ with 54.8 percent of the votes and 8 of the 13 seats in the PIS administrative council, while PASOK's Panhellenic Socialist Movement /PASK/ received only 23.6 percent and lost three seats in the council (it had seven and now has four). Once more the doctors again gave victory to the true democratic process and voted against PASOK's partisan practices as well as against its syndicalists in the health sector.

The engineers of all specialties also gave PASOK the same message in electing the new administration of the Technical Chamber of Greece /TEE/. The Democratic Movement of Engineers /DKM/, which leans towards ND, received 38 percent of the votes--compared to PASOK's 18 percent--in the Attiki Nome where 55 percent of the TEE members cast their vote and came first in almost all the country's nomes! The TEE results in yesterday's election is a proud answer of the country's technical world to PASOK's partisan methods against them--methods which reached the point of making a "practice" the construction of public works without supervision!

The election results show that DKM (ND) secured 70 seats compared to 44 for PASK (PASOK), 29 for KKE's DPK /expansion unknown/, 24 for KKE-Int.'s ASME /expansion unknown/, 22 for the Engineering Projects Directorate (of Dessylas), 4 for the Independent Group, 1 for ASPET and 1 for AKM /expansions unknown/.

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DEMAGOGIC IDEA OF 'NATIONAL PRIDE' DEEMED HARMFUL

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 23-24 Dec 84 p 8

[Article by "E": "Pride..."]

[Excerpts] The days have come when, to a higher or lesser degree, we all distribute wishes and gifts.

Wishes to highly placed persons. Wishes related to our future, our country, our daily life, the small and large problems that beset us and have become increasingly worrisome in recent months.

We have recently seen the revival of an echo of bad days.

What is being heard, what is being said, what is being written, is quite similar to what was being said and what was being written by the people of the 7-year period, that the majority heard with relative indifference.

First and foremost, we would like to ask that the exploitation of the useless and ubiquitous idea of national "pride" stop.

In conjunction with the alleged indifference about the displeasure and the disappointment that large nations feel vis-a-vis the behavior adopted by the representatives of Greece, we are getting very close to the climate that had been created 15 years ago by the luminaries who used to govern us.

Athens newspapers would write things--and one does not have to specify which ones--because all of them would publish the same "proud" texts.

We know, of course, that they were compelled to do so, and we sincerely understand their position more than the enthusiasm shown by their readers.

Enthusiasm? Yessir.

They were not compelled to read the paeans, the stories, the crazy speeches, the victories of Greece that only existed in their imagination, and the "sonorous slaps" addressed to all those who dared to attack its regime.

Nevertheless, in those days of our "national pride," Greek newspapers were going through a golden period.

So, in simple words, what is being said belatedly and which is unfortunately true, is that during the first years of the dictatorship it was only a qualitative minority that reacted in genuine fashion against the colonels.

The gift that we would like to offer to those who are governing us is a little modesty. A little simplicity, a little humbleness--a Christian virtue fitting the season--and, of course, a little sincerity, a degree of veracity in the announcement and the description of our international "achievements."

Because the "pride" that characterizes all the media is combined with a good dose of untruth.

It is not true, and it was never true, that Greece is sufficiently big, glorious and important to be indifferent to the opinion of the other important countries of the world. It is not true that they are admiring us for our audacity, that they appreciate the courageous and macho way with which we face the demands of the big and powerful. It is not true that we don't care if the doors of the White House and of Downing Street remain closed to us and that we are satisfied if we are welcomed by the homeless 'Arafat and the tent-dweller Al-Qadhdhafi.

All that "pride" is false and harmful and does not belong to democratic regimes, where those in power have the obligation to render an account of their actions to the people, the parliament and even the press.

The fact that they are successful at this time should not console them and should not reassure them. Our people often suffer from inertia and bear up under untenable conditions, and they often are magnetized, fascinated and dazed by all kinds of demagoguery. Not for long, not forever, but for sufficient time to inspire the demagogue and his followers with the illusion that they have definitely won the power game.

The things that are being said now are similar to what was being served us during those old, black days.

Fortunately, they are not the same, they only look like them.

But isn't it time for the professional "proud" people to understand that the show must come to an end?

This is our wish.

CSO: 3521/124

BRIEFS

NICARAGUAN, SALVADORAN WOMEN'S DELEGATIONS--The two-member delegation of the Nicaraguan Sandista Front (FSLN), consisting of Glenda Landerey, who is a member of the FSLN Assembly, a deputy of the Constituent Assembly and secretary general of the "Louiza Amada Espinola" Nicaraguan Women's Union /ENG/ and Xanthi Suarez, a member of the ENG International Relations Committee, both of whom were in Athens for the Third Congress of the Federation of Greek Women, met at the office of the KKE Central Committee /KE/ comrades O. Kolozov, alternate member of the KE Politboro, Mena Papaperikli, director of the KKE-KE section, and Sp. Stathakis of the KE Public Relations Section. At the meeting KKE reassured the delegation of its solidarity with the government and people of Nicaragua in their struggle to repulse the plan of American imperialism. Also in the same KE office a meeting took place between Julia Ester, director of public relations of the Progressive Women's Union of Salvador with comrades Betty Ambatellou, an alternate KE member and Eleni Papapetrou, a member of KE's women's section. At the meeting the two sides updated each other on conditions in their respective countries and KKE expressed its full support to the struggling Salvadoran people. /Text/ /Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 12 Dec 84 p 2/ 7520

MEETING OF KKE-INT.-FORMER KKE (EXT.) MEMBERS--The discussions between KKE-Int. leadership and the more than 100 former KKE (Ext.) members will be completed tomorrow night at the KMAS /expansion unknown/. During their second meeting last Monday the following amusing incident took place...Someone wanted to photograph those present at the meeting. Immediately several of the participants got scared and hastened to...hide their faces. They imagined photographs like those released by international press agencies showing anti-fascist demonstrations in Chile. Some unsuspecting persons asked if some of those present were Turks or Iranians who did not want their faces to be exposed to the secret services of Evren or Khomeini...And if they were, then what business did they have to be at that place?...Of course they were not...Turks or Iranians, but still active KKE members...who were not enthused with the idea that (the...special services of the KKE (Ext.) party) would learn that these former KKE members were concerned with the problems of the other leftist party... /Text/ /Athens I AVGI in Greek 16 Dec 84 p 3/ 7520

ALLEGED KGB MEMBERS--I offer this information to Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu and let him check it out, since he reportedly is the head of the KYP [Central Intelligence Service]: Two KGB members were included in the eight-member Soviet delegation to the Second International Conference of the KEADEA [Movement for National Independence, International Peace and Disarmament], a PASOK organ: Tair Tairov of the military branch of the Soviet secret intelligence service, and Vladimir Sluminov of the KGB political branch dealing primarily with peace movements. Tairov belongs now to the Soviet Peace Committee and is a highly placed member of the KGB. When Yuri Andropov, father of the present Soviet ambassador to Greece, was head of the KGB, Tairov was his close adviser and his secretary. However, these two Soviets serving in their country's secret service are not the only ones posing as members of peace movements. Among the secret agents who infiltrated the KEADEA conference last week--at which Mr Papandreu himself made a speech--was also Bohuslav Kucera, a Czech. [Text] [Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 16 Dec 84 p 6]

CSO: 3521/124

NONSOCIALIST COALITION EXPECTED TO LAST THROUGH ELECTIONS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Dec 84 p 5

[Article by Per Nordrum]

[Text] Even though the Social Democrats have regained their self-confidence and optimism, for the present, it is far from certain that they can regain political power in the parliamentary elections of September 1985.

Oslo--The nonsocialist coalition in Norway is beginning to show signs of discord. At the same time, the Labor Party under Gro Harlem Brundtland has conducted a relatively successful offensive this fall, which apparently has given the Social Democrats more self-confidence and optimism with regard to the parliamentary elections in September next year.

Actually, there are few indications that the coalition that includes the large Conservative Party and the two smaller parties, the Center Party and the Christian People's Party, has been hit by a serious split. On the contrary, apart from several quarrels that broke out in November, they have shown a solid united front. But how long can it last?

Oil policy, of course, is extremely important in Norway. Oil accounts for half of the country's exports. Deciding which companies will be permitted to do what in the North Sea is big-time politics. Contracts and licenses mean many billions of kroner. The foreign companies have been present from the very beginning, but now the Norwegian state's own company, Statoil, is becoming larger and larger. But how rapidly should politics be used to the advantage of Statoil.

At present, Mobil is responsible for operating the enormous Statfjord Field. This job involves many billions of kroner. According to the regulations, Statoil can assume responsibility for operations at the expense of the foreign companies after a certain period of time. There has been general agreement that Statoil should take over Statfjord from Mobil. The disagreement has been over when this should occur.

For safety reasons, the Conservative Party, the party of Prime Minister Kare Willoch, wanted the Statfjord Field to be taken over in the 1990's. In the latter stages of negotiations, the Center Party insisted that 1987 was the proper time. The result was that Statoil will take over the field as early as

possible between 1987 and 1989. This result came about because the Center Party went along with the Social Democratic opposition and the small Liberal Party, which has announced that it wants to work with the Labor Party if the elections next fall should give them a majority together.

The Statfjord affair has created much bitterness within the governing coalition. The totally uncompromising position of the Center Party is a good example of how not to solve problems, Conservative chairmand Erling Norvik said after the open battle that threatened to cause a governmental crisis in mid-November.

The Conservative Party chairman added: "Such pressure (as that applied by the Center Party) in public would have led to a political disaster if no one had had the maturity to prevent it." Understandably, this statement has done anything but please the Center Party.

Another, smaller dispute arose later in November. Both the Center Party and the Christian People's Party joined the Labor Party in the Industry Committee of parliament to oppose the government's proposal on supports to industry.

"They cannot sit in a nonsocialist government and, at the same time, seek support from the Labor Party in parliament," prominent young Conservative politician Per Kristian Foss stated angrily. "That is a form of 'cooperation' that could be fatal," he said.

All attempts at reconciliation have failed. The Conservatives were the only Party in parliament to support the three-party coalition's proposal to end subsidies to the shoe industry, among others. It should be noted that the proposal involves branches of industry with small plants scattered over the Norwegian districts. This is precisely where the Christian People's Party and the Center Party receive most of their votes.

The Center Party has been accused of fishing for votes, since recent polls have indicated that the party has only about 5 percent of the voter support. This is the worst figure for the Center Party since opinion polls were introduced in Norway. The Christian People's Party has never been pleased by Labor Party accusations that it is often nothing more than an appendage to the Conservative Party.

This fall the Labor Party has criticized the government sharply. Unemployment in Norway is higher now than at any other time after the war, although it is low by international standards. At present, 70,000 Norwegians are out of work. At the same time, Norway is earning more and more billions of valuable oil dollars. Naturally enough, most people have a difficult time seeing the connection between large oil revenues and unemployment--and the enormous flow of currency reserves to foreign banks.

The opposition under Gro Harlem Brundtland has been able to utilize this to its own advantage. In addition to using simple arguments, the Labor Party also has learned gradually to change its language: earlier she used complicated sentences with numerous dependent clauses. Now she is more able to speak a

simple and comprehensible language. It is hardly surprising that this appeals to the voters.

"The smiles on the faces of the governing parties seem somewhat forced, Mr President," Harlem Brundtland said during the financial debate in parliament in November. It was a financial debate that dealt with broad outlines. In this way, a broader agreement was reached between the government and the opposition.

Prime Minister Willoch did not fail to remind Harlem Brundtland that, as prime minister, she had said that, "A battle against inflation is both a battle for employment and a battle on behalf of the weak." This is the path that the Willoch government is following and that the Labor Party now believes has led to a dead end.

Now is the time to add more fuel to the fire and get the economy moving in order to reduce unemployment, according to the Labor Party. Labor accuses the government of thinking about the past instead of developing a policy that can solve the problems of the future. In an almost classic example of relations between the government and the opposition, Gro Harlem Brundtland was told by the government that, as a member of the opposition, she was preaching irresponsible policies.

If we look around in the world, we must agree with Willoch and his people that the situation is not one bit better in countries that are ruled by the Social Democrats. When the socialists are in power, they do not dare conduct the irresponsible policies now advocated by the Labor Party. The Conservatives point to Sweden as an example.

The question is whether the nonsocialist parties have lost so much support by ruling during times of economic difficulties that the voters will want a change next fall. Will unemployment and dissatisfaction cause enough voters to turn their backs on the government? But what is the alternative, many ask. After all, the Labor Party has managed only to play on this dissatisfaction without actually formulating a solid alternative. Experienced political observers are far from convinced that the Labor Party will be able to keep up its steam long enough to reach its goal of victory in September next year.

9336
CSO: 3613/51

MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY ELECTS NEW LEADERSHIP

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 18 Dec 84 p 9

[Article by Jan O. Helgesen]

[Text] AKP (M-L) [Workers' Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)] has held its national congress "somewhere in Norway" and not surprisingly it elected university instructor Kjersti Ericsson as its new leader. She succeeds Pal Steigan. Teacher Jorunn Gulbrandsen got the post of political deputy chairman and Arne Lauritzen was elected as organizational deputy chairman. Since the last congress there has been a women's revolt in AKP and the party has now become a real women's party, the new leadership said during a meeting with most of the Norwegian mass media at Tostrupskjellren yesterday.

There are signs that women will now get the place they have long deserved in the fight for revolution in Norway.

"The men have dominated the party and represented it to the outside world-- even though the women have done a lot of work behind the scenes all along. We are now developing a new policy marked by the women's struggle. The women's struggle has been underestimated in the communist movement," said the new party leader, Kjersti Ericsson. One consequence of the gains women have made in the party is a resolution that the central committee must consist of 50 percent women. That is the case with the newly-elected central committee. And 50 percent of the congressional delegates were also women.

Working Class

As always when AKP holds a press conference the whole thing smacked somewhat of a seminar. This time the subject was the "working class." Kjersti Ericsson said that 50 percent of those attending the congress are from the working class. After some debate on the boundaries of class affiliation, it was decided that while a nurse's aide belongs to the working class, a nurse does not! But nurses do not have to worry because of that. For belonging to the "intermediate group" means that one can be an important alliance partner for the working class. The new party leadership also said that KLASSEKAMPEN is a good newspaper but its employees are intellectuals, not members of the working class. This was not intended as a compliment or an insult, as far as we could tell.

China, NATO, Etc.

AKP people are thick-skinned when it comes to reporters' lack of understanding of their importance for the working people. Therefore there were many rounds about relations with China, NATO, the peace movement, armed revolution, etc. The party has been too servile to China, the leaders said. AKP opposes NATO and is lukewarm with regard to the peace movement. After the revolution the party expects to use friendly experts to keep things running and bring us into a transition period. The party also has trade union deputies in central positions in large firms. They could be a resource in that situation, we were told.

The party is very secretive about names--for security reasons. But in addition to Kjersti Ericsson, Jorunn Gulbrandsen and Arne Lauritzen, Tellef Hansen became union leader and Siri Jensen head of the women's committee. Tron Ogrim, the personification of the party's idea bank, left the central committee for personal reasons. This may have something to do with the fact that Jorunn Gulbrandsen is Ogrim's wife.

6578

CSO: 3639/45

BRIEFS

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY ANNOUNCED--Dr Menezes Alves, an attorney, confirmed to our newspaper that he will be a candidate in the next presidential elections. "I shall be a liberal candidate, against the 'Eanist' project and against Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo," he said. He also disclosed that he had already hired two "marketing" experts from the United States, who are at work at his headquarters in the Avis building and in one floor of a building on Fifth of October Avenue. He stated that he does not believe in "Eanism" and that "I will advocate a referendum in order to change society. I will also increase the private sector and encourage Portugal to have a closer relationship with the Arab countries." He added: "I shall express reservations about our membership in the EEC and I shall advocate the privatization of the press and television sectors in order to facilitate the establishment of new stations, among them one for the church." In regard to the military, Dr Menezes Alves said that he will recommend that they permanently return to their barracks, and that he is also for continued Portuguese membership in NATO. He will be for real autonomy for the Azores and Madeira. "I do not believe that the polls favoring Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo for the presidency are accurate; she cannot succeed in becoming president, and the same goes for President Eanes," he stated. Dr Menezes Alves was a presidential candidate in 1980, but said that he now had a new program. "I learned a great deal and I know better the ambitions and needs of the Portuguese people, who want to live under a liberal regime," he concluded. [Text] [Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 21-27 Dec 84 p 1]

CSO: 3542/80

DANES, NORWEGIANS INSPECT F-16 PLANES FOR RUST

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 19 Dec 84 p 10

[Text] Corrosion has not been found in the landing cylinders of Norwegian F-16 fighter planes as was the case in Danish planes of the same type.

"However the air force is waiting to get more details from Denmark and the 69 F-16 fighters will be inspected on that basis," Air Force Inspector General Magne T. Sorensen told the NTB news agency.

The newspaper EKSTRABLADET reported Tuesday that most of the F-16 planes in the Danish Air Force have been grounded because corrosion was found in the landing cylinders. Only 10 of a total of 52 planes are in shape to fly.

The rust was discovered after the Danish Air Force had its fifth crash of an F-16 plane in the last year and a half on Friday. In these crashes the planes have either suffered total damage or have been put out of operation for an indefinite period of time.

"Corrosion has not been a problem for us, but we do not know enough about it. Therefore it is quite natural that the Air Force Supply Command is waiting for more detailed information," the inspector general said.

There is widespread cooperation among the countries operating the same types of airplane. The exchange of information is purely routine and the Norwegian Air Force can count on getting the necessary data as soon as it is available in Denmark.

In recent years the air force has lost three of its F-16 planes which replaced the Starfighter in the mid-1970's. The third crash occurred when an F-16 burned up at Rygge early this fall.

But the Norwegian Starfighters have been grounded for good. A year ago the Stavanger press talked a lot about the airplanes standing and rusting at the Sola air base.

However their final fate has now been decided on--they will be used for training purposes for military personnel as well as civilian school students. One

even ended up in a museum as an item of defense history. It is in Gardermoen at this moment.

In the 1960's the Starfighter planes became famous internationally--the ones in the West German Luftwaffe, that is. These planes, which were produced on license in West Germany, cracked up one after another for reasons that have never been fully clarified. One of them flew the entire length of southern Norway in the mid-1960's and crashed a few meters from a mountaintop in Narvik--with the pilot slumped unconscious over the controls the entire time and accompanied by Norwegian fighter planes.

The Norwegian Air Force got its first one in 1963 via American arms aid. The United States got the last of these planes back a few years ago. In the early 1970's Norway got 15-16 Canadian-built Starfighters and these will now be used for training purposes.

"None of the Starfighters is operative today. Some of them will be used to provide spare components for other airplane types, especially when it comes to instruments. The others will be used primarily to train our personnel, but as recently as a few weeks ago one of the planes was turned over for civilian educational purposes at a vocational school in Rogaland," said Air Force Inspector General Magne T. Sorensen.

6578
CSO: 3639/45

PLANS TO PURCHASE HELICOPTERS FOR ARMY

Decision Not Yet Made

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 28 Nov 84 pp 12-14

Article by Frank de Moor

Text Minister of National Defense Freddy Verven PVV Party of Freedom and Progress wants to get permission from the government in a few days to start the private contract purchase procedure with the (eight) helicopter builders, who are regarded as qualified with one or two of their models to replace part of the Alouettes of the ground forces, which are sometimes 25 years old.

The amount of this helicopter purchase is estimated at about 12 billion Belgian francs, but everything indicates now that it finally threatens to be even more. For the Alouettes are not being replaced, without further ado, by similar liaison and reconnaissance helicopters.

The 38 Alouettes which are being retired from service starting in 1987, because of their great age and high maintenance costs are of the Artouste type. The newer models (about 30 units) are on the other hand, of the Astazou type and should continue to fly until 1995.

It is precisely those Astazous, where national defense wants to add liaison as well as antitank missions to 46 so-called multi-role helicopters. They are stronger machines, which can perform as well. That is called Aeromobility I. As reconnaissance helicopters the present Alouettes also play a role in the Atk anti-tank missions of the Belgian armed forces in the FlG, but they cannot destroy any enemy tanks themselves. They can only report them and possibly wait until the air force comes to provide support to the ground troops or till the troops clear the area with antitank guns or with Swing Fire or Milan missiles. NATO and

also the Defense Planning Committee have urgently requested the Belgian Armed Forces during the last 10 years to use helicopters, which can destroy enemy tanks with their own weapons.

This mission, which at times also would have to be carried out at nights, again has to do with the tank superiority, recognized everywhere, which the Warsaw Pact troops have over those of NATO, and with the discussion whether NATO has sufficient (according to some, already more than enough) antitank weapons.

Anyway, the option to equip the light aviation of the Belgian Ground Forces with Atk helicopters is not new. Nor is the discussion about the type of helicopter either.

So in the seventies, not to mention Aeromobility I (Atk and liaison), helicopters for limited transport (Aeromobility II) was still considered, such as for flying over troop sections with Milan missiles or for the evacuation of wounded to mobile hospitals.

Manufacture

However, in 1980 it was clear that the ground forces wanted to combine its missions regarding Aeromobility I and II. So they finally decided on multirole helicopters, as was explained here in more detail, consequently in the middle of 1980 they were on the lookout for a medium size (multirole) helicopter, so that in fact only the French twin-engine Dauphin types (with Bekaert-Zwevegem as industrial partner) had any chance. However the file was put in cold storage and competitors again gained hope.

British Westland tinkered around further on its Lynx 3, unpacked a life-size mock-up of that machine at the Flanders Technology Fair in May 1983 and began to rehash regularly its social-economic compensation proposals. The German-Japanese joint venture of MBB Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm and Kawasaki built further on the success (?) of its BK 117 and was almost assured that only the BK 117 would get the approval of National Defense.

As was explained clearly here at the end of last year, the budget for the helicopter purchase was then limited to 8.2 billion francs and only 46 BK 117's or a combination of 28 Dauphins and 18 Ecureuils (both of the French Aerospatiale) could be bought for that.

But, however, no purchase was made then and Minister of Defense Vreven let the file again be reconsidered.

All applicants, who were not deterred because of the too high price or the too low-powered engine, went on the attack again. So it developed that during recent months there was continual talk of one or another applicant.

In February, the Italian Augusta again offered its whole series. Its A 109 helicopter is a light multirole, but it is still almost as heavy as the BK 117. The AB 412 (Griffon), which Augusta developed under an American Bell license, is certainly multirole, but almost a light transport helicopter. For besides 2 pilots, it can also carry up to 13 soldiers. That is twice as many as the A 109.

In March Sikorsky (controlled by United Technologies) came out with a plan to build a helicopter plant in Flanders (in Ostend ?) if National Defense would only buy its H-76. That is, as almost all highly recommended models, a militarized version of a civilian machine, in this case the S-76, that truly is a successful number. Sikorsky's compensation file is certainly more original than Augusta's. The Italians keep it with conventional Walloon-Brussels subcontractors, refer to their parent firm EFIM Manufacturing Industry Holding and Financial Company--which is one of the Italian government holdings--and forget thereby the Flemish demands to place 100 percent or at least the majority of the compensation orders in Flanders.

Sikorsky's proposal to build a H-76 helicopter in Flanders, without any further ado, is according to some (even in FLAG Flemish Aerospace Group) all too original. For this time FLAG advocates semidirect and indirect but long term compensations, which involve Flemish businesses on a sufficiently high technological level in the international aircraft industry.

Only Bell-Textron has not committed itself until now, although everyone knows that its B 222 is an old nag. TEAMCO Trans-European Airways Maintenance Company, after its fruitless efforts to sell an electronic countermeasures program (12 billion) to the government for the F-16, would do better not to immediately start lobbying for Bell. Likewise TEAMCO in Melsbroek was previously allowed to maintain all the Bell and Sikorsky helicopters of the American Ground Forces in Europe.

Save

All that indicates that National Defense intends to let everyone bid (even Hughes Helicopters with its exclusive Atk-Apache-helicopter) in the hope that the bidders will reduce their prices proportionately and increase their compensations so that the ground forces can perhaps buy heavier helicopters for the price of lighter ones.

For in this helicopter purchase package, there are at present only two light models which are affordable. There is, on one hand, the French twin engine AS 355 Ecureuil 2, which is everything except an Atk machine and on the other hand, the German BO 105, which is used precisely by the Bundeswehr Federal Armed Forces for this purpose with its 6 HOT antitank missiles. At least for the Germans, the French and perhaps also other European countries are going to fly in the nineties with the so-called eurocopter, a sophisticated fighter helicopter produced by MBB and Aerospatiale.

However, as that eurocopter takes shape and a decision about the Belgian helicopter program is so delayed, that the first machines hardly can be delivered before the end of this decade, a number of considerations have been coming to the fore in recent months. All the more so, because the antitank-(night)-fire weapons systems, which the designers want to put in medium size transport helicopters, cost what it may, actually threaten to be sold in the NATO alliance only in Belgium. Moreover, there is still the fact that the HOT antitank missiles, just as the American TOW, which arm the helicopters used now, will be replaced at the beginning of the nineties, in their turn, by very sophisticated Atk missiles of the ATGW-3 series, to which the successor of the Milan missile belongs.

All that has led to the chief of staff of the ground forces, lieutenant general Jef Segers, recently first in a limited circle and now for the first time publicly, to start to slow down the purchase of Belgian Atk helicopters. Although he never says that outright, he wants to purchase, without further ado, 40 simple transport helicopters, in which he can place Milan teams of 8 to 12 men for Atk missions, without the helicopters themselves being enlarged to hybrid and sophisticated antitank platforms.

This is a dramatic surprise: not only because a chief of staff personally aims at savings and rationalizations, but because the government would do well in those circumstances to ask Minister of Defense Vreven to consider other designers and types.

Whoever wants to bring 2 pilots and a dozen infantrymen (2 + 12) several kilometers from the enemy in an antitank position must look at multirole and medium transport helicopters. And then only Sikorsky's H-76 or Black Hawk, Augusta-Bells AB 412 Griffon or the Bell 205/UH-1H are eligible. The Lynx 3 can only transport 2 + 9 men, the SA 365 M Dauphin only 2 + 8 and the BK 117 only 2 + 6.

Consequently everything indicates the helicopter situation will have to be considered again in the light of the opportunity to first optimalize the use of the existing Milan platoons.

General Segers on Needs

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 28 Nov 84 p 13

Interview by F.D.M.

Text The chief of staff of the ground forces, lieutenant general Jef Segers is the son of the deceased Paul-Willem "P.W.," but he has long since made his own name. Jef Segers is and remains the parachute commando and certainly originally acquired more political insight than is usual in higher military circles. The accompanying remarks testify to that. We asked how it now must be with the purchase of the new helicopters.

Answer I want to first and foremost evaluate what we have, and certainly not mention my operational credits. They are already hard enough to bear. The worst is that the training program in the field which is now already limited to 22 days (NATO asks for 60 and the mixed parliamentary committee regards 45 days as a minimum) directly influences the men's motivation. You cannot motivate a tank driver if he may only polish his tank, without riding in it. So you should not think that the helicopter purchase is limited to buying 40 new helicopters. Such a purchase assumes the development of an entire infrastructure, so that those helicopters would be able to fly and shoot.

Question That implies that the program threatens to be several billion more expensive than the estimated 12 billion?

Answer I get a definite amount of operational credits and no more, even though they are new helicopters. However, I simply cannot let them fly, if I must only let my tanks operate 700, instead of 1,000 kilometers, for this purpose. Then I spoil what I otherwise build up. The Alouettes must certainly be replaced, and if possible by antitank helicopters. However, it would be military nonsense to purchase such helicopters, if we then have to stop our tanks and our artillery. But that does not mean that we do not need any helicopters.

Question It is said in a limited circle that you would prefer transport, rather than antitank helicopters in order to make the existing antitank infantry platoons with their portable Milan missiles more mobile and efficient than they now are.

Answer It amounts to that to a great extent. It would certainly be ideal to replace those Alouettes with antitank helicopters, but if it would appear that we cannot do such a thing because they are too expensive, then it will be necessary to look

for another type of helicopter. On the other hand, it is certain that we still have outstanding teams with Milan missiles. We lug them around now in trucks or C-130 transport planes, but we do not have an intermediate solution. One of the possibilities, consequently would be that we fly Milan platoons of eight men or so to the front line, rather than antitank helicopters with their own weapons. I repeat, I will first and foremost evaluate what we have.

Question The problem is then that a Milan missile only has a range of 2 kilometers, while an antitank missile which is fired from a helicopter, has twice that range.

Answer You must consider the use of such a weapon in its context. It is no secret that in the terrain of the Belgian Corps in the FRG there are not many ranges over 3 kilometers. It is a rolling terrain like our Ardennes, full of woods and villages. There are no open surfaces there like in Westphalia or deserts like in Tobruk. A range of 2 to 3 kilometers is sufficient for most of our defensive positions. We must replace our Alouettes with something better, but we cannot set up any jet fighter squadron with rotary blades. I do not have money for that. All the more so since many of the helicopters proposed to us are not really designed for antitank missions. A truck with a cannon on it is still not a tank.

8490
CSO: 3614/46

ARMY CHIEF STRESSES FORWARD DEFENSE ROLE OF ARMORED FORCES

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Dec 84 pp 22-30

[Interview with Bundesheer Chief of Staff LtGen Hans-Henning von Sandrart; interview conducted by WEHRTECHNIK editor Wolfgang Flume, date and place not indicated: "The Goal of Our Effort is to Prevent War"]

[Text] Since the beginning of October the German Army has a new chief of staff, LtGen Hans-Henning von Sandrart. Many describe him as a military politician, a term he somewhat rejects--he considers his assignments as troop leader to have been the core of his soldiering. In the following WEHRTECHNIK interview the new chief of staff comments on the situation of the army after the comprehensive planning survey and stresses that the system of armored combat troops is essential for successful defense in a forward defense posture. Two new vehicles, the antiaarmor and the tank destroyer combat cars are under development. LtGen von Sandrart also comments at length on the new army concept of increased use of simulators, on standardization and interoperability within NATO, as well as on the problem of reconnaissance.

Lieutenant General Hans-Henning von Sandrart

Hans-Henning von Sandrart was born on 21 July 1933 in Argentina and returned in 1937 with his parents to Germany. After completing secondary schooling at Bremen-Vegesack in 1953 he studied law and political science for five semesters at Freiburg, joining the Bundeswehr in 1956. From 1959 to 1964 he was battery commander in an armored artillery battalion at Lingen, until 1966 he then attended the general staff course at the Leadership Academy in Hamburg. Promoted to major in 1967 he subsequently attended a course at the British Staff College at Camberley.

Until 1969 he was assigned as the G 3 to the staff of an armored brigade, and from 1969 to 1971 he was member of the Army Study Group at the Bundeswehr Leadership Academy. Then, until 1973, he commanded the 25th Armored Artillery Battalion at Braunschweig, followed by assignment as staff officer for nuclear policy at SHAPE in Belgium.

From 1975 to 1977 he was chief of department FueS III 1 (Principles of Military Policy) in the BMVg [Federal Defense Ministry] and then, having been promoted to brigadier general, he took over as chief of the military policy office at the German NATO mission in Brussels. From October 1980 until March 1983 he commanded as major general the 11th Panzergrenadier Division in Oldenburg, followed by assignment as deputy chief of staff, operations (DCSO) at SHAPE that lasted until his appointment as chief of staff of the army on 1 October 1984. LtGen von Sandrart is married and has a son and two daughters. He is especially interested in history as well as in problems of security policy and strategy.

[Question] General, you are considered a military politician--would you stress that characterization, or would you deem other characterizations to be just as good and appropriate?

[Answer] First, I would like to say very clearly that a one-sided characterization as military politician would irk me. I do not consider it appropriate at all, even though I have been active in the area of military and alliance policy over the last ten years due to my postings.

I am a soldier. I say that with the full seriousness of the word. A soldier today is such a complicated, multifaceted profession, indeed a collection of professions, of which military policy, alliance policy, and strategy are only a specific, very interesting sector, admittedly amenable to my personal inclinations. But--I am a soldier and I consider troop command to be the core of my soldiering. Therefore, my assignments as troop commander have been the highlights of my military career. And as chief of staff of the army I have returned to that career--at least to a very important extent.

[Question] But is the chief of staff of the army still a troop commander? Do not rather the commanding generals of the corps, or, for example, the NATO commander of the Central Army Group fit into that role?

[Answer] That is true. The chief of staff has dual functions. On the one hand he is a ministerial department chief, but on the other he is also the military service chief of the army. I would like to devote myself especially to that part. The fact that my long and valuable activity in the alliance has shaped my strategic concepts and my thinking is obvious.

New strategical considerations are also determined by the fact that no other armed force in the alliance is as integrated as the German one, and that the army bears the major burden in the forward defense and thus in the defense of our country.

Preserve Continuity of Leadership

[Question] Probably every officer sets certain goals for his activities in taking over a new function. Where do you intend to place your emphasis?

[Answer] First, I would like to say what I have been telling to everyone: I am interested in preserving the continuity of leadership of the German Army,

and I want to join in those efforts that my predecessor initiated and continued--he also moved within the continuity of leadership. The army is a very complex organization because of its many-sidedness and the people serving in it, and it thus cannot stand abrupt jumps or sudden course changes. And there is no reason for it--the course for the 90s has been set, there is a carefully thought out plan for structuring the army until the end of the millenium. The future of the army is of decisive importance; as I already briefly mentioned, it bears the main burden in the German contribution to the alliance and in the defense of German territory.

The task of the army staff is to fuse the operative concept within the framework of the alliance with the long-term personnel structure and armament plans after political decisions have been made regarding armaments planning and personnel structure. The conceptional unity of operational planning within the alliance, structural planning in connection with the field and territorial armies, armaments and material planning, training and education concepts is to be pursued. The mental potential of the army must be mobilized even more for that great task.

After all, the aim of our efforts is war prevention through deterrence by a prepared force. It is here that we find fault with the so-called alternative strategies that have recently been much discussed. In the NATO we very carefully analyze the premises of some strategies. Mostly they contain only suggestions on how we should defend ourselves once we are attacked. In my opinion strategies should be evaluated as to the extent they are strategies of war prevention. Many are more strategies for war.

Forward Defense Principle Will be Fully Maintained

[Question] It has been preached for years that the current peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr was the absolute minimum to carry out an active forward defense. Now it looks like major reductions have to be made due to the personnel situation in the 90s. Does that not mean that the principle of forward defense will be deflated, especially in the case of the army? Or can the--let us call it "loss in combat power"--be compensated by increased use of technology?

[Answer] The drastic birth decline in our country will have consequences for the Bundeswehr and thus also for the army. Decisions of the Federal Government, especially the extension of basic service to 18 months, limitation of exemptions from service, increase in the number of training facilities will assure that the principle of forward defense will be retained without reductions. The 38 assigned brigades of the army remain the untouched core of the German contribution to the alliance in their present state. Thus the high reaction ability of the army will continue to reach its defensive strength after mobilization in the required time. Here the army is setting on the political will to authorize the required measures to maintain full preparedness at the right time. A worry of all those responsible in the NATO is whether these political measures will be introduced in a timely manner in a crisis situation, especially when the difference between mobilized and peacetime strength becomes even bigger than before. The army will in the future continue

to have the ability to fulfill its mission within the framework of the alliance. Of course, changes in the current army structure are not impossible. These include not only the adjustments made to maintain personnel strength, but are also designed to eliminate current weak spots, for example, through improvement of infantry defense capability and increased maintenance of our soldiers in the reserves. Moreover, the army must be oriented to the conditions of the battlefield of the 90s. This, of course, includes the use of all technological opportunities. To the extent that technology offers us possibilities to limit personnel needs they will be used, as they were in the past. Examples of such personnel-saving technology are rocket launchers, mortars, drones, new bridging equipment, loading and transportation equipment.

But no matter how modern the technology, it cannot replace the leaders and fighters in the army. And thus all savings measures have their limits. For example, it has often been suggested that the crew of the battle tank be reduced from four to three men by installation of an automatic loader. This would lead to a reduction of some 2500 soldiers in the army over a semi-generational turnover. It remains debatable, however, to what extent the crew of the battle tank will then be overcome by the 24-hour combat day, by the longer periods in action due to the increasing night combat activity in our and also the opposing forces, by additional missions such as reconnaissance and security.

[Question] The army has recently decided on a concept of increased use of training simulators. Could you roughly outline the concept, and point out where you see the greatest benefit--is there improvement in training, is training more economical, or what...?

[Answer] Improvement in the use of our ranges and training areas, I would like to add immediately. The usefulness thus does not lie in this area or another, it is something of everything! In July 1984 it was decided to equip the combat troops with training simulators for gunnery and combat service. The concept of equipment includes:

--Dueling simulator for the Leopard 1 and 2 battle tanks, the Marder armored personnel carrier, the Luchs reconnaissance vehicle, and for antiarmor systems,

--Gunnery simulators for the improved Leopard 1 battle tank and for the Leopard 2 battle tanks, as well as

--Insertion tubes for the Leopard 1 and 2 battle tanks.

Duel simulators consist of training devices that can simulate firings with the aid of laser beams and sensors. Hits and misses are indicated by noise/smoke, the shot is also reflected in the sight of the firing tank by a tracer reflection. Dueling simulators will be installed on the combat devices, they are used in gunnery and combat practice, and they should essentially maintain skills learned in gunnery practice in combat service.

Gunnery simulators represent the combat quarters of a tank, and reproduce terrain and targets in the sights. They allow for performing parts of

preparatory gunnery practice and replace parts of gunnery schooling. In addition, research is underway to determine whether a platoon combat simulator is practicable and financially justifiable. It would permit tactical training for command personnel.

The 35mm tube insets, placed in the gun of the main battle tank, permit the use of subcaliber training ammunition in certain gunnery exercises.

In addition for these simulators for gunnery practice and combat service driving simulators and training tanks or driver cabins for the Leopard 2 battle tank, the armored howitzer, and the Marder armored personnel carrier have been acquired.

The main advantages of this equipment concepts lie in:

--training reflecting the threat and combat situations,

--savings in operational costs, for example, by reducing the training costs for the Leopard 2 driver training by about 70 percent, by at least 20 percent by using training ammunition in gunnery training for the improved Leopard 1 and the Leopard 2, and

--as I already said, better utilization of ranges and training areas, as well as

--reduction of environmental damage and consideration for the population.

In summary, I would like to say that the simulation will become increasingly more significant in training. The initial investment is undoubtedly very high, but the long-term effect of improved training and savings of operational costs speak for the use of simulators.

[Question] But has it been ascertained that training on the real equipment and in the field will be maintained without changes, or could and should reductions be made here as well?

[Answer] Training with the actual equipment in the field will continue to the necessary extent. However, the use of simulators allows for certain reductions in the present extent, or for replacements, resulting in reduced operational costs and reduced environmental damage. Simulators cannot and must not completely replace training with the original equipment; training with the actual equipment will continue unchanged in the field, in exercises, and in live fire. The soldier can master his mission only if he masters the original equipment.

In addition to the planned acquisitions for combat troops it should be mentioned that the army is already using numerous simulators with positive effect. Examples are the driver training simulator for the Leopard 1 battle tank and the flight target simulator of the Gepard air defense vehicle.

A soldier's trust in his weapon is the decisive factor for his motivation. He attains that trust not with a simulator, but with the equipment that he would have to fight with in a crisis. Training in combat will continue to be the crown, but through the use of simulators it will be considerably more effective.

Fall Maneuvers: Friendly Reception of the Training Troops by the Population

[Question] This year the fall maneuvers were reported by the press almost exclusively in connection with disturbances by our purported peace lovers. What did the fall maneuvers mean from the military point of view? Were there new combat procedures, were there particular tasks, or were they fall maneuvers as before?

[Answer] I would like to mention right off, that the press did report somewhat more extensively, especially to a great degree about the friendly reception of the training forces by the population. For me, that was perhaps the most positive result. Essentially, maneuvers represent the highpoint of soldier training, since they are designed to practice the cooperation of all parts, i.e., combined arms training. This was true also in the case of the fall maneuvers of 1984, especially at the Nimble Hedgehog exercise directed by the Commanding General, II Corps. In close cooperation the field army, the territorial army, ground forces of the allies, air forces of various nations as well as agencies and forces of civil defense within their legal tasks exercised.

During these army exercises new structures were, of course, tested--mention should be made of tests with a brigade reconnaissance company--, principles of deployment were further developed--I would like to mention here the deployment of an entire PAH [anti-tank helicopter] regiment in cooperation with an airborne brigade--, and ways were found to better inform the population in the preparation and execution of such major exercises.

The last fall maneuvers not only proved again that the army is prepared, they also showed that our concepts are correct and that plans point in the right direction. But we must not forget our allies, they also trained here this fall. Especially the British showed with their Lionheart 84 exercise that they could rapidly bring reinforcements to Germany. This underscores the fact that our allies are also prepared to defend our country.

New Weapon Systems for Armored Forces

[Question] It is generally said that the German army can be very satisfied with the results of the 15-year plan that has now been adopted. Where do you see the highlights, where will be the greatest improvements?

[Answer] The decisions of the minister in connection with the comprehensive planning survey have laid the path for the Bundeswehr plans until 1998. Further modernization of the army has been assured, even though all projects could not be fully realized to the desirable extent. But in these times of stringent financial restraints compromises must be made.

Particular concentration will lie in the fields of command and reconnaissance, fire support and munition supply, air mobility, and of course, the armored troops. The absolutely necessary unity of command, reconnaissance and combat action will be achieved by the Heros, a further development of the Autoko, artillery and air defense direction systems, and the included reconnaissance means. The fire power and denial capability of the army will be adopted to the needs of the forward defense by the MARS medium artillery rocket system, the Self-Propelled Howitzer 70, and the use of modern, including intelligent ammunition for the artillery and the engineers. All this--command, communications, improvements in ammunition and reconnaissance--we include under the term "periphery." These periphery systems give the main combat systems their true effectiveness on the battle field. The PAH-2 antiarmor helicopter will allow for the required ability for night combat, and the ability of the defender to form rapidly and flexibly antiarmor concentrations--something of such paramount importance for the defense--will be improved.

A particularly important decision concerns the core of the army, the armored forces. In spite of all the alternative suggestions and projections made in recent years by those having a calling, these forces are indispensable for the forward defense. This is affirmed not only by our national research, but also by studies and plans in the alliance. By including the antitank armored vehicle in the Panzergrenadier force the decisive step toward improved antitank ability of the infantry will be taken. I would like to attach particular importance to that new weapon system and I hope that the German industry will have a really big hit with it.

The same is true for the other new weapon system, the tank destroyer vehicle, which, with its elevator platform and third generation rockets can be used both against tanks and helicopters. The inclusion of these two new weapon systems will adjust the defensive capability of the army to the expected threat of the 90s, and guarantee it. We know, that it is a threat that also and growingly counts on the maintenance of shock action by armored attack under the use of modern technology and improved firepower.

[Question] You already pointed out that the new concept includes strengthening of the Panzergrenadier [mechanized infantry] components. The Panzergrenadier battalions will receive new armored personnel carriers and antitank vehicles, the tank battalions are to have only two tank companies, but also one equipped with armored personnel carriers. Does this not mean a reduction in the importance of the battle tank as a universally useable antitank weapon?

[Answer] No, the importance of the battle tank does not decline, since in the foreseeable future there will be no weapon system that combines the firepower, survivability, and mobility as well as the battle tank. But where there is fault--and the Israelis have had to pay in blood for that experience--is in the need for an even closer cooperation between the battle tanks and the mechanized infantry. We want to achieve this by the organic mix in the battalions that you mentioned, and develop this into a system of armored combat troops.

Let me try to illustrate it once more in a different way--the three elements of mobile and imaginative defense consist of the situation-oriented denial action, fire, and movement with shock effect. Through the use of modern technology these factors must be fused into an operative comprehensive concept. The tank as an instrument of fire and movement will continue to play a leading role in this fused concept, but not a solo part.

[Question] The planned increase in the number of Panzergrenadier brigades from 15 to 17 points to a trend toward increased mechanization. Why has the old concept of Jaeger [light infantry] battalions been abandoned? I am somewhat surprised by this, since the Americans are now establishing light infantry divisions which are to be used in Europe, i.e., in urban or forested areas, reinforced, if needed, by armored units?

[Answer] The German Army will have to rely on the mechanization of its combat forces to maintain its mobility as the numerically inferior under enemy fire and avoid being attrited. After the assignment of the 51st and 56th Home Defense Brigades and their further development to Panzergrenadier brigades for use on the forward edge of the defense line the increase in the number of these units from 15 to 17 is only logical.

The planned establishment of light infantry divisions by the U.S. must be considered with regard to the world-wide strategic role of the American Army, i.e., the need for rapid deployment. As you already indicated in your question, the Americans also foresee the need to reinforce that division in case of a deployment to Europe by strong mechanized forces, i.e., light infantry is to supplement mechanized forces, relieve them in suitable terrain, but not displace them.

To be sure, we would gladly have so-called light units in addition to the existing brigades for combat in forests and urban areas--but our given personnel and financial conditions do not permit this. Giving up such units is for us the lesser evil compared to giving up mechanized units. For combat under special conditions, however, we will certainly keep light brigades, such as the mountain troops and the airborne brigades. In addition, every division has several Jaeger battalions which can be used for combat especially in urban areas and forests.

Joint Command and Mission Principles in the NATO

[Question] The German Army, like the entire Bundeswehr, is an alliance force. In crisis it will fight side by side with its allies. What is the importance of the alliance for the army, with reference to equipment, but also mission principles? On the basis of your experiences in the NATO will there be even more standardization and compatibility, not only in weapon and command systems, but also in tactical command procedures? Where do you still perceive weaknesses?

[Answer] Fulfillment of our defense mission is only possible within the framework of the alliance. The maintenance, or increase of its combat power will thus continue to have a high degree of importance. Standardization and

interoperability are important building blocks in that direction. However, we are an alliance of sovereign nations with differing national interests. For this reason there will always be limits to standardization. For example, an army oriented exclusively to a European battlefield will have different or at least varying standards from an army that must consider the entire world as a possible field of action. The individual allied armies have different structures and traditions. For this reason there are natural variations in command and mission principles, primarily on the first command level. However, the alliance has succeeded in taking a great step forward by publishing a joint tactical command regulation. The Allied Tactical Publication ATP 35 fixes mandatory command and deployment principles for all allied forces. By the way, we are proud that proven German command principles are reflected in this regulation.

All told, a considerable extent of standardization was achieved in the past; this tendency will continue to increase in the future, as it will have to do in the case of, say, the introduction of new command and information systems. In this specific area the ability to cooperate is perhaps even decisive for the outcome of the battle and more important than standardization of main battle equipment, no matter how desirable that is. Joint exercises of major allied units show again and again that cooperation is functioning. Interoperability is thus not a slogan but reality. Due to perhaps greater similarities and also a narrower geographic task orientation I see here an even greater field for increased European cooperation within the framework of the NATO alliance.

Problem: Reconnaissance

[Question] The Bundeswehr is making great efforts to improve its reconnaissance ability by developing and acquiring new systems. Why is there in the army sector so little cooperation with allied forces? Disregarding AWACS for the moment, why is there not NATO-wide army reconnaissance system or at least one above corps level?

[Answer] The statement that there is too little cooperation with the allied forces in the area of reconnaissance means is only partially correct. Cooperation is very intensive. A few examples: At this time we are working with France on the RATAc, the artillery detection radar, and the RASIT, the armor detection radar. France, Great Britain, and Italy and Canada are partners in the CL-89 reconnaissance drone, France and Canada are partners in the CL-289 reconnaissance drone. In further projects, such as the KZO target location drone and the AOR artillery location radar Germany is striving for cooperation with other European countries.

However, I agree with you to the extent that cooperation in this field could be even better.

I would like to introduce my answer to the second part of your question with a few words about the concept of reconnaissance in the army for better understanding. This concept considers the fusion of a dual function as an important component: the horizontal union of all reconnaissance forces and means originally assigned to a level of command, to assure the highest possible

independence in reconnaissance. This independence is an elementary prerequisite for major units to carry out combined arms operations, but, as said, the independence is horizontal. Then there is the vertical union, which through the timely supply of reconnaissance results from the lower level of command to the higher level permits satisfactory situation determination in a longer perspective. At the same time it is a union in reverse, in which the higher level of command is to supply a possibly current compromised enemy situation to the subordinate command levels, to facilitate a reliable enemy situation determination further forward. This union of horizontal and vertical assures the best possible exploitation of all reconnaissance forces and means and can thus compensate for weaknesses at various levels and thus indirectly lead to cost savings. The reconnaissance fusion will work in the German army and to the neighboring major NATO units with the help of command and information systems which with the least delay are to assure every possible enemy situation and target location as important prerequisites for successful command and engagement.

I am purposely putting situation determination and target location on the same level. Both are very closely connected, since target acquisition can also result in a situation determination. On the other hand, the increased fire against mobile targets deep in the battle area makes it necessary that important targets are filtered out of a situation determination without delay. These are then transmitted, also without delay, to the combat forces, so that the actual target, the enemy, can be fought better and more effectively.

The army supplies NATO with a large volume of reconnaissance results, and the NATO appreciates this. More would be desirable, both from our and NATO's viewpoint. But here too personnel and finances imposes certain limits. Unfortunately, there is no army reconnaissance system above corps level in NATO. In war NATO has access on all levels to assigned reconnaissance means, such as aerial reconnaissance, as well as to national reconnaissance results to the greatest possible extent, such as telecommunication and satellite reconnaissance. For the NATO it is essential, however, that the national reconnaissance resources, especially in the case of an integrated front such as Central Europe, flow together at the various levels and that the total results flow upward, i.e., both on the national as well as the NATO levels. On the other hand, results that are submitted on very high levels, such as satellite reconnaissance, AWACS results, or results from modern national reconnaissance devices such as the American TR-1, must also arrive quickly at the appropriate level for control of countermeasures, so that the detected targets can be engaged quickly. Here financial ceilings and also national interests will simply not lead to a NATO system with uniform hardware and software. It will rather mean that the various national systems concerned with the processing of reconnaissance results must be so compatible that they are able to submit results to the neighbors even if the hardware is different. There are enough reconnaissance results that are of interest not only for one's own corps but also for the neighboring corps.

There is much more. The reconnaissance results must be combined somewhere. Just take the following example: A surveillance radar realizes that in a certain area there is a concentration of vehicles. This alone is not

meaningful, since it could be tanks or trucks. At the same time the electronic intelligence submits a certain signature from the same area that signifies that a command post is located there, by itself this too would only be a surmise. A third reconnaissance source, perhaps a long-range patrol, reports that command post vehicles are moving into position. Each report by itself is not a sufficient basis for a definitive finding or even for an engagement mission, but all three results with their idiosyncrasies superimposed on each other would provide a clear picture from which then an engagement order could be derived. For this reason the reconnaissance results must be brought together somewhere, the Americans call it "fusion," where a rapid evaluation can be made by feeding into a computer, and which then will practically result in a target definition. In Europe we are only in the beginning of this. To reach agreement many national hurdles have to be overcome, at the same time there must be even greater coordination with the various services since they have in part different reconnaissance missions. Modern technology can be of great use in this field.

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CSO: 3620/168

BRIEFS

FIRST T-72 TANKS ARRIVE--The first T-72 armored tanks ordered from the Soviet Union have arrived in Finland. The new tanks replace the obsolete T-54 tanks, which have served for over 20 years. A group of Finnish instructors and technical personnel has been in the Soviet Union during the autumn receiving training in the new type of tank. The tanks are lodged in the Armored Brigade in Parola. The T-72 is characterized as an efficient and modern combat vehicle. It weighs 48 tons, and its equipment consists of a 125-millimeter cannon, a machine gun and an antiaircraft machine gun. There is a three-man crew in the tank.

[Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Dec 84 p 19] 12327

ITOW ANTITANK MISSILES FROM U.S.--A batch of ITOW antitank missiles has been delivered to the defense forces from the United States. The equipment will be used in training next year. The missile receives the name antitank missile 83. ITOW is an improved model of the TOW antitank missile. ITOW is a heavy antitank missile for infantry equipped with a tripod gun carriage. Its range is roughly 4 kilometers. It is generally transported in a vehicle, but on difficult-to-traverse terrain it can, if necessary, be moved by manpower. Finnish specialists received usage and maintenance training in the United States during the autumn. Training of the original personnel will be broadened unaided in Finalnd next year. Steps will be taken to train conscripts in using the missiles in the Sodankyla light infantry brigade next autumn. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 15 Dec 84 p 25] 12327

PATROL VESSEL FOR BORDER GUARD--The border guard establishment's new heavy coastal patrol vessel is being ordered from the Rauma dockyard of Hollming, Inc. The border guard establishment and the dockyard signed the order agreement on Thursday. On Wednesday of last week, the Ministry of the Interior authorized the border guard establishment's staff to obtain the ship. The new patrol vessel has an aluminum hull, is 43 meters long and is a 270-ton vessel in its displacement. It is designed in cooperation with the Defense Ministry and the defense forces. The total acquisition price is 56.5 million marks. The coastal patrol vessels of the Koskelo class now in use are becoming superannuated. The plan is to replace them partly with new light coastal patrol vessels of the Lokki class and partly with new heavy coastal patrol vessels. The ship now ordered is the prototype of the heavy patrol vessel. The Lokki-class prototype is already in use, and the next three ships have been ordered. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Nov 84 p 12] 12327

AEGEAN SEA, NOT STRAITS SEEN KEY TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 7-13 Dec 84 p 30

/Article by Georg. An. Perimenis: "Greece a Key for the Control of Eastern Mediterranean!"/

/Excerpt/ In the more than 3,000-year history of Greece, the Aegean Archipelago has always played a most significant role in the development and propagation of the Greek-Christian civilization or, as it is aptly called, humanism, a phenomenon, that is, which is universally characterized as the great Greek miracle the whole world reveres.

The above concerns the glorious yet turbulent distant past whose mistakes should always be a lesson to us but on whose laurels we should never rely. Let us then see what the situation is in the Aegean at a time when man walks on the moon and wanders in space.

Much has been written and masterfully pointed out that the Turkish straits are of great strategic importance. It is argued that their fall into enemy hands will leave the way completely open into the Eastern Mediterranean. This notion has become a myth and is diabolically, one could say, spread and perpetuated. It is clearly evident that such perpetuation is achieved because those directly concerned have undertaken a propagandist activity which approaches the limits of hysteria while we are limited to an informational inaction which almost approaches the limits of Nirvana.

Before such a situation our allies, sometimes partially informed or pretending to be totally uninformed and sometimes driven by expediencies unfamiliar to me, are satisfied with what is being said or written, while sometimes they adopt and, not infrequently, undertake protracting, pre-blame-causing actions.

It is time this myth is put to rest and the whole issue be examined in its normal dimensions. All honest persons do not doubt the value of the straits when they are considered as an integral part of the Aegean Islands' area. It is absolutely unreal to claim that the control of the straits alone assures free communication between the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, since the Aegean Archipelago, with its innumerable islands properly armed, forms a continuous successive natural defense front which extends in depth and ends at the very strong Kithira-Crete-Kasos-Karpathos bastion.

Therefore, it is the control of the whole area from the straits to Crete which ensures free communication between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and while control of the straits could possibly be achieved with a simple land or amphibian action, control of the archipelago is much more difficult and requires much more complex operations. One could easily say that controlling the island areas and Crete will continue to be very difficult even if control of the whole Greek mainland is achieved.

Therefore, the strategic importance of the straits is not simply underrated when they are detached from the Aegean area but becomes almost nil. This is the simple truth and refusal to recognize it is contrary to logic and to the elementary principles of conducting a war.

Can it be that the Turkish excitement about Limnos Island is not related to the above truth? Not only is it related but it is a plain consequence of this truth.

Also, much has been written in NATO texts and much has been starred in NATO forums about the strategic value of the Turkish mainland and especially its eastern part because it borders on the Soviet Union and the explosive areas of the Middle East and Persian Gulf. This too cannot be disputed by any logical person.

Yet, in this case too, the Turkish area becomes important not when it is considered as an isolated area but when it is solidly connected with the Greek mainland area and especially the Greek sea area. This is so because what role can the Turkish land area play if it is cut off from the west? There is no doubt it will be completely cut off if the control of the Greek land area and especially the Greek island area is lost, when, that is, the area which ensures control of the Eastern Mediterranean is lost.

The conclusion, therefore, is easily reached that the Greek area and especially the Aegean Archipelago and Crete are of immense strategical importance for the control of the Eastern Mediterranean and for the support of any possible operations in the east. More simply, while the importance of the Turkish area is bound together with that of Greece, the opposite is not valid. The importance of the Greek area, that is, is self-existing and independent of the Turkish area. As a matter of fact, loss of the Turkish area will increase the importance of the Greek area.

This, I believe, is the substance of the issue and the rest is rhetoric serving expediencies of doubtful if not suspicious origins.

I would like to raise my voice so loudly as to be heard by our allies across the Atlantic. It is about time they realize or cease to pretend that they understand that both the land and sea Greek areas, being the southeast end of the Balkan Peninsula and projecting deep into the Mediterranean, is very valuable to the Alliance. It is absolutely entwined with the concept of support of any activities in the Middle East and Persian Gulf as well as with

the concept of survival of any forces engaged in the Eastern Mediterranean. In other words, it is the area key for securing control of the Eastern Mediterranean.

It is, therefore, evident that the entrance of enemy naval forces into the Eastern Mediterranean will be very difficult, if not impossible, if the Aegean Islands are properly fortified if, that is, the successive lines of defense they form are properly strengthened. Consequently, winning and maintaining control of the Eastern Mediterranean is very difficult. It is my opinion that our allies and particularly those on the other side of the Atlantic should have this in mind when drawing up their various defensive plans.

The rapid deployment forces about which we read so much in the newspapers could also be easily used wherever it would be deemed necessary, in the Persian Gulf, for instance, without worrying about its rear areas. Also because the survival of the forces engaged in the Eastern Mediterranean--the aircraft carrier groups for example--are not only free of risk but comfortably secured. I believe these issues are of vital, most vital importance.

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CSO: 3521/115

NUCLEAR ARMS' MANEUVERS IN NORTHERN GREECE DESCRIBED

Athens | AVGI in Greek 14 Dec 84 p 3

/Article by Marios Kostas/

/Text/ The Greek soldiers who are painting the building housing the American guard--the only building visible behind the second barbed wire fence--work while the men of the 83rd American detachment have their guns trained on them.

A few kilometers away one can see the first houses of Drama. All its inhabitants know that Drama has nuclear weapons. The NATO bases in our country, such as Drama, are part of the logic of limited nuclear war in Europe.

Agreements signed by the Right have created units in our country which, when NATO decides, will respond with nuclear missiles to the "Red offensive from the north."

A broad training cycle begins in the fall and continues until late spring with the NSI /NATO Surveillance Inspection/ review--a review dreaded by the unit commanders since NATO officials from Brussels come to check the operational preparedness of the Greek nuclear forces!

First they check the security of the Special Weapons Depots as the depots of nuclear weapons are called. This is a basic part of NSI. The responsibility for guarding the depots is assigned to the Greek Armed Forces and the Special Weapons Security Companies (LAE0) they have established.

Next they check the vehicles which are specifically modified to accommodate the nuclear missiles. Finally, the men are tested on their theoretical and practical knowledge concerning the nuclear procedure. A training missile similar to the nuclear missile is activated by Greek soldiers all the way to the point of loading the missile into the cannon. The slightest mistake, the slightest omission during the review is enough to term the unit non-combat ready.

Distinctions

Apparently the Greek military is doing well. Gold placques testifying to excellent showings during NSI reviews adorn the offices of the Greek commanders who ask their men to repeat the same feat next year.

It must be noted that the Greeks do everything except the arming of the missile which houses the nuclear warhead. This secret is kept by the Americans who do the arming in a special vehicle away from Greek eyes.

The review of the American officials is attended by senior officials of the Greek Army General Staff.

During the training of the Greek units two more exercises take place: the Operational Readiness Test /ORT/ and the Operational Readiness Inspection /ORI/. In the ORT exercise--which takes place separately for each unit--a pre-nuclear missile, or conventional missile, is used.

ORI does not involve shooting but deals with the nuclear procedure and is designed to acquaint personnel with war conditions.

It is not known what type or capacity warheads are in the Honest John missiles in the NATO nuclear units. According to foreign publications, the artillery pieces the Greek Army uses are M-422 missiles of unknown force.

The Scenario

In all exercises the scenario is exactly the same. The "Reds"--according to the scenario--exploit the recent tension between the Blue land (Greece) and the White land (Turkey) and concentrate strong forces at the border, and according to intelligence, they are ready to attack. Bands of irregulars have appeared in various parts of Makedonia while the security forces have dismantled wide spy nets of the Reds. The Reds who, according to the scenario, are attacking in order to reach, at last, the Aegean Sea, have superiority in the air and in nuclear weapons.

It is not necessary to point out what this scenario reminds us of, which is the same with that used for national military exercises. The danger for the military appears to be from the north and east as the premier declares. And in this context they prepare our Army in keeping with the NATO dictates.

Replying to questions from the political editors following the disclosure in the press of the ORT exercise in the Honest John missiles, the government spokesman said: "The presence of American nuclear weapons in Greece is based on agreements signed by EPE /expansion unknown/, and they have never been ratified by the Greek Chamber of Deputies and therefore they have no validity for our government."

But the problem is not the American nuclear weapons in the American bases in Greece, but the NATO nuclear weapons located mainly in Langada and Drama.

Three staff plans are still in effect. Known as Cosmic and Etna, they deal with nuclear support for our Army, the storage of nuclear weapons and the security of the depots, and finally the plan Aristotelis of NATO origin.

A new round of training for the Greek nuclear units has started this year. A great deal of money will be spent again for the maintenance of the NATO installations and the special vehicles for the transport of the missiles as well as for the lavish dinners for the American inspectors. And all this takes place while the government talks about a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans.

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MILITARY

GREECE

SURPRISE ANNOUNCEMENT LISTS RETIREMENT OF HIGH OFFICERS

Army-Navy Retirements

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 22 Dec 84 p 1

/Excerpts/ According to existing indications President of the Republic K. Karamanlis and Premier A. Papandreu during their meeting yesterday dealt mainly with the changes in the Armed Forces and their timing, together with the presentation of the new defense dogma, to the extent these may have repercussions on the country's foreign policy.

This was the conclusion of political observers who took into account not only the brief statement from the president (questions related to internal developments and the country's foreign policy were discussed) but also a series of other events which naturally were of strong interest for the president.

These events are related to Papandreu's new "defense dogma" and its connection by the opposition to the changes in the Armed Forces. They are also related to the reaction of the American government as well as Turkey which connected this new theory with the possibility of tension in the area during a critical turn of the Cypriot problem.

Moreover, the fact that President Karamanlis during his meeting yesterday with the new leadership of the Armed Forces noted their "heavy responsibility" and--more importantly--the "need to preserve their unity" is not unrelated to the president's strong interest in the recent changes in the Armed Forces.

The New Retirements

Seventeen more senior officers (brigadier generals) were retired yesterday. This concluded the sudden retirements which caused many questions. At the same time 18 brigadier generals were promoted to major generals and several appointments were made of newly promoted vice admirals and Air Force major generals.

The 17 brigadiers being retired (in a month) will be given the rank of major general "as having successfully completed their career" following the promotion of junior colleagues.

No public announcement was made on the appointments of the new vice admirals and Air Force major generals because the related decrees had not been signed. It became known, however, that the following Air Force officers were appointed:

Il. Psomas, deputy chief of the Air Force General Staff; G. Mavrakis, commander of aviation training; Nik. Papadopoulos, Air Force inspector general; and G. Kakaris, National Defense General Staff member./GEETHA/.

It was also announced that five rear admirals were appointed as follows: Vasilikopoulos to naval training; Theofanidis to administrative service; Lismanis as deputy chief of the Navy General Staff; Triandafilidis as fleet chief of staff; and Theokharis to the fourth GEETHA branch.

Those Retired

The following Army brigadier generals were retired: D. Lavrendakis, Kh. Androutsopoulos, Pan. Papaverios, Georg. Tsanganos, N. Georgagakis, Evr. Salamouras, G. Niotis, Marinos Nikolopoulos, Kon. Karolidis, Evangel. Derekas, Lam. Khalatsis, Ioan. Panoritis, Kon. Stoumbos, Zaf. Demestikhas, Dim. Galatas, and Vas. Papadimitriou.

Those Promoted

Those promoted to the rank of major general to fill vacancies are: Nik. Psimoulis, Evt. Salias, Stef. Tambakakis, Georg. Papadopoulos, Evt. Karlioutis, Nik. Mangafosis, Dim. Manikas, Vas. Goulielmos, Theod. Spanoudakis, Pang. Pandazis, Evstrat. Sandris, Ioan. Poulakas, Ioan. Liodakis, Nik. Varvalakos, Mikh. Lambrianidis, Ioan. Verivakis, Kon. Kritsonis, and Ioan. Tzanakis.

More Retirements Announced

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 20 Dec 84 p 1

/Text/ More senior officers were retired by the government yesterday. A TV announcement said that changes were made in the leadership of the Armed Forces and that the General Army Staff /GES/ chief, and Army inspector general and the Army commanding officer were placed under retirement. The announced retirements were:

In the Army: Six of the 11 lieutenant generals were retired including GES Chief Lt. Gen. Kourkafas. Besides the three lieutenant generals who were retired two days ago, the General Staff Officers Council /SAGE/ decided at its meeting yesterday to retire two more lieutenant generals--Commander of the Third Army Corps Nik. Kolomvas and GES Deputy Chief Alex. Kalenderidis.

At the same time SAGE retired "as misguided" 12 major generals as a result of promotions given to five of their colleagues (Dim. Limniatis,

Mikh. Venetakis, Stamatis Veliidis, Ath. Papastathis and E. Sanidas). Those retired are: Nik. Gryllakis, An. Karadimas, P. Kolokouris, Dim. Lambrou, Grig. Khronis, Th. Pondikakis, Dim. Verros, P. Tarandidis, Vas. Leivadas, Khr. Organisis, I. Bitos, and Nik. Thrysanthou. All were promoted to the rank of retired lieutenant general.

In the Navy: Vice Admiral and Fleet Commander Giorgzas and Vice Admiral and National Defense School Commandant K. Zografakis were retired. Rear Admirals II. Perisakis and Per. Lambiris were promoted to vice admirals. Rear Admirals K. Metallinos and Ar. Kelaidis were retired "as misguided," but were promoted to the rank of retired vice admirals.

In the Air Force: Lt. General Sot. Kondogiannis was placed under retirement.

Following the retirements and promotions SAGE decided at meetings under the chairmanship of Air Force General Nik. Kouris, the new National Defense General Staff chief, with the participation of the new GES Chief Lt. Gen. Pentheroudakis and Air Force General Staff Chief Lt. Commander Apostolakis, the Government Council for National Defense met under the chairmanship of Defense Minister Papandreu and completed the leadership of the Armed Forces by appointing:

Lt. Gen. Emmanouil Skoulas, until now commander of the Athens Military Directorate as Army commanding officer; Lt. Gen. Mikh. Vretakis, until now commandant of the Military Academy, as commander of the First Army Corps; Lt. Gen. Dim. Limniatis as the Athens Military Directorate commander; Lt. Gen. Ath. Papastathis as commander of the Higher Military Command for the Interior and the Islands; Lt. Gen. E. Sanidas as commander of the Fourth Army Corps; Lt. Gen. G. Ioannou as GES deputy chief; Vice Admiral II. Perisakis as fleet admiral and Vice Admiral Per. Lambiris as GEETHA second deputy chief.

Air Force Major General Nik. Stappas was appointed chief of the Tactical Air Force Command while Air Force Major General II. Tzamouranis was appointed commandant of the National Defense School.

Learned About Retirements From TV

Army Inspector General An. Soundias, Army Commanding Officer Ath. Karavanidis and Higher Military Command for the Interior and the Islands Commander Pan. Panourgias were not even advised in advance of their retirement. On the contrary, they believed that such an issue existed in mind only. It is characteristic that the first two were placed in retirement while on duty. The first was on an inspection tour at the border island of Samos. At the Officers' Club he was approached by surprised officers who told him: "General, it was announced on TV that you have been placed in retirement..." Karavanidis was on an inspection tour in Veroia and learned the news from subordinate officers. Lt. Gen. Panougias was luckier. He heard the news with his own ears while watching a TV news bulletin!

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MILITARY

GREECE

BRIEFS

AIRCRAFT SPARE PARTS ON FRENCH PLANE--Hundreds of crates with aircraft spare parts were found yesterday at the Mikra airport on a French civilian plane headed for Iraq. The load was not declared to the authorities by the pilot who had reported only the crew and two passengers (French). The French aircraft had landed at 1800 hours and stopped in front of the airport tower and a smaller plane of the Air Club was moved next to it in an effort to hide it. Customshouse personnel found the crates stacked at the rear of the plane. They opened two of them and upon finding the spare parts notified the security authorities who immediately formed a 2-kilometer radius ring around the plane! The Salonica police chief did not permit photographers to take pictures while the pilot threatened to create a diplomatic episode if he was not allowed to fly to his destination. Reliable sources said last night that the French plane will leave today with its load by order of the Deputy Finance Minister Dimosthenopoulos because, as he claimed, spare parts for fighter planes were not included in the regulations "for the transportation of ammunition." /Text/ /Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 28 Nov 84 p 17 7520

REPAIRS ON NIGERIAN PLANES--After tough negotiations, the Greek Aircraft Industry /EAV/ will repair and maintain the Nigerian C-130 transport planes, a fact which proves the vertical increase of the company's reliability throughout the world since within a short time it has assumed the repair and maintenance of other countries such as Egypt and Jordan. EAV Chairman Prof. P. Fotilas said in a statement that the awarding of similar contracts to EAV is of particular significance considering the fact EAV is "a young enterprise." The fact that the C-130's are part of the air forces of a large number of countries opens up new opportunities for EAV whose activities extend to various sections of the modern repair and construction technology. /Text/ /Athens ELEVTEROTYPIA in Greek 5 Dec 84 p 47 7520

TURKISH NATO ADVANTAGE--Whose interests does it harm and whom does the Greek government's decision to abstain from the NATO exercises favor? With both countries having the same NATO armaments and similar war technology, the Turks simply have a better knowledge of the handling of the continually renewed arms systems, while we will proudly abstain. But does this represent a policy for Greece to have, that is, one wooden foot in NATO and the other in Third World explorations? /Text/ /Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 14-20 Dec 84 p 207 7520

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MILITARY

NORWAY

DENMARK REPORTED INTERESTED IN BUYING KOBBEN CLASS SUBS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 20 Dec 84 p 11

[Text] The Danish Navy has indicated its interest in taking over submarines of the Kobben class when Norway will be renewing its submarine force as of 1989.

Erik Senstad, section chief, of the Ministry of Defense tells NTB that Norwegian and Danish authorities will be meeting after the New Year to discuss the possibility of the takeover.

However, it will hardly be a question of renting or selling all of the 13 Norwegian Kobben class submarines. The Navy has expressed the desire to rearm and retain part of the Kobben class submarine force in addition to six new submarines which have been ordered from a West-German shipyard.

"In that case, Kobben class submarines may be in operation in the Norwegian Navy up to the year 2000," says Erik Senstad.

Erik Senstad says that it is too early to state the number of Norwegian submarines which may be taken over by Denmark, and the price they will fetch.

The Danes have also approached the West German Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, for the purchase of second-hand submarines but have received a negative answer from the Bundeswehr.

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NAVY EXPECTED TO MODERNIZE SIX SUBS AT DOMESTIC SHIPYARDS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Nov 84 p 4

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] The Navy will probably be spending close to 400 million kroner on modernizing six of its old Kobben class submarines in the coming years. The inspector of submarines, Commander Reidar Skarlo, tells AFTENPOSTEN that this work may very well be carried out by Norwegian industry which has both the know-how and the capacity.

"In addition, it saves the Armed Forces considerable operating costs, and we shall avoid having our staff, which will necessarily have to participate in the work, spend any prolonged period of time abroad," he says.

It is now 75 years since Norway got its first submarine, an event which is marked by the issue of an anniversary book.

Commander Skarlo says that Kværner Brug, among others, has developed a high level of competence, as far as pipelines for the power industry are concerned, and that it is on the basis of the same principles that the pressure-resisting parts for the old Kobben class submarines will be improved.

The anniversary book on submarines, which, incidentally, was written by Captain Tore Prytz, draws the attention to the strong reaction on the part of Norwegian shipyards a few years ago against approaching German shipyards directly without any prior international bidding in connection with the construction of Norwegian submarines. The strained economic situation within the Armed Forces has led to the modernization plans for submarines which the Navy is now in the process of implementing.

Commander Skarlo says that the Navy is now preparing model defense plans in connection with the purchase of six new submarines, at the same time as a number of old submarines will be modernized.

"The Air Force purchased its F 16 aircraft long before any decision had been made on the kind of weapons with which the aircraft would be provided. The aircraft thus will become rather obsolete before becoming fully operative,"

he says. Commander Skarlo says that in order for the Navy to avoid getting into a similar situation toward the end of the century, as far as submarines are concerned, it will have to take into consideration already at this point the demands which will be made of the next generation of submarines.

The Kobben class submarines were purchased in connection with the Navy plan of 1960. Due to American arms aid, Norway covered only 60 percent of the expenditures in connection with the implementation of the plan. In the mid-seventies, the submarines were provided with fire-control equipment.

Skarlo says that a modernization of the submarines now will involve replacement of the electronic equipment and improvement of the body and the mechanical parts. "However, by the turn of the century, such mechanical parts will be worn out and become obsolete," he says.

It is assumed that the new ULA class of submarines will be in operation until approximately 2020. Already a decade ago, the Navy started thinking about this purchase. The Navy decided on six submarines, with an option for an additional two submarines. It is clear, however, that the Navy wants to have at its disposal a larger number of submarines than merely eight, and that this may be best done by not purchasing the last two ones, but instead modernizing six of the old submarines of the Kobben class, of which the Navy today has got 14.

The new ULA class submarines are much larger and more effective than the Kobben class submarines. The vessels are twice as heavy, as far as displacement is concerned, and have more than twice as many torpedoes onboard. Crews who will be serving onboard will have showers in the new submarines. "However, where does the Navy want the vessels to have their base?" This question has been discussed. Commander Skarlo's viewpoint is as follows: "The submarines ready for mobilization ought to have their base in North Norway in order that they may be brought into action in a number of combat areas as early as possible. With modern air transport, it will only take a couple of hours for the crews to be ready for action. The Navy has a base at Tromsø which handles submarines in North Norway in need of maintenance. That base will be fully utilized," says Skarlo, adding that the new ULA-submarines have been built to participate in warfare as an attacking force.

"On account of improved anti-submarine capacity on 'the other side,' we shall have to expect to fire torpedoes at a considerably larger distance than in the case of the Kobben class submarines today. Incidentally, we plan to man the vessels with highly competent people in order to avoid having special 'attack forces,' which are only brought into action whenever something happens."

"I hope that the new command order will not cause any changes in this fundamental view," says Commander Skarlo.

LARGE INCREASE IN NUMBER OF SUBMARINE INTRUSION INCIDENTS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Dec 84 p 15

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] The number of reports on submarines in Norwegian fiords and waters has tripled in the last 3 months, possibly on account of the publicity given to Nils Owren's book "Sink the Devil." The above statement was made by the commander of the Naval Forces in South Norway, Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen, at a press conference last Thursday. He stated that the search for submarines in Sunnhordland last year cost the Navy 6 million kroner in addition to the usual operating costs.

Admiral Pedersen, moreover, said that he was gratified that the Navy had learned to apply the working time provisions in a more efficient manner.

"This has given us more time for navigation and more training for the crews." He said that the Navy is now working on defense plans for the forced requisition of civilian vessels which may be used together with military vessels and boats from the Coast Guard.

"Combined, such a fleet will have a sufficient deterrent effect on foreign submarines in a situation of war," he said.

Rolf E. Pedersen, furthermore, said that the capacity of the Navy in the anti-submarine sector ought to be of the magnitude of eight to ten escort vessels. The almost 500 million kroner, which will be the total investment in new equipment in Norway, is a very good improvement.

Admiral Pedersen stressed the significance of an alert coastal population and said, "It is better to report three times too often than one time too little."

In answer to the question about the reason why foreign submarines enter Norwegian fiords, Pedersen said that it is not unlikely that they try to

test the reception for communications from the home base. He did not want to comment on the recent article in AVIATION WEEK on the possibility of American satellite surveillance and localization of submarine activity also in Norwegian fiords. "We have contact with the headquarters among our partners in the Alliance," he said.

In answer to the question whether Admiral Pedersen regards the investments in the coastal artillery in South Norway as satisfactory, he said that the Navy is doing its best with what it has and that, on account of the technological developments today, it will be possible in 10-15 years to get weapons that are a good deal better than the weapons today. The Swedish firm of Bofors has extended the option time for ordering four new turret guns for Norway although we have taken no position on such purchases.

Pedersen, incidentally, said that he was satisfied with the decision to give captains authority to use all weapons in addition to torpedoes in the search for foreign submarines. Pedersen said that sinking a foreign submarine by a torpedo should still be decision which will have to be taken at the government level and not by military authorities. A torpedo will hit the target on which it has been aimed. Depth charges and Terne depth charges [terne-salver: trade name for older type of Norwegian-made depth charges fired from surface vessels; translator] in times of peace will inflict sufficient damage to force submarines to surface and become identified. That, of course, is the main idea, said Rear Admiral Rolf Pedersen.

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SOUTHERN NAVAL FORCES CHIEF: READY TO DEAL WITH MINISUBS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 14 Nov 84 p 10

[Article by Eivind Bull-Hansen, NTB]

[Text] The Armed Forces are psychologically and, as far as materiel is concerned, partly prepared to face a situation with foreign minisubmarines in Norwegian fiords.

This statement was made by the commander of the Naval Forces in South Norway, Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen, in connection with the crisis handling play on submarine hunts at the command center in the mountains at Jåttånuten near Stavanger.

"We feel that the submarines are sneaking in on us," Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen tells NTB, but he points out at the same time that there is no reason to dramatize the situation.

Inspection of Sea Floor

The Naval Forces have lately inspected areas around the most important defense installations along the Norwegian coast in search for the crawling treads of minisubmarines on the sea floor, and further inspections will take place at regular intervals. So far, there have been no indications that such foreign minisubmarines have been operating in Norwegian waters.

It is primarily the submarine reports from Sweden which have induced the Norwegian Armed Forces to make preparations for involving submarines in the search of Norwegian waters as well. Also in Japan, the crawling tracks of minisubmarines have been spotted, according to Rear Admiral Pedersen.

So far this year, the Armed Forces in South Norway have launched about ten actions as a result of reports from people claiming to have seen objects in the sea looking like submarines. The Armed Forces in South Norway have received an average of one report per week from people stating that they have sighted minisubmarines.

The number of reports on unidentified objects has this year been higher than the average for previous years. However, only 17 percent of the reports has subsequently, been classified by the Armed Forces as likely submarines.

More than 50 percent of the reports has been invalidated as not involving minisubmarines, while 30 percent of the submarine observations has turned out to be Norwegian or Allied submarines.

Since 1969, on a national basis, only four observations have been characterized, on the basis of investigations carried out by the Armed Forces, as undoubtedly foreign submarines on illegal expeditions within Norwegian territorial limits.

One of the certain submarine reports caused the well-known submarine hunt in the Sogne Fiord in 1972. According to Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen, it was a Polish submarine of the Whiskey class which, at the time, violated Norwegian territorial waters by entering the fiord.

"The reports on unidentified objects in the waters off South Norway in the last year have concentrated on the Hardanger Fiord, the Sogne Fiord and North Trøndelag," Rear Admiral Pedersen says.

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ARMED FORCES CONSIDERING PURCHASES OF MINISUBMARINES**Minisubmarines From Yugoslavia**

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jan 85 p 8

[Article by Ingemar Lofgren]

[Text] The Swedish Armed Forces are considering purchasing more submarines from Yugoslavia.

In the business contract for the two minisubmarines already purchased by Sweden it is stated that further purchases may be made under the contract if the Swedes turn out to be satisfied with the materiel.

"The contract with the Yugoslavs contains an option for an extension of the deal, if desired. This means that we may obtain further units in the future," Goran Ditzinger of the Defense Materiel Administration tells DAGENS NYHETER.

In answer to the question whether the new purchases, if any, would comprise the same types of minisubmarines as the ones which Sweden received in December, Ditzinger answers:

"The contract applies to these very vessels, and the option, therefore, applies to the same type of materiel."

At the Defense Materiel Administration, it is stressed, however, that before getting involved in new business with the Yugoslavs, the Navy will test and evaluate carefully two minisubmarines which have already been purchased, the R 1 and the R 2.

Learning to Track Down

The reason why the Navy has procured them is that they want to learn to track down and seize the foreign submarines which are said to be operating in Swedish waters, among other places off Karlskrona last spring. They will thus be used as training vessels.

Since the vessels are made of aluminum and operated by means of encased electric motors, they may readily elude both magnetic wave detectors and submarine detectors.

The approximately 10 divers now being trained on R 1 and R 2 will later on this year test the vessels along the Swedish coast. They will find out whether the vessels will have an impact on the Swedish defense systems. Subsequently, the Armed Forces will find out whether it will be possible to improve the incident preparedness.

Other Countries

A question one asks oneself is whether it would not be sufficient to have two minisubmarines in Sweden, since they are only to be used for purposes of study. The Defense Materiel Administration, the Defense Staff and the Navy have, moreover, stressed emphatically that they will not be used for offensive purposes. Why, then, has the door been left open for further purchases?


"Other countries use several minisubmarines in their defense. If we could afford it, we would also want to have more of them," the chief of the Defense Staff, Vice-Admiral Bror Stefenson, tells DAGENS NYHETER.

There are several areas of use, Stefenson says. Divers may use the minisubmarines as a means of transportation, among other things, when they study our own sea floor, our own mine-laying, etc.

"Later on, they may, however, also be used in the Baltic," Bror Stefenson adds.

Authorized Sketch Published

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Jan 85 p 4



Photographs are prohibited, but the Swedish Armed Forces have published this sketch.

START-UP AID FOR INDUSTRY, TECHNOLOGY DATA BASE, NETWORK

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 5 Dec 84 p 4

[Article: "Limited Start-up Aid for the Establishment of a Network"]

[Text] Bonn. The Federal Government of West Germany, in cooperation with the states, is going to support the gradual creation of an information network for industrial and applied research, and it also intends to allocate funds for start-up aid for a limited period of time. These facts are contained in a bill entitled "The Program of the Federal Government for the Years 1985-88 Regarding Technical Information", which is currently being evaluated by the appropriate departments and other bodies.

This bill demonstrates that Bonn considers to be important the participation of German companies in the development of a worldwide electronic market for economic information. The federal economics minister is to support the creation of economic information banks with information that has been gained as a result of carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the state and that can be found in stores of data available to the state.

The federal program to promote the gathering and processing of information that worked from 1974 to 1977 was, in the years thereafter, only partly able to attain its original goals. An experts' report about technical information in the Federal Republic, which was presented by the president of the federal auditing office in his capacity as federal commissioner for cost-efficiency in administration, therefore recommended restatement of technical information policy.

The Federal Government is now following the recommendation by presenting its new program. In it, Bonn states in principle, "In a free-market economy, producing and supplying electronic technical information are, as a rule, to be done by private enterprise and are thus determined by private initiative. Considering their market positions and because of the risks to themselves that they assume when they invest their capital, companies must make their own decisions regarding to what degree and for what purpose they wish to become involved. Therefore, in the field of electronic information markets, the aims of technical information policy are to improve basic conditions, especially to remove obstacles and bottlenecks so that private initiative can function better."

The program draft states that necessary for an independent German supply of technical information is cooperation in a spirit of trust between publishers of technical literature, technical information facilities and science libraries. Despite the general line stressing private initiative, the state is granted the right in individual cases to produce, offer and disseminate electronic technical information to carry out its duties and responsibilities. The program demands as a prerequisite for state support of private projects "appropriate efforts on the part of business".

It is above all in the area of the creation of economic information banks that the Federal Government considers private initiative to be of primary importance--for the creation of new types of information banks, for the conversion of existing stores and for the opening of internal data banks. The Federal Government intends to make an offer limited in scope and time within the framework of an invitation to submit bids; the terms must still be worked out in detail.

The following fields are emphasized with regard to the limited start-up aid for economic information banks:

Information about products in certain specialized markets, e.g., machine-building, energy technology, electronics and construction.

Information regarding companies and industrial sectors, e.g., balances, the calculation of profits and losses, as well as profiles of German firms.

Information for German companies engaged in foreign trade, especially general surveys about the economies of selected countries and specific industrial sectors in these countries.

Selected statistics and forecasts as to economic development both at home and abroad.

Bibliographical banks with technical and management information regarding economic matters.

Finally, an analysis of the need and market for economic information is to examine the question whether there is a need for economic information beyond the aforementioned measures--there is special concern about the situation of small and medium-sized German companies--in order to preserve and improve the competitiveness of German business.

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CSO: 3620/186

DETAILS OF ECONOMIC AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 8 Dec 84 p 7

/Text/ Yesterday Greece and Czechoslovakia signed an agreement for economic, industrial and technical cooperation. The agreement, signed at the National Economy Ministry, is the result of the first productive meeting between the countries following Premier Papandreu's visit to Czechoslovakia last summer.

The two delegations, headed by Deputy Minister of National Economy K. Vaitsov and Foreign Trade Minister Bohumiz Urban, met for 3 days and agreed on the following:

- a. To promote the implementation of the agreement transferring to Greece the social insurance funds of Greek refugees from Czechoslovakia. The social affairs ministers of the two countries will soon be asked to sign the agreement provides for the transfer to Greece of 24 million dollars which will be paid in cash installments over 5 years. There are still 5,000 Greek nationals in Czechoslovakia, but the agreement will also include those who are already repatriated.
- b. To expand the trade relations and give particular emphasis to industrial cooperation. In this framework cooperation between the Elefsis shipyards and a Czech company will be promoted. This cooperation will create the pre-conditions for the production in Greece of freight cars for use by the Railway Organization of Greece. The entire order will reach 5.5 billion drachmas, of which 1.4 billion will represent the Czech participation. Czechoslovakia will provide a loan for financing the project at favorable terms.
- c. To arrange as of now our export relations for the 1985-86 period. It has already been decided that in 1985 Czechoslovakia will buy 4,000 tons of oranges and 2,000 tons of lemons--in addition to the 14,000 tons of citrus fruit already agreed.
- d. To promote the production of tractors in Greece with the cooperation of Stayer and the Czech company Tzetor /transliteration/.

e. To hold talks for expanding trade relations in industrial products.

Vaitsos said a timetable has also been arranged for 1985 and 1986 for clear targets for implementing the long-term program Papandreu signed in Czechoslovakia.

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CSO: 3521/109

BRIEFS

INCREASED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION--The industrial production index continued to rise in September. According to data issued by the National Statistical Service of Greece /ESYE/, the general production index for mines, industries and electricity increased by 3.6 percent in September 1984 compared to the corresponding month in 1983. The industry index, particularly, marked an increase of 2.9 percent. These developments resulted in the increase during the January-September 9-month period of the general index by 2.4 percent and of the industry index by 1.5 percent compared to the corresponding 1983 period. These increases are confirmed if one also uses the data with seasonal corrections. Such data show that the 1984 increase in manufacturing products will reach 1.5 percent. On the other hand, the employment increased by 0.4 percent during the same period according to the ESYE data. Thus, the upturn of the economy is improving the situation in the labor market as well. /Text/ /Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 5 Dec 84 p 7/ 7520

UNSATISFACTORY LEVEL OF INVESTMENTS--Fifty percent of the industries cannot secure bank loans on the basis of normal bank criteria and the other 50 percent have reached the limit of survival. As concerns the area of investments, administrative officials said that a sample study of 50 enterprises listed in the stock market shows that during the first 6 months of 1984 there was a drop of 28.6 percent in investments in current prices compared to the first 6 months of 1983--a drop which is due to the government policy, that is, on price controls, inflation, the budget, etc. As regards the trade policy, the same officials claimed that the government gives the impression it is an objective control but in fact there is no true Change and as a result the fears increase more and more /Text/ /Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 13 Dec 84 p 17/ 7520

CSO: 3521/122

FINANCE MINISTER TELLS PARLIAMENT EXPECTATIONS FOR 1985

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Morten Malmo]

[Text] In 1985 the government is anticipating real growth in Norwegian business investments of a good 9 percent and that is excluding oil activities, shipping and home construction. It is also anticipated that industrial production will increase even more next year than it did this year. Finance Minister Rolf Presthus made these "predictions" in Storting yesterday and he concluded by saying that the Norwegian economy is on the road to improvement. Gunnar Berge (Labor) criticized the government however for giving what he called a "highly slanted presentation" of the Norwegian economy.

The debate on balancing the budget was the last "battle" before Storting started its Christmas recess yesterday and the debate was in many ways a repetition of the budget debates earlier in the fall session. Representatives of the government parties stressed the bright aspects in the Norwegian economy while the opposition saw less positive features. Among other things Gunnar Berge feared that the decline in unemployment could be a temporary phenomenon and he repeated once again that the Labor Party's alternative budget would have provided 25,000 more jobs in 1985 if it had been approved.

Finance Minister Rolf Presthus harshly criticized the Labor Party's budget alternative and said that such a plan would have driven Norwegian economic development into a blind alley and also pointed out that higher taxes, as proposed by the Labor Party, would have fueled a stronger price and cost increase.

The chairman of the Storting Finance Committee, Petter Thomassen (Conservative), stressed that the total economic plan for 1985 takes care of the central tasks by increasing efforts in the health and social affairs sector, safeguarding employment, intensifying research and laying the foundation for an active district policy.

Harald Synnes, parliamentary leader of the Christian People's Party, said that a growing number of people will value the results the government has achieved over the last 3 years.

"A better foundation has been laid for winning the fight against unemployment, for increasing the emphasis on the health and social sector and for evening out inequities. A solid foundation has been laid for the three coalition parties to go on the offensive in the vital working year that lies before us," Synnes maintained.

Labor member Sissel Ronbeck reminded the government parties of a statement that her party colleague Guttorm Hansen made during the debate on the opening address in Storting earlier in the fall session in which Hansen used this image: "It does not help much that the economic wagon starts moving faster if more and more are left lying in the ditch. On the contrary, that is a totally wrong approach."

"The most important basis for the welfare state is not a compensatory social policy but a social economic policy," Ronbeck added on her own account.

Yesterday's balancing of the national budget means that Storting has given its final approval to the economic plan for 1985 in all areas where the state has income and expenses, including the social security budget.

Storting also supported allowing some of the currency reserves in the Bank of Norway, estimated at 3-4 billion kroner, to be placed in Norwegian banks. Yesterday's budget balancing debate also means that banks, finance companies and firms can issue "certificates," i.e. negotiable securities with a 1-year redemption period. The government also got the green light to liberalize currency regulations on individual and company purchases of foreign bonds. This was opposed by the Labor Party, the Socialist-Left Party and the Liberal Party.

6578
CSO: 3639/45

LONG TERM ADULT UNEMPLOYMENT SEEN CONTINUING PROBLEM

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 24 Dec 84 p 7

[Article by Tone B. Jamholt]

[Text] In 1980 10 percent of those out of work had been so for a long time, in other words they had been out of a job for more than 6 months. In 1983 one out of every four were in the ranks of the long-term unemployed. In 1984 the figure is one out of three. They can risk being permanently unemployed. Around 90 percent of those who have been out of work for a longer period of time have a low educational background.

In other words there has been a dramatic climb in the number of the long-term unemployed. In September 1983, 15,600 had been out of work for more than half a year. A year later, in September 1984 the figure had climbed to 20,000.

However the number of people registered as unemployed declined somewhat. At the end of November it measured 58,300, a decline of 4300 compared to last year. Unemployment declined somewhat for men during the year while it increased somewhat for women.

Young People

Registered unemployment among young people also declined somewhat. It is now around 7000. But here the hidden figure is high.

The individual and household censuses for 1970 and 1980 ("Oslo--Rich and Poor") show that there has been a marked decline in training--and job frequency--among young people between 16 and 19 years of age in Oslo and that this has led to a sharp increase in the number of young people without permanent employment. In 1970, 9.9 percent of this age group was jobless in Oslo, in 1980 the figure was as high as 30 percent. If we subtract those subject to the draft and those covered by welfare benefits, we are left with 5700 young people in Oslo who only work now and then. That is a quarter of the young people in Oslo.

Social Assistance

The social assistance statistics also indicate the number of those who have been out of work for a longer period of time. This year an estimated 120,000 people will receive social assistance, a figure that has doubled in 3 years. More and more people are getting social assistance over a long period of time.

The number of those out of work for a longer period of time has risen in all European countries where unemployment is high. The trend has been so dramatic that we are in danger of having a permanent unemployment problem in several countries. The number of new jobs absorbs only the new groups that join the labor market. We are seeing the same thing in Norway, according to a report on the labor market issued by the Institute for Social Research.

This report says that this form of "business cycle unemployment" leads to a more systematic elimination from the labor market which affects "weaker groups." The problems on the labor market also prevent women from looking for work.

Ted Hanisch of the Institute for Social Research told ARBEIDERBLADET that the problems of long-term unemployment are concentrated on a few groups and that they are the ones who have to shoulder the really big burdens of unemployment.

Restructuring

If the labor market now continues to develop in a favorable direction, long-term unemployment among young people will probably decline somewhat. But long-term unemployment among workers over the age of 60 can be of a more permanent nature. This is related primarily to restructuring efforts in industry. Although the labor market is developing favorably, plant closings and reorganizations are still occurring in industry. This will affect older workers regardless of market conditions, in Hanisch's opinion.

Politicians

Employment is an inflammatory political theme. Municipal Affairs and Labor Minister Arne Rettedal hopes to get unemployment down to 50,000 by spring. Prior to a Storting election it is expected that the government will emphasize labor measures to reduce unemployment figures. If we count the number of people included in job programs total unemployment will not decline. In November 1983 there were 37,800 people in such programs; this November the number is 40,900.

The situation on the labor market is an important campaign card for the opposition. Labor Party financial policy spokesman Gunnar Berge says unemployment must go down to around 20-25,000 before we can talk about having full employment again.

6578
CSO: 3639/45

SPECIFICATION OF 'URGENT REINDUSTRIALIZATION ZONES'

Madrid YA in Spanish 6 Dec 84 p 5

[Text] The Council of Ministers yesterday specified the number and locations of "Urgent Reindustrialization Zones" (ZUR) and set the basic criteria which give form to the proposed law which will regulate them, although this bill was not definitely passed pending the decision of the Council of State. Eduardo Sotillos, the government spokesman, said yesterday at the press conference, which regularly follows a Cabinet meeting, that the government, acting on a proposal by Carlos Solchaga, minister of industry and energy, has decided on six areas: Galicia (Ferrol and Vigo), Asturias (Langreo, Aviles, Gijon and Mieres), Ria de Bilbao, Madrid, Barcelona and the Bay of Cadiz.

With the ZUR, the government plans to compensate the areas affected by the industrial reconversion, including a series of benefits to new industries which decide to establish themselves in the specified areas. It is expected that about 33,000 new jobs will be created.

Galerias, to the Cisneros Group

As first reported in YA yesterday, the Council authorized the sale of Galerias Preciados to the Diego Cisneros organization. A green light was also given to the sale of the following Rumasa enterprises: Drame to Marcos Elguizabal; St. Augustus Weinkellere to The Nose Cash and Carry Ltd; Vinicola del Castillo to Fomento e Inversiones del Pais and 25 percent of the stock of Ficis to the German enterprise BASF Farben and Fasern.

The sale of the stock of the following enterprises was also authorized: Laboratorios Frine, Union Vinicol Alcoholera, Richard Haas Weingroskellere, Instituto Espanol, Laboratorios Mas, Barbar ward and Mas Cosmetic.

Grange Law

The government also studied a report on the basic contents of the bill on farm associations presented by Carlos Romero, minister of agriculture, fishery and food. They set up a working group to coordinate the adjustment of the agreement on Gibraltar under the chairmanship of Gonzalo Puente Ojea, undersecretary

of the ministry of foreign relations, which will include representatives of the ministries of defense, economy and treasury, interior, labor, transportation, tourism and communications and the office of the prime minister. A larger role was authorized for the ministry of economy in Hutsa when a revision of the enterprise's program of action, investments and financing for the current fiscal year was approved. This involves an increase of the enterprise's capital from the 1.3 billion pesetas originally planned to 4.8 billion pesetas. As YA recently reported, the purpose of this investment--which will be financed through the state budget--is to allow the enterprise to absorb moderate losses so as to continue its activity and to make adjustments in its staff.

In another agreement, the Basque Autonomous Community was authorized to issue 3.2 billion pesetas worth of government securities to finance the cost of investments authorized in the Basque country's general budget. The securities may be purchased by individuals or corporations. The spokesman reported that during the 2 years the government has been in power, 101 sessions have been held--76 decisionmaking and 25 deliberative--plus extraordinary working sessions resulting in an average of one meeting per week, including the vacation periods. During these sessions 11,204 subjects were discussed; 126 bills, 25 royal decree-laws, 4,862 royal decrees and 6,171 general matters (ministerial orders, resolutions and agreements) were passed.

Appointments

At yesterday's meeting, the Council of Ministers approved the following appointments: Jose Luis Crespo de Vega as Spanish Ambassador to Guatemala and Juan Antonia Rossignoli Just as president of the Competence Defense Tribunal.

9204
CSO: 3548/62

FLURRY OF LAYOFFS BY ASTILLEROS ESPANOLES

Madrid ABC in Spanish 6 Dec 84 p 56

[Article by Jose Antonio Vega]

[Text] Madrid--Astilleros Espanoles, S.A. [Spanish Ship-builders] [AES] has sent out a total of 8,406 letters of suspension or rescission of work contracts to workers of the factories in Olveaga, Puerto Real, Cadiz, Asua, Sestao, Seville, Manises and Astano (Ferrol) according to the Union Workers Committee. The workers now have the alternative of accepting the suspension and joining the Employment Promotion Fund or of accepting the rescission of the contract.

The factory at which the largest number of worker layoffs were made was Olaveaga--formerly Euskalduna--where 2,234 workers have received letters sent by the enterprise. This will leave only 201 workers who will maintain the center which will be put back into operation again if such action is called for under the fleet plan which must be completed before July 1985.

As to La Naval in Sestao, 895 workers received the AESA communication according to the shop committee, since the AESA personnel department refused to give out figures as to the number of letters sent.

At Puerto Real and the Bay of Cadiz, 1,011 workers also received the letters from the enterprise. Among these workers are persons between 25 and 35 years of age, at this newspaper reported yesterday. The plant committee of the shipyard at Puerto Real announced yesterday that 400 letters of suspension and rescission have been received in addition to those announced previously.

At the Asua employment site, all members of the work force of 418 received layoff letters, thus that factory will be eliminated. As to the Manises center, which engages exclusively in making motors, 11 workers received the letter from the enterprise.

At the Astano enterprise in El Ferrol, 3,404 workers and 11 company office employees in Madrid will receive the appropriate letters of suspension or rescission within the next few days.

Also, in Seville, a highly profitable ship building center will issue terminations since, according to the Workers Committee report, the enterprises has sent out 273 of those letters. Besides, 33 AESA Madrid center workers will be laid off due to the naval reconversion.

The General Employment Directorate has already approved all the employment adjustment actions requested by the various naval sector enterprises being reconverted. According to the report of the Ministry of Industry approved on 36 November, 8,400 workers of the great shipyards subsector are surplus. Of these 4,500 will be placed in early retirement at the age of 55 years.

All workers who have received the letters of suspension or rescission of contract may choose to accept the suspension of their contract and join the Employment Promotion Fund for the surplus workers of the naval reconversion which was created last Monday, 3 December, by a resolution of the Ministry of Labor. Under the terms of this fund, which for the present is being boycotted by the workers on the instructions of their shopcommittees, the workers will wait 36 months to be rehired. Such rehiring would have to be granted by the Urgent Reindustrialization Zones. The workers, however, may choose the recission of contract and sever all connections with the enterprise.

On the other hand, yesterday the workers' sit-in at the various factories continued both at AESA and Astano, though at the latter plant, according to EFE news agency reports, they abandoned the sit-in at 1400 hours yesterday. At the same time, they agreed to request the civil governor of Pontevedra to free four workers imprisoned on the night of 4 December at Vigo. The Ascon enterprise workers in Vigo received yesterday an advance of an average of 150,000 pesetas per worker against the back pay due them for their 3 last months of work.

9204
CSO: 3548/62

INDUSTRY FORECASTING INSTITUTE PREDICTS CONTINUED GROWTH

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jan 85 p 11

[Article by Bjorn Anders Olson]

[Text] Swedish industry expects to increase its production further in the first quarter of this year. More export orders are expected whereas the Swedish domestic market is becoming more subdued. The rate of employment, however, will only increase for white-collar workers.

This is the overall picture that Swedish industry gives of itself in the most recent forecast of the National Institute of Economic Research.

The picture, however, is somewhat mixed. Especially the lumber mill industry has already begun to feel a setback, and the forest industry is always too early in a business cycle.

The forecast of the National Institute of Economic Research is based on a study of 2,200 industrial enterprises and shows that the upswing in the Swedish industrial activity continued in the fourth quarter of last year. Production, employment and demand increased further. Half of the enterprises operated at full capacity and 70 percent of the enterprises considered their volumes of orders on hand to be sufficiently large.

The only industry which reduced its production was the lumber mill industry, and the forest industry expects a continued decline in the supply of orders during the first quarter of this year.

For the fourth quarter in a row, the rate of employment rose among workers, contrary to the predictions of the companies. During the first quarter of this year, the companies do not either expect any increase in employment for their workers.

During the fourth quarter last year, the supply of orders from the domestic market increased at an unexpected rate. For the first quarter of this year, it is expected to drop anew.

This, however, is being compensated by an increased supply of orders from abroad, in particular for the iron and steel industry, the food manufacturing industry, the chemical industry and the rubber goods industry. The forest industry as a whole and the lumber mill industry, in particular, did, however, experience a declining demand.

As far as the first quarter of this year is concerned, especially the metal goods industries and the transport means industry (automobiles, etc.) expect a clear increase in their order supplies. The lumber mill and pulp and paper industries expect a continued decline. Still, 90 percent of the pulp industry regards the volume of orders on hand as good.

As far as production plans for the first quarter are concerned, there is an upward trend for Swedish industry in general, but the rate of increase will, however, slow down.

The electrical industry, the transport means industry, the kniwear industry, the paper industry, the chemical industry and the rubber goods industry, however, expect "definite upward trends in their production plans."

It is the lumber mill industry, the graphic industry and the cement industry which expect production cutbacks.

As for employment, which will become one of the major election issues, the rate of employment increased in industry during the fourth quarter, and, as pointed out, as far as workers are concerned, that increase in employment was unexpected.

The rate of employment increased among workers within most industries, but the highest rate of increase was clearly within the iron and steel industry. The food manufacturing industry, the lumber mill industry, the paper industry and the instrument industry, on the other hand, experienced reduced employment.

The increased employment among white-collar workers is primarily attributable to the electrical industry, the transport means industry, the instrument industry and the chemical industry.

Within the first and second quarters of this year, industry, for the fifth quarter in a row, expects no change in the employment rate for workers. The rate of employment among white-collar workers is expected to increase, especially within the iron and steel industry and the chemical industry.

It was, moreover, emphasized in the forecast by the National Institute of Economic Research that the steadily increasing shortage of labor, an increase which has been going on for 18 months, stopped, i.e., the shortage remained at a constant level.

Finally, as far as price increases are concerned, slightly less enterprises expect price increases during the first quarter than was the case 12 months ago.



The graph shows that the return on investments in industry remained largely unchanged between the third and fourth quarters after having increased since the end of 1982. The return on investments, however, lies somewhat above the most recent business cycle peak, which occurred in mid-1980.

Key: 1. Industrial trend.

7262
CSO: 3650/121

EGE-KOOP'S NISLI EVALUATES CURRENT HOUSING LAW

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 25 Dec 94 p 3

[Interview with Fehmi Nisli, Assistant to the Ege-Koop General Coordinator, by DUNYA; date and place not specified]

[Text] The fact that the law on collective housing was passed and that work has begun on solving the problem of housing, which has been one of the most controversial issues of the past few years, has given that issue a new dimension and vitality. Soon after the law was passed considerable activity in the establishment of cooperatives was observed.

And one of those endeavors is the Ege Kent, founded with the aim of solving Izmir's housing problem, which is being carried out with the help of the Housing Creation And Construction Cooperatives Association. The Ege-Koop's Assistant to the General Coordinator, Fehmi Nisli, points out that the latest Collective Housing Law is the most adequate one so far. Nisli, who stressed that the problem of housing will never be solved in Turkey if this law No 2985 fails, answered our questions on the housing problem as follows:

DUNYA: Can law No 2985 on collective housing which was passed during 1984 be evaluated as an adequate law?

NISLI: Law No 2985 which came into force in 1984 is the best law on collective housing that has been passed to this day. Despite the fact that all the laws passed previously were adequate with regard to content they did not work. The deficiency in those laws stemmed from the fact that they relied on the budget for resources. The deficits in the budget were covered from the fund that had been set aside and this made the laws inapplicable.

From that standpoint the Collective Housing Fund established by the new law and the Public Enterprises Directorate have created new resources for the housing sector and ensured a new cash flow. The fact that the money collected will be handed over only to housing cooperatives will be one of the factors that will ensure success. Thus there can be no question of hindrances in the housing construction sector. But the law gives rise to some doubts all the same: will it be possible to ensure the cash flow? However, one thing is certain, if this law does not succeed either, it will become impossible to solve the problem of housing in Turkey, which has reached huge dimensions. In

fact it will not only be impossible to build collective housing but any housing at all.

DUNYA: According to you will the money collected in the fund be sufficient? To what extent will the credits extended make it possible to meet housing needs? What are the weak points and your recommendations for remedying them?

NISLI: The money that is expected to collect in the fund will be sufficient. According to this law three separate credit allotments are foreseen. Credit amounts have been calculated in the law according to area with a view to encouraging the building of small homes. Thus with a credit of 1,750,000.00 Turkish liras for 60 m² houses, 80% of the cost is covered. However, as the surface increases the proportion of the costs covered considerably decreases. This is one of the law's weak points. According to a survey, almost 90% of the [coop's] members prefer 100 m² homes. And as can be readily seen from this, the people of our country continue to live in the style of traditional families. And according to a research carried out by our technical service the cost per m² unit exceeds 40,000.00 Turkish liras. Which shows that 100 m² housing will cost 4 million Turkish liras. Yet, according to the Collective Housing Law credits of only 2,750,00.00 Turkish liras are to be extended for a 100 m² home. Since we address ourselves to the middle and low income sector, members will be forced to resort to their own resources to make up the difference, which will put them in a difficult position. Which means that the problem of private resources will have to be solved. And we at the Ege-Koop have solved this problem. We are planning to make up the difference with the housing credits we will get from the European Settlement Fund. With the \$6,125,000.00 credits we requested we will meet the cost of foundation building above flood level, as it is called. With the Council of Europe Settlement Fund credits which give us a big advantage in creating housing, we will be able to complete our housing projects within four years at the most without having any credit problems.

DUNYA: These days when the construction of collective housing is being accelerated instead of the classical, which we call conventional, system of building, the faster, mass produced system of prefabricated housing is recommended. What is the Ege-Koop's approach on this issue?

NISLI: It is true that at this point debates on the technological aspects of creating housing are intensifying. The fact that in recent years factories using the prefabrication system of production have proliferated has started to draw attention in that direction. Insofar as the prefabrication system makes it possible to create multiple housing within a short period of time, it may appear to be advantageous. However, we are not of the opinion that Turkey has yet reached that stage from the standpoint of technology. The production of prefabricated housing makes us pause for thought on two counts. The first one stems from this region's geopolitical situation. In our area, which is in the primary earthquake zone, this system could be rather risky. On the other hand, costs are higher for us. The fact that housing projects have to be completed within a short period of time puts a financing burden on collective housing cooperatives which have to work with the credit system. That is why we prefer the classical construction technique.

DUNYA: Esteemed Nisli, in what way will resorting to building collective housing contribute to urbanization?

NISLI: Because of rapid urbanization Turkey has developed anomalously. In the past uniform regulations and also alienation with regard to housing and its environment led to widespread unplanned urbanization. Urbanization took place without any thought for problems such as community structures or green areas. But in collective housing projects elaborated through cooperatives and cooperative associations, planners and architects are aiming at achieving a healthier environment and better living conditions.

In such projects all community structures are started together with housing construction, and when the project is completed a modern city with all its structures emerges.

DUNYA: Can you tell us about the evolution of the Koop project from its foundation to the present day?

NISLI: Ege-Koop was officially founded on 7 March 1984 and began its activities. At the beginning, instead of the 2,000 members projected in the light of feasibility studies, within so short a period as 21 days we were faced with a demand for 11,000 memberships. Close to 10,000 of those have been implemented. And the Ege Urban Housing Creation and Building Cooperatives Association's project, by having been able to complete the foundations in such a short period as 6 months, earned the title of Turkey's and maybe the world's fastest project. In generating housing the views and wishes of two or more members belonging to a block were also taken into consideration, thus implementing an important factor called "Project Democracy" with regard to neighborhood ties, roads, car parks, green areas, children's playgrounds and sports structures, which were included in the block in a well planned and equitable manner. At this point we have 40 cooperatives. Obtaining land, which has been the greatest problem in generating collective housing, was no problem for us since we work in association with local authorities. From August 1984 to the present 7 final projects out of our preliminary schemes have been completed and at least 13 of the cooperatives belonging to our association are ready to apply to the municipality for permits to dig foundations. And we are proceeding with the construction of the 230 housing units whose foundations were begun on 29 September.

12278
CSO: 3554/62

FUTURE ENERGY SHORTFALL EXPECTED FROM DECREASED LIGNITE PRODUCTION

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 8 Dec 84 p 7

/Excerpts/ Two large Public Power Corporation /DEI/ units--300 MW each--at Ptolemais and Amyndaion are expected to cease operating (in 1986-87 the first and in 1987 and the first 6 months of 1988 the second) as a result of large lignite deficits the two stations will face.

According to estimates the drop in lignite production in the Ptolemais area mines during the 1986-88 3-year period will reach 13 million tons. How to cover this drop has not yet been determined. Thus, due to these deficits for the above 3-year period a 300 MW unit in Agios Dimitrios of Ptolemais will not be able to operate because of the following reasons:

a. Up to 31 October 1984 the lignite production in the Ptolemais area reached 19,880 million tons and is expected to reach 24 million tons by the end of the year, compared to the June 1984 estimates for a production of 25,033 million tons.

b. The 1985 lignite production in the same region cannot exceed 28 million tons, while the needs for that year will be 29.5 million tons (the needs are less than normal because of losses suffered by the fifth unit of the Ptolemais Electric Power Station /AIS/, the first Agios Dimitrios unit, and because it has been decided to maintain I and II AIS units in Kardia. Thus, there will be no lignite in the yards of the AIS in Ptolemais.

According to DEI Federation of Greek Miners /OME/ the long-term program in Ptolemais is impossible to determine at this time because it is not known when PYRKAL /expansion unknown/ will construct and deliver the first conveyor belts and loading machines for the Notion Pedion mine. (Also, no decision has been taken about the disposal of the Kardia Pedion equipment when its unit ends operations in 1990.)

On the other hand, the studies about the other critical issues of the Ptolemais lignite center have not advanced at all and there will be a delay of 1 year.

The Amyntaion Center

According to OME-DEI data, there are important delays in the Amyntaion area (estimated at 3 years) due to the delay in the delivery of the conveyor belts and loading machines. Thus, three large bulldozers to be delivered in 1985 will remain idle until the end of 1987 due to the lack of this equipment. The economic losses will be about 12 billion drachmas. As a result, these delays will cause a deficit in the production of lignite which in 1987 and the first 6 months of 1988 will reach 5 billion tons--3.7 million tons in 1987 and 1.5 million tons in the first 6 months of 1988. These deficits will render inoperable one of the two Amyntaion AIS units.

7520
CSO: 3521/109

SEARCH FOR OIL ON GOTLAND EXPANDED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jan 85 p 11

[Text] The search for oil on Gotland will continue in 1985. Ten to fifteen new holes will be drilled in the area in the north-eastern part of the island where the present production takes place.

In the fall seven oil-prospecting holes were drilled, in four of which traces of oil were found. No new finds were made, however, which it would be profitable to exploit. However, these finds and new seismic measurements that have been made have provided reasonable basis for further exploration.

Two Million

Today, oil is produced from 28 holes in 14 deposits. Between 50 and 60 cubic meters of oil are pumped up each day, and the annual profits are approximately 2 million kroner.

Sixty-Three Percent

It is Opab [the Oil Exploration Company], which is owned for 63 percent by the state, which has the franchise for the oil on Gotland. The production and the exploration, however, are undertaken by SP Exploration, which is a subsidiary of Svenska Petroleum [Swedish Petroleum]. Other participants in Opab are, among others, Aga, Boliden, Granges, Sydkraft.

The total turnover of Opab is approximately 17 million kronor. The quality of the Gotland oil is high and on a level with the oil produced in the North Sea.

7262
CSO: 3659/121

IS BANKASI SALE OF KEBAN DAM REVENUE SHARING BONDS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 26 Dec 84 p 9

[Text] It has been announced that after the Bosphorus Bridge revenue sharing bonds, revenue sharing bonds for the Keban Dam will be put up for sale at the Is Bank branches from 7 January 1985. The relevant agreement between the Is Bank, the Public Enterprise and the Housing Fund Directorate was signed on the evening before last.

The Keban Dam revenue sharing bonds which will be put up for sale on 7 January 1985 will be of the (A) and (B) types. The (A) type bonds, worth 20 billion Turkish liras, will mature in 3 years while the (B) type bonds will mature in 5 years. It has been decided to issue the same number of bonds for both types. Accordingly bonds of the (A) and (B) type will be sold to the public in the form of 100,000 certificates worth 50,000.00 Turkish liras, 70,000 certificates worth 100,000.00 Turkish liras, 10,000 certificates worth 500,000.00 Turkish liras and 3,000 certificates worth 1 million Turkish liras.

It has been pointed out that the annual revenue of type (A) bond owners will increase by 11.5% within three years while the annual revenue of type (B) bond owners will increase steadily in the years to come and that their average net annual income will be in the vicinity of 50%.

The Keban Dam revenue sharing bonds will be made out to the bearer and will be bought and sold freely. The revenues will be totally tax exempt and a single individual will not be entitled to purchase more than 10 million Turkish liras worth of bonds.

Payments of revenue shares will be effected every six months at the Is Bank branches and payment dates will be announced each time. Bond owners will be able to convert their bonds into money, reflecting any appreciation in value to be calculated by the bank, at any branch and at any time. Citizens residing abroad will be able to purchase bonds by paying for them out of their accounts at the Is Bank or by sending money orders in foreign currency.

According to the information obtained, at present the Keban Dam generates 6 million kilowatt-hours. The cost of the electricity generated is 12 Turkish liras today. While a 50% net profit was foreseen on the bonds, the Keban Dam's annual production was still calculated as 6 million kilowatt-hours.

Administrators of the Public Enterprise Fund to whose knowledge we resorted stated that:

"We don't expect the price of electricity to go up to even 19 or 20 Turkish liras; according to our calculations by the end of the second year the price of electricity should rise no higher than 18 Turkish liras. Even if it rises to 18 Turkish liras, according to our calculations it seems certain that the profit sharing bonds should yield a net 50% which will be distributed."

12278
CSO: 3554/62

LARGEST EVER NORWEGIAN ANTARCTICA EXPEDITION STARTS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Dec 84 p 40

[Article by Torill Nordeng]

[Text] The Norwegian Coast Guard will make history when the coast guard ship "Andenes" moves out of Oslo Fjord today on its way to Antarctica. The ship is on a civilian operation for the Norwegian Polar Institute in Norway's biggest scientific expedition in the Weddell Sea. On Friday afternoon King Olav inspected the vessel and the 42-man crew and wished them a good voyage. The ship's commanding officer, Captain Torstein Myhre, said that both officers and crew members stood in line for a chance to make the trip.

"We have a crew member on board who voluntarily extended his conscription period by 3 months in order to come along. A lieutenant was also willing to be reduced in rank so he could participate as a seaman, but there was not room enough for him," Myhre said.

Commodore Magnus Stene, coast guard inspector, wanted to stress the point that the 4-month voyage the "Andenes" is now embarking on will give the coast guard extremely valuable experience in operating in polar waters. The ship will have put 25,000 nautical miles behind it when it returns to Norway at the end of March. In the Weddell Sea off Antarctica the ship will function as a floating research platform for 13 scientists, surrounded on all sides by icebergs. From the ship 15 scientists will be flown in to Queen Maud's Land. Two camps will be set up there, one of them 200 kilometers from the ice barrier. Two Finnish-owned helicopters from Helicopter Service in Stavanger, piloted by Gabriel Gaard and Paul Ellingsen, will perform this job. "Flying a helicopter in Antarctica is a job that requires a lot of caution. Pilots have only a white mass below them without contours," said the leader of the expedition, glaciologist Olav Orheim of the Norwegian Polar Institute. One of the camps, which has been named Camp Norway 5, will be established at the outer limit of the distance that is practical to reach by helicopter and snowmobile. It is estimated that it will take 4 tons of fuel to get the men and their equipment in place.

Orheim did not want to ignore the fact that it takes a lot of careful and thorough planning when one is conducting research projects in the world's most

inaccessible area. "It can be dangerous to encounter difficult drift ice. But with a ship as large as the coast guard ship 'Andenes,' with the most advanced navigational equipment on board and with every opportunity to get weather and ice warnings at all times, we have nothing to fear from being in the Antarctic," he said.

Orheim has taken part in 11 previous Antarctic expeditions. His special field is iceberg research and he says that sometime in the future it will be realistic to tow these colossal ice blocks up to drought-stricken areas of the world. The ice that covers Antarctica makes up 75 percent of the world's fresh-water reserves.

The director of the Norwegian Polar Institute, Odd Rogne, said at a press conference on board the "Andenes" Friday that 14.5 million kroner have been appropriated in two national budgets for the expedition. He also said that Norwegian Antarctic research since the 1960's has been characterized by a mentality of spasmodic effort. Three summer expeditions were planned at 3 year intervals, Rogne said.

It was also stressed at the press conference that the Norwegian Antarctic activity now has political undertones. Norway was one of the 12 countries signing the treaty on Antarctica on 1 December 1959, exactly 25 years ago. This treaty put all territorial demands on hold but stated that the continent should be accessible to all who wanted to conduct open research there. The area was declared a demilitarized region. In 1991 the treaty could be reviewed for possible revision.

Norway has stressed repeatedly that the treaty acts as a very good tool for protecting the continent. Other nations have brought up the issue of Antarctica in the United Nations General Assembly, asking if the United Nations itself should not take over the administration of the world's seventh continent. Olav Orheim has no reservations about leading a Norwegian scientific expedition that will also show the rest of the world that Norway is looking after its interests in the Antarctic.

Coast Guard Inspector Magnus Stene emphasized that it is entirely justifiable to use one of the coast guard vessels in this kind of context. "Our task is defined by royal resolution as including the granting of support to scientific expeditions," he said.

The coast guard ship "Andenes" will be heading south with a heavy cargo. Loading began in Bergen with the most advanced computer equipment for research. The Norwegian Polar Institute's equipment, including everything from wool socks to snowmobiles, was loaded on board from Sondre Akershus wharf. And the steward on board, Hans Dyroy, said that 15 tons of food has been loaded on the ship.

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DIPLOMAT VIEWS SEABED MINING ISSUES

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 11 Dec 84 p 15

[Article by Erwin H. Hofer, first embassy secretary, Swiss Observer Mission to the United Nations, New York*: "The Future of Seabed Mining; Switzerland and the New Law of the Sea Convention"]

[Text] The New Convention

On December 9 the time period expired during which it was possible to sign the new law of the sea convention. Following about 10 years of discussion, the agreement became reality on December 10, 1982, in Montego Bay, Jamaica. Even during the closing ceremony that took place there, 117 nations signed the text -- probably the greatest number ever attained for concluding a multilateral pact. Henry Kissinger, who himself had offered substantial initiatives in the area of deep sea mining, also described the law of the sea conference as one of the most important negotiating bodies in the history of humanity, one that would have a lasting influence on the political stability and economic well-being of the global community of nations. In the past two years, 34 additional signatures have now been affixed to the document. Admittedly, the agreement has been ratified by only 14 nations, thus leaving it until now well under the limit of 60 that would be required for it to come into force.

Reservations About The Deep Sea Mining Agreement

This underlines the fact that, aside from the impressive quantitative approbation accorded to the convention, those nations which did not sign or which continue to have a number of reservations despite their signature will possess considerable leverage for the pact's future. Such reservations are not directed primarily against the convention itself, which with its comprehensive and balanced character does in fact represent a highly significant achievement of codification. Rather, the doubts are directed at chapter XI of the agreement, which regulates the exploitation of seabed resources beyond the continental shelf. Here the principle of the "common heritage of mankind" serves as a guideline upon which the convention will stand or fall based on the desires of the developing nations and the corresponding legal foundation. This linkage binds at least the formal fate of the entire convention to the legal and economic problems that are characteristic of deep sea mining.

Who Has Reservations?

Specifically, the reservations mentioned are being voiced in those nations which, though they may not have a monopoly, nevertheless possess extensive control of those capital resources and technologies decisive for the start of commercial extraction of raw materials on the seabed. This is most visibly revealed by the structures of those four major multinational consortiums whose research efforts in this area are the most advanced. They are the Kennecott group, Ocean Mining Associates, Ocean Management Incorporated, and Ocean Minerals Company. Firms from the US, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Great Britain, Japan, and the Netherlands are participants in these amalgamations. In addition, there also exist two strictly national companies, the Association française pour l'étude et la recherche des nodules and the Japanese Deep Ocean Resources Development Company.

The United States' Rejection

The four multinational consortiums are all registered in the United States. With the exception of the Kennecott group, American firms also hold at least 50 percent of the shares in the consortiums in each case. These interrelationships emphasize the key position held by the US, which in particular is also a consequence of the fact that the United States possesses the most advanced deep sea mining technology. During the 10 years of negotiations on the law of the sea, the attitude of the United States underwent a profound change which reflected its general shift in direction in foreign and economic policy. Starting from Kissinger's statement quoted above, the US finally came to decisively reject chapter XI of the convention under President Reagan. As cabinet member and representative of the American neoconservative school of thought, Jeanne Kirkpatrick repudiated the new deep sea mining order as an expression of global paternalism that served as a planning instrument for income redistribution. Following the Republican administration's clear victory in the presidential elections on November 6, there are currently no indications that its attitude will noticeably change in the next few years.

The Judicial Policy Controversy

American arguments deal in particular with the mining system's judicial policy dimension. Chapter XI of the convention does in fact exhibit revolutionary traits in comparison to the traditional law of the sea. For the first time since acceptance of the principle of freedom of the high seas as advocated by Hugo Grotius in the 17th century in his polemic "Mare liberum," a global codification contains the rule that the resources of an area outside national zones of jurisdiction are removed from the individual disposal of specific countries and are to be viewed as property of the entire community of nations. The basis of this is the idea, compelling of itself, that in an age of extraordinarily close economic and political interdependence the utilization of previously stateless areas can no longer be abandoned merely to the discretion of individual countries, but that the interest of all the remaining nations are to be accorded due consideration.

As a minimal framework, for example, regulations regarding the management of overlapping mining zones and protection of the ocean environment during raw material extraction are needed. Viewed on a worldwide scale, agreement does indeed exist as to the fact that universal regulation of the deep seas is necessary. Part XI of the convention, however, has broadly extended the idea of joint, overriding interests, thereby causing a polarizing judicial policy dispute that stands in the way of the treaty's global recognition.

No International Seabed Authority As Yet

In the meantime, the principle of "common heritage", and with it the principle of the collective ownership of raw materials located on the seabed, is relegated, at least temporarily, to the realm of "soft laws," while de lege lata the principle of freedom on the high seas continues to be valid. For this reason, the planned institutional arm of chapter XI, the International Seabed Authority, also has no effective legal foundation at present. The authority would of course exercise broad powers extending from general control and coordination of member nations' deep sea activities to detailed administrative duties. The individual nations would no longer be able to assert their desires outside of the framework of the authority's complex decisionmaking mechanisms, but only within it. These mechanisms often take the form of very ingenious compromises in order to satisfy a variety of interests.

Compulsory Transfer of Know-How to the "Enterprise"?

Of necessity, the operational core of the "common heritage" -- the so-called parallel system -- will therefore also not be put into practice for the time being. According to this system, the authority's entrepreneurial organ, the enterprise, would extract raw materials in a parallel manner to private or state-owned deep sea mining companies. At the same time, the functional ability of the enterprise would of course depend on the technology that private firms would supply to it. Under certain conditions, the enterprise might therefore find itself compelled to resort to a kind of compulsory transfer of technology -- a transfer, which not only the enterprise, but also consortiums from developing countries could take advantage of. This aspect of part XI caused doubts in countries at an advanced technological level because companies with large research investments run the risk of being able to claim for themselves the fruits of massive capital expenditures to only an insufficient degree.

Not In This Century

In addition to the judicial policy dimension, we must consider the economic aspects which are of decisive importance for the future of deep sea mining. The common heritage principle, with its inner relationship to the demands for a "New International Economic Order," came to the fore precisely because exploitable deposits of potato-sized metallic lumps, or nodules, containing primarily copper, nickel, cobalt, and manganese were discovered in certain deep sea areas, especially in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone south of Hawaii

and, to a lesser extent, in the Indian Ocean. Given a projection of the often extraordinarily steep growth in consumption of these metals since the Second World War and an optimistic appraisal of technological development in the field of methods for their extraction, during the 1970s the widely held opinion was that the start of commercial raw materials extraction from deep sea mining was soon to take place. At that time, the end of the current decade was eyed as a time framework. Based on this assumption, in its final phase between 1980 and 1982 the law of the sea conference was faced with real time pressures. Today, however, the picture looks quite different. As a rough estimate not based on definitive data, a time period of 20 to 30 years is mentioned -- meaning that commercial deep sea mining will hardly be realized in this century.

The Decline In Consumption -- More "Land" Reserves

This decisive shift can be traced to the raw materials markets and to the high cost of mining on the high seas. As to the supply situation, in the case of copper one can observe a marked decline in consumption since 1979. Copper prices fell in 1982 to their lowest real level since the Second World War. Exploitable continental reserves might still be sufficient for the next 60 years. Additional resources could stretch this limit to as many as 160 years. A noticeable decline in the use of nickel was likewise recorded. Continental reserves will meet expected demand for at least another 75 years. Taken of itself, cobalt would be relatively well-suited for deep sea mining. Yet because of increasing substitution possibilities, such as in the aircraft industry, and extensive land reserves lasting an additional 100 years, here, too, the possible start of commercial use has shifted. Land reserves of manganese are likewise sufficient for well over 100 years.

Not Yet Competitive

In view of this situation, deep-sea mining must become extremely cost-effective if it is to be at all competitive. This requirement has until now not yet been fulfilled, however. An estimated investment of more than 1.1 billion dollars is needed just for the development of a single minehead. Moreover, no definite extraction technology -- such as the suction process -- has met with definitive success. These problems naturally also result in significant consequences for the described institutional and operational aspects of the "common heritage." In particular, today, at least, it is not yet clear to what extent the profit margins from raw materials mining on the seabed would suffice for financing the full cost of the authority and the enterprise with their mechanisms for managing production and diverting earnings to benefit the developing countries.

In addition to the laws of the market, we should examine yet another economic aspect which is of great potential importance, but whose precise significance can at present not be determined. What is meant are the metalliferous sulfur deposits located in geologically active areas in the deep sea along about 72,000 km in the earth's crustal system. At numerous points in this system, masses of sulfur with a high content of zinc, copper, lead, silver, and gold

flow out of crater-like formations onto the seabed, there forming so-called polymetallic sulfide deposits, as the customary technical term would have it, or PMS for short. Awareness of the importance of these deposits only developed during the final phase of the law of the sea conference when the convention had already been written largely to reflect the nodule phenomenon. Hence, should the outlines for a commercial use of PMS become visible, which at present is still in no way certain, then chapter XI would be in need of a multitude of amendments. In addition, the deposits having the greatest concentration of metal are for the most part located within the continental shelf. This of course decreases the inclination of the respective coastal nations, above all the United States, for instance, to take their place within the limitations of the "common heritage."

Early Codification Is Advisable

If one combines the judicial policy dimension of deep-sea mining with the economic aspects already described, the question could easily arise as to whether it made any sense at all to provide this complex situation with a legal backing as early as the present time. This question can definitely be answered in the affirmative. First, in the case of the nodules, and leaving aside the PMS, amounts are at stake which at the beginning of the 1980s were estimated to be equal to about 6 trillion Swiss francs. Second, very different timeframes predominate in the field of mining than in other areas of the economy. Planning and investment considerations are ahead of respective market conditions by two to four decades. We therefore currently find ourselves in a critical phase, about which Kissinger's words as mentioned at the beginning are entirely applicable -- for it is indeed a matter of creating the preconditions needed for a subsequent order having great political and economic significance.

Initial Agreements and the Distribution of Mining Zones

The fact that international efforts at codification are in themselves very timely is illustrated, among other things, by the number of nations which already have national laws regarding the granting of deep-sea exploration licenses to private companies. This is true for the US, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, for example. It is especially noteworthy that the four major multinational and the two national consortiums have already reached agreement in negotiations concerning the distribution of mining zones, in particular, in the Clarion-Clipperton region. Based on this agreement, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the US signed a pact in Geneva on August 3, 1984, in which these nations promised to grant no licenses until they had determined that the zone awarded to the applicant did not overlap the area of a different consortium that had submitted its request to one of the other parties to the pact.

Steps Toward Formation of a Dual System

The civil law agreement among the consortiums as well as the international pact among the eight nations reveal new perspectives for deep sea mining. On

the one hand, the final document passed in Montego Bay specifies that the consortiums must settle potential conflicts regarding overlapping zones prior to submitting licenses. This kind of peaceful conflict resolution is therefore entirely in the interest of the convention. On the other hand, it is striking that the nation which de facto is the most important one still remaining beyond the bounds of the new treaty -- the United States -- is a major participant in the Geneva agreement. Here one sees at least the possibility that an entirely different parallel system than the one specified by the convention will develop -- that is, a dual system consisting of nations belonging to the convention and of countries which would conduct deep-sea mining operations based on the principle of freedom of the high seas -- whereby individual nations such as, say, Japan and France would be involved in both systems by reason of their signing of the convention.

At present, it is still by no means clear whether, and to what extent, such a scenario will become reality. Should such a development appear to be in the offing, however, then its cause would lie in the fact that the law of the sea convention, at least until now, has been incapable of creating a universal common ground. The resulting possibility cannot be overlooked: broad extension of the concept of the "common interest of mankind" might then -- at least in individual mining zones -- bring about just the opposite of that actually intended by the treaty, namely, the exploitation of raw materials deposits under the exclusive aegis of the traditional industrialized mining nations.

The Swiss Viewpoint

Switzerland is observing the developments described here primarily on the basis of three aspects: First, the country's general foreign policy goals are involved; second, from the standpoint of its special interests and situation as a land-locked nation; and third, from the standpoint of its attitude regarding the issue of deep-sea mining. As far as the first point is concerned, from the Swiss viewpoint there exists the necessity of creating a universal law of the sea system, including the deep sea. Such a system should not be used as a political instrument for or against certain nations, rather it should be used specifically on behalf of the criteria of legal certainty and universality. One can therefore only hope that a return to a global consensus will be possible at a later point in time.

Second, Switzerland has a substantial interest in the new law of the sea convention because, among other reasons, it puts the land-locked countries in a better position than the high seas agreement of 1958. This is also especially advantageous to the Swiss ocean-going fleet -- a fleet which our country of course maintains for important reasons of national security policy.

Third, it is beyond doubt that the Swiss economy will not play any leading role on an international level in the field of deep-sea mining. On the other hand, however, various companies within our country come into consideration as suppliers of technology for this new method of obtaining raw materials. The far-reaching stipulations contained in part XI gave rise to corresponding doubts for this reason also.

Switzerland's tangible policy in regard to the law of the sea can be derived from these three factors: the country always assumed a positive attitude towards the treaty as such. For this reason, it decided, despite its critical attitude toward certain sections of chapter XI, to sign the document, which was done on October 17, 1984. This decision serves to protect the country's major interests in the remaining parts of the agreement. It also takes account of general political and economic events, as dealt with here, in the field of deep sea mining. On the basis of this step, our country can now take its place as a member of the preparatory commission whose task it is to clarify the general provisions of part XI of the convention by means of administrative regulations. The work carried out by this body, which until now has convened alternately in Geneva and in Kingston, Jamaica, sets the stage for certain possibilities for taking a further step towards the final goal, which is the universality of a new deep sea system.

*This report is an expression of the author's personal opinion and should not be viewed as the author's position as a member of the Swiss Diplomatic Service.

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EFFECTS OF ACID RAIN SPREADING INTO CENTRAL FINLAND

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Nov 84 p 10

[Article: "Effects of Acid Rain Already Spread Into Central Finland"]

[Text] Jyvaskyla--The effects of acid rain are already spreading into the province of Central Finland and possibly the province of Vaasa as well, it is revealed in a Jyvaskyla University study which has been done by assistant professor Tapani Valtonen, special lecturer Tellervo Valtonen and laboratory technician Pekka Kaunismaa.

The acidity of the water in Pylkonmaki's Kiminginjarvi is already below pH 5, which has caused schools of dace in particular among the lake's fishes to seek better water on the shores. The dace, which reacts sensitively to changes, does not tolerate a sudden increase in acidity.

The fish deaths which have occurred in Ahtari's Niemisvesi and Moksunjarvi are more difficult to explain than in Kiminginjarvi. Valtonen said that the aluminum content of the waters in Ahtari is exceptionally high; on the other hand, the pH value is normal.

The water administration is also investigating Niemisvesi and Moksunjarvi. Numerous theories are advanced to account for the fish deaths. Blasting, fish diseases and acid rain are thought to be the reasons.

According to Valtonen, acid rain alone has not caused the new condition in the lakes; an unusually large amount of rain and abundant area draining are necessary for it. A 10-year development may be behind it. The critical limit has only now been crossed, and the consequences can be perceived clearly.

He held that the acid rain originates mostly in Central Europe and the Nordic countries due to the west and southwest winds. Acid rain also comes from the southeast.

Valtonen considers the effects of Finland's own industry very slight.

According to Valtonen, fish deaths caused by acid rain have occurred in several dozen small lakes of South Finland, but the Kiminginjarvi observations are the first in Central Finland.

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